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During the Ming period (1368-1644), the emergence of the doctrines of Ch'en
Hsien-chang (1428-1500) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), which are close to the
Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-93) School of Mind, played a revolutionary role in
challenging the Chu Hsi (1130-1200) School's orthodoxy and dominant role in the
academic community. Their teachings caused a paradigm-shift among
Neo-Confucians.
Liu Tsung-chou (1578-1645) is considered a great Neo-Confucian master.
Living in the late Ming period, Liu was intimately immersed in the paradigm of the
School of Mind. His intellectual career was devoted in the main to philosophical
reconsideration of the doctrines propounded by Ch'en Hsien-chang, Wang
Yang-ming, and Wang's followers. Liu expressed his creative ideas regarding
Neo-Confucianism through these reconsiderations and played an important role in
the intellectual transition in the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing.
Firstly, as a background to Liu Tsung-chou's thought, this study documents the
reemergence of the School of Mind in the early Ming. It describes Ch'en
Hsien-chang's teaching of sitting in meditation and his doctrine of emphasizing
tranquillity. The development of the School of Mind in the middle Ming is explicated
by way of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge. The
factionalization of the School of Mind in late Ming is documented through a study of
the doctrines propounded by Wang Yang-ming's followers. Secondly, Liu
Tsung-chou's family background, early life, political career, and intellectual
achievement are introduced. Finally, Liu's contribution to the reconsideration of the
doctrine of Mind in Ming Neo-Confucianism are investigated through a systematic
study of his views on the existing schools. With reference to Ch'en Hsien-chang's
doctrine, I will discuss the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the teaching of
sitting in meditation in the Ch'en Hsien-chang School; the arguments regarding them
in the Wang Yang-ming School; and Liu's views on them. With reference to Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine, I will discuss Liu's changing attitudes toward Wang's doctrine;
the two men's different attitudes towards overcoming selfish human desires and
extensive learning; and the difference between Wang and Liu on the correct
interpretation of the Great Learning. In my investigation of Liu's reconsideration of
the doctrines promoted by Wang Yang-ming's followers, I will discuss Liu's sense of
the degeneration of Wang's followers; the debates on Wang's "Four Sentences of
Teaching"; Liu's criticism of Wang's "Four Sentences of Teaching" and the debates
on it; Liu's criticism of the moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's followers;
iii
and Liu's scheme of moral reformation of his time.
The study will conclude with an assessment of the impact of Liu's
reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism and its influence in the period from late
Ming to early Ch'ing.
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Modern scholars of the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing consider that a
pivotal intellectual transition took place this period. This transition is described in at
least four different ways. First, it is considered as the change from Neo-Confucianism
to anti-Neo-Confucianism.1 Secondly, it is considered a change of intellectual
climate from the studies of moral principle to those of "practical statemanship"
(ching-shih chih-yung chih hsiieh and evidential studies (k'ao-chii
chih hsiieh also known as "practical learning" (shih-hsiieh Jflp).4
Thirdly, it is considered the switch from the pursuit of the learning of "honouring the
moral nature" (tsun te hsing and the "knowledge of moral nature" (te hsing
chih chih to the pursuit of the learning of "following the path of inquiry
1 See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao Ch'ing-tai lisiieh-shu kai-lun [Intellectual trends in
the Ch'ing period] (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1985), p. 6; Wing-tsit Chan, "The materialism
of Wang Fu-chih," in Wing-tsit Chan, comp. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (hereafter
abbreviated as Source Book) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 692; Hou Wai-lu
JM, et al., Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang shih-kang [An outline of history of Chinese thought]
(Taipei: Wu-nan t'u-shu ch'u-pan yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1993), p. 372.
2 See Hsieh Kuo-chen HfSfi, "Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u te hsiieh-feng" [The
intellectual climate in late Ming and early Ch'ing], in Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u te
hsiieh-feng [The intellectual climate in late Ming and early Ch'ing] (Shanghai:
Shanghai shu-t'ien ch'u-pan she, 2004), pp. 36-7; Yamonoi Yu [JLiiff'/Jt, Min Shin shisoshi no kenkyu
[Studies of the intellectual history of Ming and Ch'ing] (Tokyo: Tokyo
University Press, 1980), pp. 223-38.
3 See Hsieh Kuo-chen, op. cit., pp. 37-8; Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology:
Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East
Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984).
4 See Ke Jung-chin M'MW, Chung-kuo shih-hsiieh ssu-hsiang shih 1j1 S[History of
Chinese practical learning] (Peking: Shou-tu shih-fan ta-hsiieh ch'u-pan she, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 1-13;
Chung-ying Ch'eng, "Practical learning in Yen Yuan, Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming", in Wm.
Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and
Practical Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 39-45; Irene Bloom, "On the
'abstraction' of Ming thought: some concrete evidence from the philosophy of Lo Ch'in-shun", in Wm.
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and study" (tao wen hsiieh and the "knowledge of hearing and seeing" (wen
chien chih chih Fourthly, it is considered a progression from a
pre-modern to a modern age with the emergence of individualism and liberalism.6
Although these studies differ in emphasis they all confirm the notion of transition.
Living in the late Ming, Liu Tsung-chou [Chi-shan j|§[JL[, Nien-t'ai ,
1578-1645] is a good example of a transitional figure.
n
Liu Tsung-chou is considered the last master of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism.
It is probably for this reason that most of the modern studies of Liu Tsung-chou
concentrate on interpreting his creative thinking on Neo-Confucian philosophy, such
as his doctrines of "being vigilant in solitude" (shen tu 'fjl®) and "making the will
Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., op. cit., pp. 69-70.
5 See Yii Ying-shih "Ch'ing-tai hsiieh-shu ssu-hsiang shih chung-yao kuan-nien t'ung-shih"?jf
1Lfpfliill£i?SH;MW- [Interpretations of some important ideas in Ch'ing intellectual history],
in Yii Ying-shih, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang ch'uan-t'ung te hsien-tai ch'uan-shih.dp8]
[Modern interpretations of Chinese intellectual tradition] (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh
kung-ssu, 1987), pp. 405-86.
6 See Hou Wai-lu fii:7f]ls, Chao Chi-pin /Ofrifri and Tu Kuo-hsiang LtlSIPPh Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang
t'ung-shih itiMSfcl. [A comprehensive history of Chinese thought] (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan
she, 1960), vol. 5, pp. 27-9; Shimada Kenji Chiigoku ni okeru kindai shii no zasetsu cpSS
(C 43 (t -5 ®'Iff [The frustration of modern thought in China] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo,
1949; reissue, 1970), pp. 230-83; Goto Motomi and Yamanoi Yu eds., Minmatsu
Shinsho seiji hyoron shu [A collected essays of political criticisms of the
period of late Ming and early Ch'ing] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1971), pp. 409-11; Wm. Theodore de Bary,
"Individualism and Humanism in Late Ming", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., Selfand Society in Ming
Thought, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 145-248.
7 See Mou Tsung-san Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan [From
Lu Hsiang-shan to Liu Chi-shan] (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chii, 1979), p. 458; Lao Ssu-kuang [Lao
Sze-kwang] STd, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih [A history of Chinese philosophy]
(Hong Kong: Union Press, 1980), vol. 3b, p. 683; Liu Shu-hsien Huang Tsung-hsi te
hsin-hsiieh ting-wei [Huang Tsung-hsi's role in the School of Mind] (Taipei:
Yiin-ch'en wen-hua shih-yeh ku-fen yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1986), p. 2; Tungfang Shuo ^7?^ and Tu
Wei-ming Tu Wei-ming hsiieh-shu chuan-t'i fang-t'an lu: Tsung-chou che-hsiieh chih
ching-shen yii ju-chia wen-hua chih wei-lai
[Interviews with Tu Wei-ming on an academic topic: the philosophy of Liu Tsung-chou and
the future of Confucian culture] (Shanghai: Futan University Press, 2001), p. 22.
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sincere" (ch'eng i BfScjjp.8 Some of them, following Mou Tsung-san's
suggestion, agree that Liu Tsung-chou's doctrines can be characterized as
reformulating Wang Yang-ming's 3E|i§Bfj [Shou-jen ^ffY, 1472-1529] "explicit
teaching" (hsien-chiao MMO °f the mind in the spirit of the "esoteric teaching"
(mi-chiao WlWO of "being vigilant in solitude".9 Although this statement is right in
depicting the basic character of Liu's philosophy, there is another aspect which
merits further study, that is, the relation of his philosophy to the intellectual transition
in late Ming and early Ch'ing.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao points out that Liu represented the end of an era
because of his criticism of Wang Yang-ming's followers. Liu forsook empty talk,
which was popular in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's followers, for practical
self-cultivation, in an anticipation of the practical learning of Ch'ing scholarship.10
Ch'ien Mu iSfJl and Hsieh Kuo-chen HflUM observe that Liu's idea of human
8 See Okada Takehito [SJEEIjO Ydmei to Minmatsu no Jugaku t. P [Wang
Yang-ming and late Ming Confucianism] (Tokyo: Meitoku, 1970), pp. 439-62; T'ang Chiin-i, "Liu
Tsung-chou's doctrine of moral mind and practice and his critique of Wang Yang-ming," in Wm.
Theodore de Bary et al. eds., The Unfolding ofNeo-Confucianism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975), pp. 305-32; Mou Tsung-san, op. cit., pp. 451-541; Lao Ssu-kuang, op. cit., pp. 608-82;
Tu Wei-ming, "Subjectivity in Liu Tsung-chou's philosophical anthropology", in Tu Wei-ming, Way,
Learning and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1993), pp. 93-116; Wong, Simon Man-ho [Huang Min-hao], Liu Tsung-chou: His Doctrine of
Vigilant Solitude (PhD dissertation of Department of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, 1996);
Tungfang Shuo Liu Tsung-chou p'ing chuan [A critical biography of Liu
Tsung-chou] (Nanking: Nanking University Press, 1998); Cheng Tsung-i Ming Ch'ing
ju-hsiieh chuan-hsing t'an-hsi: ts'ung Liu Chi-shan tao Tai Tung-yiian BJ]jff ■ f/tS'JflS
[ilSlflcSiJtrt [The transformation of Confucianism between Ming and Ch'ing dynasty: from Liu
Chi-shan to Tai Tung-yuan] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000), pp. 41-68; Huang
Min-hao [Wong , Simon Man-ho] MMkia, Liu Tsung-chou chi ch'i shen-tu che-hsiieh
[Liu Tsung-chou and his philosophy of "being vigilant in solitude"] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng
shu-chii, 2001).
0 See Mou Tsung-san, op. cit., pp. 451-7; Tu Wei-ming, op. cit., p. 106; Tungfang Shuo and Tu
Wei-ming, op. cit., p. 102; Cheng Tsung-i, op. cit., pp. 45-57; Huang Min-hao, Liu Tsung-chou chi
ch 'i shen-tu che-hsiieh, pp. 232-4.
10
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien lisiieh-shu shih [fJjfc [A
3
nature, which regards it as nothing but physical nature, is close to many Ch'ing
scholars, such as Wang Fu-chih [Ch'uan-shan j^p[_L(, 1619-1692], Yen Yuan
IMtC [Hsi-chai 1635-1704], andTai Chen MM [Tung-yuan jfllfU 1723-77].11
Cheng Tsung-i even regards Liu Tsung-chou as being involved in the current
12of anti-Neo-Confucianism. Some recent studies also regard Liu's contributions as
so-called "practical learning".13
Two of Liu's disciples, Huang Tsung-hsi TPtTKfji [Li-chou 1610-95] and
Ch'en Ch'iieh [Ch'ien-ch'u 1604-77], are regarded as the leading masters
of new intellectual trends in the early Ch'ing. Huang is regarded as a representative
of both the new trends of practical statemenship14 and evidential studies.15 Ch'en is
regarded as a representative of the new trend of anti-Neo-Confucianism.16 Hsieh
history of Chinese scholarship in the last three hundred years] (Taipei: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1956), p.
7.
11 Ch'ien Mu £§fj|, Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsiieh-shu shih 41HTf7iL[4^^ f^T [A history of
Chinese scholarship in the last three hundred years] (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1987), p. 24;
Hsieh Kuo-chen Itflllfjl, Huang Li-chou hsiieh-p'u [An intellectual biography of Huang
Tsung-hsi] (Taipei:Taiwan Commercial Press, 1967), p. 34. Ch'en Lai also emphasizes that
Liu's idea of human nature as nothing but physical nature is different from many of his Neo-Confucian
forerunners. See Ch'en Lai, Sung Ming li-hsiieh [Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism] (Taipei:
Hung-yeh wen-hua shih-yeh yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1994), pp. 390-3.
12
Cheng Tsung-i, op. cit., p. 153.
13 See Ch'en Sheng-yung PjfbplJJpl, "Pu t'ien chih shih: Liu Tsung-chou Chung-hsing chin-chien lu
yen-chiu" H'JzHjn[A study of Liu Tsung-chou's "Chung-hsing chin-chien
lu"], in Chung Ts'ai-chiin MEEtT ed., Liu Chi-shan hsiieh-shu shih-hsian lun-chi if]jf£fLllpffl
[The symposia essays on Liu Tsung-chou's thought] (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and
Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 1998), pp. 409-32; Chan Hai-yun MMS, "Liu Tsung-chou te shih
hsiieh" [Liu Tsung-chou's practical learning], in ibid., pp. 433-56.
14 See Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Introduction", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, tran., Waiting for the Dawn:
a plan for the prince (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 63; Wu Kuang "Huang
Tsung-hsi yii Ch'ing-tai hsiieh-shu" [Huang Tsung-hsi and Ch'ing scholarship],
in Wu Kuang Ju Tao lun-shu fflMfitiM [Essays on Confucianism and Taoism] (Taipei: Tung-ta
tu-shu ku-fen yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1994), p. 230.
15 See Ch'ien Mu, op. cit., p. 31; Liu Shu-hsien MEETc, Huang Tsung-hsi te hsin-hsiieh ting-wei tpItk
[Huang Tsung-hsi's role in the School of Mind] (Taipei: Yiin-ch'en wen-hua shih-yeh
ku-fen yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1986), p. 176.
16 See Hou Wai-lu et al., Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih, vol. 5, pp. 191-8; Cheng Tsung-i, op. cit.,
pp. 189-223.
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Kuo-chen and Liu Shu-hsien §PJjJfk7fe generally agree that Liu's doctrine exerted a
great influence on Huang.17 Ch'ien Mu points out that Huang's endeavouring to
learn how to "exhaust the myriad differences of the myriad things", rather than
pursuing a one-for-all principle, was influenced by Liu.18 Chin Kuan-t'ao
and Liu Ch'ing-feng maintain that Huang's switch from the study of moral
principle to that of statecraft was inspired by Liu's monistic philosophy, which holds
that "what fills Heaven and Earth is ch'i H, (pneuma)."19 Wm. Theodore de Bary
also shows that Huang reaffirmed Liu's emphasis on the ruler's need to share power
with his ministers in his discussion of ministership and went beyond it to
institutionalize dissent in the school.20 There are fewer studies on Ch'en Ch'tieh than
on Huang Tsung-hsi,21 but most of them confirm that Liu inspired Ch'en's criticism
of the Great Learning, in which he exposed his position of anti-Neo-Confucianism.22
Lastly, in his series of essays on the intellectual transition in the period from late
Ming to early Ch'ing, Wang Fan-sen listed Liu Tsung-chou's influence on
many intellectual trends of this period.23
17 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Huang Li-chou hsiieh-p'u, pp. 24-8; Liu Shu-hsien, op. cit., pp. 1-29.
18 Ch'ien MutifJl, Sung Ming li-hsiieh kai-shu [A general introduction of Sung-Ming
Neo-Confucianism] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng shu-chii, 1977), pp. 434-5.
19 Chin Kuan-t'ao and Liu Ch'ing-feng SUWtt. Chung-kuo hsien-tai ssu-hsiang te ch'i-yiian
[The origin of modern Chinese Thought] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University
Press, 2000), p. 189.
20 Wm. Theodore de Bary, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, p. 184.
21 See Cheng Tsung-i, op. cit., p. 189.
22 Chan Hai-yiin W'MS, Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u Ta-hsiieh p'ien yen-chiu [A study
of Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u's Ta-hsiieh p'ien] (Taipei: Ming-wen shu-chii, 1986), pp. 53-8; Teng Li-kuang
Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u yen-chiu [A study of Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u] (Taipei: Wen-chin
ch'u-pan she, 1992), pp. 103-6; pp. 130-1; Cheng Tsung-i, op. cit., p. 196.
23 See Wang Fan-sen zE'ifL^S, "Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u te jen-p'u yii hsing-kuo-hui"
JSJlltiljllt" [The rise of the society for reflection on faults in the late Ming and early Ch'ing], Bulletin
of The Institute ofHistory and Philology, Academia Sinica, vol. 63, Part 3 (July 1993), pp. 679-712;
"Hsin chi li shuo te tung-yao yti Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u hsiieh-feng chih chuan-pien"
[The intellectual transformation of the late Ming and early Ch'ing as seen in
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All of these studies show the importance of Liu's role in this intellectual
transition. My study will place Liu in his historical context. It will investigate how
Liu's response to the legacy of his Neo-Confucian forerunners and contemporaries
relates to the Ming-Ch'ing intellectual transition. This methodolgy is distinctive: a
historical approach provides a new angle on the study of Liu Tsung-chou's thought,
which to date has been written about primarily from a philosophical perspective, by
modern scholars such as Mou Tsung-san, Tang Chn-i, Tu Wei-ming and Huang
Min-hao [Wong, Simon Man-ho],
Liu lived at a time when Wang Yang-ming's doctrine was being popularized.
Many studies of Liu's thought focus on his responses to Wang.24 Wang Yang-ming
is regarded as a Neo-Confucian master in the middle Ming. The debate between Chu
Hsi [Yuan-hui x,E$g, 1130-1200] and Lu Hsiang-shan |5ji|^[_L[ [Chiu-yiian fi
$[f, 1139-93] is a prominent feature in the history of Neo-Confucianism. It is
generally agreed that Chu Hsi was known for his contention that "nature is principle"
the crisis of the "Mind is Principle" doctrine], Bulletin of the Institute ofHistory and Philology,
Academia Sinica, vol. 63, Part 3 (June 1994), pp. 333-372; "Ch'ing ch'u ssu-hsiang ch'ii-hsiang yii
Liu-tzu chieh-yao: chien lun Ch'ing ch'u Ching-shan hsueh-pai te fen-lieh" 'ilfW Jf, Bfi'JTTfi
[A new intellectual trend in the early Ch'ing period and the
compilation project of Liu-tzu chieh-yao] , Bulletin of the Institute ofHistory and Philology,
Academia Sinica, vol. 68, Part 2 (June 1997), pp. 417-48; "Ch'ing ch'u te chiang-ching hui"
illMllt ["The classics discussion society" of the early Ch'ing], Bulletin of the Institute ofHistory and
Philology, Academia Sinica, vol. 68, Part 3 (September 1997), pp. 503-587; "Jih-p'u yii Ming mo
Ch'ing ch'u ssu-hsiang-chia" [Moral diaries and late Ming and early Ch'ing
intellectuals], Bulletin of The Institute ofHistory and Philology, Academia Sinica, vol. 69, Part 2
(June 1998), pp. 245-94; "Ch'ing ch'u ssu-hsiang chung hsing-shang hsiian-yiian chih hsiieh te mo-lo"
[The metaphysical crisis of seventeenth-century China], in
Bulletin of the Institute ofHistory and Philology, Academia Sinica, vol. 69, Part 3 (September 1998),
pp. 557-87; "Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u te i-chung tao-te yen-ke chu-i"
[A variety of moral Puritanism in late Ming and early Ch'ing], in Hao Yen-p'ing and Wei
Hsiu-mei eds., Chin-shih Chung-kuo chih ch'uan-t'ung yii t'ui-pien: Liu Kuang-ching
yiian-shih ch'i-shili-wu sui chu-shou lun-wen chi jffiSMJlf
[Tradition and metamorphosis in modern Chinese history: essays in honour of Professor
Liu Kuang-ching's seventy-fifth birthday] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica,
1998), vol. I, pp. 69-82.
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(,hsing chi li ftHPiM), which maintained that the nature of things is the principle that
needed to be investigated. Lu Hsiang-shan, on the other hand, was known for his
contention that "the mind is principle" (hsin chi li >L\HPfJI), which insisted that the
mind itself is the principle that needed to be cultivated. As the Neo-Confucianism
of Chu Hsi dominated the Yuan dynasty, the Lu Hsiang-shan School eventually
declined.26 The emergence of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine in the middle of the Ming
dynasty led to a revival of Lu's school. From then on, Wang's name was often
associated with Lu, while Chu's name was always associated with Ch'eng I fMI©
[I-ch'uan 1033-1107]. The distinction between the Ch'eng-Chu School and the
Lu-Wang School was so clear-cut that scholars even described the doctrines of Lu
Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming as the School of Mind (hsin-hsiieh >Cjv!p) and the
doctrines of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi as the School of Principle (li-hsiieh 3|f!|l).27
Although the School of Mind became popular after the emergence of Wang
Yang-ming, according to the great historian of intellectual history of the Ming,
24 Okada Takehito, op. cit.; T'ang Chun-i, op. cit.; Mou Tsung-san, op. cit.
25 See Araki Kengo, "Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming", in Wm. Theodore de Bary et al.,
eds., The Unfolding ofNeo-Confucianism, p. 42. It is far from precise to use these generalizations to
characterize the philosophies of these two Neo-Confucian masters. However, they do supply us with
clues about the different characteristics of their intellectual orientation.
26
Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi and Yuan Neo-Confucianism", in Hok-lam Chan and Wm. Theodore de
Bary, eds., Yiian Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion under the Mongols (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982), pp. 197-223.
27 For example, Wing-tsit Chan has used this distinction in his study of Neo-Confucianism of the
seventeenth century. See Wing-tsit Chan, "The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch'eng-Chu School of the
seventeenth century", in Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., eds., The Unfolding ofNeo-Confucianism, p.
543; Ch'ien Mu, although he thought that this distinction was not well-measured enough, also said that
"It is not quite against the truth to consider that the Lu-Wang School of Mind concentrated only on
human life and Ch'eng-Chu School of Principle concentrated both on human life and the cosmic world
(or world of nature)". See Ch'ien Mu|^f§, Chu-tzu hsin hsiieh-an [A new anthology and
commentary on Chu Hsi's philosophy] (Taipei: San-min shu-chti, 1971), vol. 1, p. 55. Lao Ssu-kuang
made a similar distinction in his study of the history of Chinese philosophy. See Lao Ssu-kuang, op.
cit., vol. 3a, p. 407. Wm. Theodore de Bary also presents evidence to prove this distinction can be
seen in some of the critics of Wang Yang-ming. See Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Message of the Mind
1
Huang Tsung-hsi, it had a forerunner in Ch'en Hsien-chang [Po-sha or
Pai-sha 1428-1500], In his famous Ming-ju hsiieh-an [A
philosophical anthology of Ming Confucians] Huang Tsung-hsi said:
With Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ming learning started to become precise and subtle.
The effort he emphasized is entirely that of interior cultivation: of a state that is
prior to joy and anger and yet not empty, and of a state that is amid ten thousand
entangled emotions and yet unmoved. This teaching gained importance with the
rise of Wang Yang-ming. The teachings of the two masters [Ch'en and Wang]
are extremely close.28
Thus, Liu was under the influence not only of Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind
but also of Ch'eng Hsien-chang's School of Mind. This study will look at Liu's
contributions in the following three important areas of late Ming thought: (1) the
revision of Ch'eng Hsien-chang's paradigm of the School of Mind; (2) the revision
of Wang Yang-ming's paradigm of the School of Mind and (3) the criticism of the
doctrines propounded by Wang Yang-ming's followers. In investigating Liu's
contributions in these three areas, I will evaluate Liu's relation to the Ming-Ch'ing
intellectual transition.
This study is divided as the following chapters. Chapter 2 documents the
reemergence of the School of Mind in the early Ming. It describes Ch'en
Hsien-chang's teaching of sitting in meditation and his doctrine of emphasizing
tranquillity. The development of the School of Mind in the middle Ming is explicated
in Neo-Confncianism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 95-108.
28
Huang Tsung-hsi "Pai-sha hsiieh-an shang" EzT/4*Pljl-h [The Pai-sha School: part one],
in Ming-ju hsiieh-an [A philosophical anthology of Ming Confucians] (hereafter
abbreviated as MJHA) (Taipei: Hua-shih ch'u-pan she, 1987), chiian 5, p. 78. For an English
translation, see Julia Ching, trans., The Records ofMing Scholars (hereafter abbreviated as Records)
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 84.
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by way of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge. The
factionalization of the School of Mind in late Ming is documented through a study of
the doctrines propounded by Wang Yang-ming's followers. Chapter 3 introduces Liu
Tsung-chou's family background, early life, political career and intellectual
achievement. Chapter 4 investigates Liu's contributions to the re-evaluation of the
doctrines of Mind in Ming Neo-Confucianism through a systematic study of his
views on the existing schools. First, I will discuss the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and the teaching of sitting in meditation in the Ch'en Hsien-chang
School; the arguments regarding them in the Wang Yang-ming School; and Liu's
views on them. Secondly, I will discuss Liu's changing attitudes toward Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine; their different attitudes towards overcoming selfish human
desires and extensive learning; and the difference between Wang and Liu on the
correct interpretation of the Great Learning. Thirdly, I will discuss Liu's sense of the
degeneration of Wang's followers; the debates on Wang's "Four Sentences of
Teaching"; Liu's criticism of Wang's "Four Sentences of Teaching" and the debates
on it; Liu's criticism of the moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's followers;
and Liu's scheme of moral reformation for his time.
The study will conclude with an assessment of the impact of Liu's
reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism and its influence in the period from late




2.1 The reemergence of the School of Mind in the early Ming
In the history of Ming Neo-Confucianism, the roles of Ch'en Hsien-chang and
Wang Yang-ming are very important. In his description of Ch'en Hsien-chang in his
Ming-ju hsiieh-an Huang Tsung-hsi said:
On account of his teaching, many Confucians of the Ming period did not lose
their standards for the good life. Only with him did the effort of acquiring
sagehood become clear, to be further developed by Wang Yang-ming.1
This shows that Ch'en and Wang started a new age for the learning of sagehood. In
his description of Wang Yang-ming Huang made a more detailed description to
explain in what sense Ch'en's and Wang's doctrines are new. He said:
The Ming approach to learning was opened by Ch'en Hsien-chang but started to
flourish only with Wang Yang-ming. The earlier custom was to memorize the
known sayings of the former scholars, without reflecting carefully or seeking to
develop their hidden points. This is the meaning of the statement that each man
is only repeating Chu Hsi.2
The description shows that the doctrines of Ch'en and Wang are new in comparison
with that of the scholars of the Ch'eng-Chu School. The Ch'eng-Chu
1
Huang-Tsung-hsi, "Pai-sha hsiieh-an shang", in MJHA, chiian 5, p. 79; Records, pp. 86-7.
2
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Yao-chiang hsiieh-an" [The Yao-chiang School], in MJHA, chiian 10,
p. 179; Records, p. 100.
10
Neo-Confucianism was the state ideology of the Ming dynasty. Huang's description
assigns a revolutionary role to the doctrines of Ch'en and Wang. Ch'en and Wang's
revolutionary role is confirmed by the Ming-shih [The history of the Ming
dynasty]. In its description of the academic community of the Ming period, the
Ming-shih said:
Basically Confucians of the early Ming all represented minor branches and what
were left of the followers of pupils of Chu Hsi. The transmission of doctrines
from their teachers was clearly traceable and their patterns were in perfect
order. ... The division of systems of learning began with Ch'en Hsien-chang and
Wang Yang-ming.4
This text confirms the prevalence of the Ch'eng-Chu School and the revolutionary
role of Ch'en Hsien-chang and Wang Yang-ming. However, it also leaves an
impression that the Ch'eng-Chu School of the early Ming had observed tradition
without any change. This impression is challenged by modem study.
Ch'en Jung-chieh [Chan Wing-tsit] in his study of four famous
Neo-Confucians of the Ch'eng-Chu school in the early Ming, Ts'ao Tuan
[Yiieh-ch'uan 1376-1434], Wu Yu-pi [K'ang-chai 1391-1469],
Hsiieh Hsiian [Ching-hsiian 1392-1464] and Hu ChU-jen
[Ching-chai 1434-1486], remarks that early Ming Neo-Confucianism grew less
3 Ch'ien Mu Ufil, "Ming-ch'u Chu-tzu-hsiieh liu-yen k'ao" Bf[ffl8iLf-if% [A study of the
development of the Chu Hsi school in early Ming], in Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo hsiieh-shu
ssu-hsiang-shih lun-ts'ung T1 H9^®ISSi]£Imi fx [Miscellaneous essays on Chinese scholarship and
thought] (Taipei: Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1978), vol. 7, p. 6; Chan, Wing-tsit [Ch'en Jung-chieh],
"The Ch'eng-Chu School of early Ming", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., Selfand Society in Ming
Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 45.
4
Chang T'ing-yii^MJS^, et al., Ming STzzTi Bf| ]£ [The history of the Ming dynasty] (Taipei: Ting-wen
shu-chii, 1975), chiian 282, "Ju-lin chuan i" [The narratives of Confucians: part one], p.
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and less interested in such intellectual aspects as metaphysical speculation and the
doctrine of "the investigation of things", which are the main concerns in Ch'eng-Chu
Neo-Confucianism, and more and more concerned with the mind, its cultivation and
preservation, and seriousness as the means of achieving that goal.5 These four
Neo-Confucians had actually driven the Ch'eng-Chu School into a new direction, the
studies of the learning of the mind, which laid the groundwork for the emergence of
Ch'en Hsien-chang and Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind.
Not only did the Ch'eng-Chu School provide the milieu for the emergence of
the School of Mind, it had a direct link to Ch'en Hsien-chang's School of Mind.
Ch'en was an intimate disciple of Wu Yii-pi. Ch'en recalled that at the age of
twenty-seven he resolved to study under Wu. Wu taught him all the books that
ancient sages and worthies had handed down as instructions. Taking Wu's
instructions as his guide for cultivation, Ch'en returned to his hometown, shut
himself up at home without ever going out, devoting himself solely to the quest for
direction in applying efforts. With no help from teachers or friends, he looked for this,
relying daily on books and texts, forgetting to sleep and to eat, and continuing in this
manner for many years without ultimately getting anywhere.6 He specifically
explained: "What I mean by not having got anywhere refers to my mind and principle
(li 3M) not converging or tallying."7 Eventually, he decided to "forsake the
complexities of learning from books and sought to find what was simple and
7222.
5
Wing-tsit Chan, "The Ch'eng-Chu School of early Ming", p. 42.
6 See Ch'en Hsien-chang [ijtJtfjjt:, "Fu Chao t'i-hsiieh Chien-hsien" fMtilS![Reply to Chao
Chien-hsien t'i-hsiieh], in Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ch'en Hsien-chang chi PjfiJilJijfljl [The works of Ch'en
Hsien-chang] (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1987), chiian 2, p. 145.
7 Ibid. The English translation is from Records, p. 87.
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essential within myself, only by quiet sitting (ching-tso ff also translated as
"sitting in meditation")."8 Through sitting in meditation, he appeared to feel
something happen to him. He said:
After a long time I saw my mind-in-itself (hsin chih t'i 'L>ieLlSi) emerging dimly,
but as though it were a thing (wu $J). In my daily life, I did all that I desired like
a horse guided by bit and bridle. In realizing the meaning of things and in
examining the teachings of sages, I found that each had its order and its origin,
just as every stream has its source. So I became very self-confident and said,
"Could this not be the effort of becoming a sage?"9
He seemed to feel that the problem that the mind and principle did not converge or
tally was completely solved by the practice of sitting in meditation.
Ch'en's forsaking learning from books and taking sitting in meditation instead
as a way for cultivation might have been inspired by Wu Yii-pi. Wu had made up his
mind to refuse the civil service examination at the age of nineteen and spent the rest
of his life farming and studying in the countryside.10 He strongly advocated the idea
of "getting the Way oneself' (tzu-te [eK#). Influenced by Wu, Ch'en is also an
advocate of this idea.11 It is because of the idea of "getting the Way oneself' that Wu
redefined learning from books more loosely. He once said:
In general, the most important doctrine that the teaching of ancient sages was
based on is simply ching^fa [reverence]. The mind of a man who is well dressed,
reverent in words and behaviour, and who adheres to rites, is naturally restrained.




Huang Tsung-hsi, "Ch'ung-jen hsiieh-an i" ~ [The Ch'ung-jen School: part one], in
ibid., chiian 1, p. 14.
11 William Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University
of Hong Kong, 1983), p. 73.
13
texts. However, it would be better if he could spend time studying to realize
12
principles and cultivate himself.
This means that, according to Wu, the function of learning from books is not
absolutely necessary but only complementary. We can imagine that Ch'eng
Hsien-chang's innovative substitution of sitting in meditation for learning from
books probably developed from Wu Yu-pi's teaching. The relation between Wu
Yii-pi and Ch'en Hsien-chang displays a gradually process of the development of the
School of Mind from its anticipation in the Ch'eng-Chu school in the early Ming.
Ch'eng Hsien-chang's taking sitting in meditation is not only related to Wu
Yti-pi but can also be traced to many Sung 7f5 [960-1279] Neo-Confucians. As a
means of personal cultivation, sitting in meditation in Chinese history can be traced
to the Taoists in the pre-Ch'in §f| period [770-222 B.C.], After it, Buddhists and
Taoists both took sitting in meditation as their basic discipline for cultivation. In
Confucianism, it was Chou Tun-i's jn]f£|5jt [Lien-hsi 1017-73] doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" (chu ching jEff?) that inspired Ch'eng Hao
[Ming-tao BJM, 1032-85] and Ch'eng IUM [I-ch'uan ffi) \ |, 1033-1107] to
introduce sitting in meditation as the teaching for acquiring tranquillity. Later, other
Sung Neo-Confucians, like Lo Ts'ung-yen [Yii-chang 5§c:|l, 1072-1135], Li
T'ung ^f|i[ [Yen-p'ing 1088-1163] and Chu Hsi, continued to treat it as a
means of personal cultivation.13 All of the experiences of the practice of sitting in
12 Wu Yii-pi tg-MiJjg, K'ang-chai chi [Jtliffjl [The works of Wu YU-pi], in Wen-yuan-ko ssu-k'u
ch'iian-shu SCrlPH13J®riJiB [The Complete Books of the Four Treasuries] (Taipei: Taiwan
Commercial Press, 1983), chiian 8, "Jen-yin yii yu-jen shu" 3r AH [A letter to a friend in the
year of jen-yin], p. 25b.
13 See T'ang I-chieh ?J§—-/j\ ed., Chung-kuo ju-hsiieh wen-hua ta-kuan 41S3WiW->C1TI'M [An
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meditation of these Neo-Confucian forerunners were taken as examples by Ch'en in
his promotion of the practice of sitting in meditation.14
However, compared to these Sung Neo-Confucians, Ch'eng Hsien-chang
created a new horizon for the practice of sitting in meditation. For those Sung
Neo-Confucians, sitting in meditation was only a complementary method of moral
cultivation.15 They did not tell people to forsake learning from books and to immerse
themselves in sitting in meditation. Ch'en not only practised sitting in meditation
himself confidently, but also adopted it as a regular custom, persuading his disciples
to practise it without considering the differences in their special characteristics and
conditions. In a letter to one of his friends, he wrote:
I tell everyone who comes to ask me for instruction to practise sitting in
meditation. I do that because I find it useful, not because I intend to play the
expert or to mislead others.16
More than that, he created a normative rule for the practice of sitting in meditation.
He contended: "To become accomplished in studies, one must foster a starting point
by sitting in tranquillity" (ts'ung ching chung tso yang-ch'u ke tuan-ni lai
ltiij/®Sfj^f5).17 Although Ch'en never explained further what is meant by the
exposition of Chinese Confucian culture] (Peking: Peking ta-hsiieh ch'u-pan she, 2001), pp. 164-5.
14 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Pai-sha hsueh-an shang", in MJHA, chiian 5, p. 83.
15
T'ang I-chieh, ed., op. cit. Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi expressed their strong objection to
any suggestion that man is in his best state when all the emotions of his mind are "tranquil", which
implies the superiority of meditation over action. See A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers: The
Metaphysics of the Brothers Ch'eng (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), p. 165; Ch' ien Mu,
Chu-tzu hsin hsiieh-an, vol. 2, pp. 277-80.
16 Ch'en Hsien-chang, "Fu Chao-t'i-hsiieh Chien-hsien", in Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ch'en Hsien-chang
chi, chiian 2, p. 145.
17
Ibid., "Yii He Ke-kung Huang-man" JH1=i]SfS]lfFEl [A letter to He Huang-man], p. 133. The
expression "fostering a starting point by sitting in tranquillity." (ts'ung ching chung tso yang-ch'u ke
tuan-ni lai was quoted by Huang Tsung-hsi in MJHA as "fostering a starting
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starting point (tuan-ni and how to foster it, this expression gives Ch'en's
teaching of sitting in meditation more philosophical implications than implied in his
Neo-Confucian forerunners' use of the term.18
Wang Yang-ming apparently had no direct inheritance from Ch'en
Hsien-chang.19 However, those mystical aspects of Ch'en's teaching of sitting in
meditation, such as "fostering a starting point" and "seeing my mind-in-itself
point by quiet-sitting (sitting in meditation)." (ts'ung ching-tso chung yang-ch'u ke tuan-ni lai
43§idj{@5rffi'ffil3l5)- See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Pai-sha hsiieh-an shang", in MJHA, chiian 5, p. 86.
Furthermore, the expression was usually quoted as "fostering a starting point from the cultivation of
tranquillity" (ts'ung ching chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni in later Neo-Confucian works,
which I will present later in this study. It is the reason that the practice of sitting in meditation can be
seen as the practice of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity". I, therefore, consider them as a pair
of coexistent theories, and will discuss them together in section 1 of chapter 4.
18 Ch'en Jung-chieh [Chan, Wing-tsit] PjfiljiSt, having given an etymological explanation of the word
"tuan-ni", firstly translates it as "universe", and then gives the expression a philosophical
interpretation as follows: "The phrase "yang-ch'u"^fctj (foster) indicates the production of activities
and the possibility of action. It is from the cultivation of tranquillity that we can discover the
restlessness of the moving of the universe. Furthermore, we can say, it is from the cultivation of
tranquillity we can recreate the universe. This point has never been indicated by anyone before. It is
Ch'en Hsien-chang who firstly propounded it." See Ch'en Jung-chieh, "Pai-sha chih tung te che-hsiieh
yii ch'uang-tso" Ezp/^/2.1[Ch'en Hsien-chang's active philosophy and its creation],
in Ch'en Jung-chieh, Ch'en Jung-chieh che-hsiieh lun-wen chi [The
philosophical works of Ch'en Jung-chieh] (Taipei: Yang-che ch'u-pan she, 1968), p. 72. Ch'en
Jung-chieh's translation, however, did not reach a common agreement among modern studies of Ch'en
Hsien-chang's philosophy. Chien Yu-wen [Jen Yu-wen] expresses his disagreement with
other etymological evidence. See Chien Yu-wen, Pai-sha-tzu yen-chiu E[A study of Ch'en
Hsien-chang] (Hong Kong: Chien-shih meng-chin shu-wu, 1970), pp. 175-8. He translates "tuan-ni" as
"beginning" and refers it to the "beginnings" of virtue spoken of by Mencius. See Jen Yu-wen, "Ch'en
Hsien-chang's philosophy of the natural", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., Selfand Society in Ming
Thought, p. 79. Following Chien Yu-wen, Paul Yun-ming Jiang also translates it as "beginning". See
Paul Yun-ming Jiang, The Search for Mind: Ch'en Pai-sha, Philosopher-Poet (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1980). p. 70. However, Chien Yu-wen, likes Ch'en Jung-chieh, refers Ch'en
Hsien-chang's expression of emphasizing tranquillity to producing activities in philosophical meaning
and maintaining its difference from that of Ch'en Hsien-chang's Neo-Confucian forerunners. See
Chien Yu-wen, Pai-sha-tzu yen-chiu, pp. 157-78. Paul Yun-ming Jiang also maintains that Ch'en
Hsien-chang's discovery of the mind through his enlightenment experience in sitting in meditation
represented an epoch-making achievement in the growth of Ming philosophy. See Paul Yun-ming
Jiang, op. cit., p. 64.
19
According to Huang Tsung-hsi, Wang "never mentioned Ch'en". See Huang-Tsung-hsi, "Pai-sha
hstieh-an shang", in MJHA, chiian 5, p. 78. But, according to Wing-tsit Chan, Wang mentioned Ch'en
twice. However, Chan also remarks that Wang only referred to Ch'en's name and did not say much
about his doctrine. See Wing-tsit Chan, "Chan Jo-shui's influence on Wang Yang-ming", Philosophy
East and West, vol. 23 (January-April, 1973), p. 10. Also according to Lao Ssu-kuang, although Wang
had a close friendship with Ch'en's faithful disciple Chan Jo-shui [Kan-ch'iian tt
1466-1560], he did not pay too much attention to Ch'en's doctrines. See Lao Ssu-kuang Chung-kuo
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emerging dimly, but as though it were a thing", were replicated again and again in
Wang Yang-ming and his disciples' experiences of moral cultivation.
Wang Yang-ming's famous experience of enlightenment in Lung-ch'ang f|iJ§
in Kuei-chou M'itl is the first example of this. After following Chu Hsi's doctrines
of "the investigation of things" (ko wu and "the extension of knowledge" (chih
chih for many years but failing to realize their true meaning, after he was
demoted to Lung-ch'ang, through a long period of practising sitting in meditation
Wang suddenly came to realize them one night. The biography of Wang Yang-ming
reports on this mystical experience:
[Wang] sat solemnly in quietude day and night to pursue the wordless oneness.
After a time, his mind became bright and clear. ... Suddenly at midnight it
occurred: he realized the true meaning of the doctrine of the investigation of
things and the extension of knowledge. In sleeplessness, he felt as if he had
heard a voice talking to him. Unconsciously he called out and jumped out of bed.
All of his servants were startled.20
It is probably this special experience that led Wang to take sitting in meditation as his
main teaching in a period of his life.21
che-hsiieh-shih, vol. 3a, p. 407.
20
Wang Yang-ming Wang Yang-ming ch'iian-chi [The complete works of
Wang Yang-ming] (hereafter abbreviated as WYMCC) (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1997),
"Nien-p'u i" — [Chronological biography: part one], chiian 33,, p. 1228.
21 Ch'ien Te-hung [Hsu-shan (JLf, 1497-1574], the main editor of the complete works of
Wang Yang-ming, reported: "The learning of the master (i.e. Wang) had changed three times, and his
teaching has changed three times as well.... While living in Kuei-yang iaDlj, he taught his disciples the
doctrine of 'the unity of knowledge and action' (chih hsing ho-i —) for the first time. After his
arrival in Ch'u-yang he mostly taught his disciples to sit in meditation. After arriving in
Chiang-yu he started to teach the doctrine of 'the extension of innate knowledge' (chih
liang-chih S^UAil), going right to the heart of the matter, in order to bring insight to his disciples.
These were the so called three changes in his teaching." See Ch'ien Te-hung, "K'o wen-lu hsii-shuo"
[A preface to the newly inscribed literary works of Wang Yang-ming], in ibid., chiian 41,
p. 1574.
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Even after he changed his teaching into the teaching of the doctrine of the
extension of innate knowledge (chih liang-chih ±51^11; liang-chih also
translated as innate knowledge of good, or innate knowing), his teaching of sitting in
meditation was so impressive that some of his disciples were still more interested in
that aspect. Wang Chi I [Lung-hsi iijH, 1498-1583], one of Wang Yang-ming's
famous disciples from the Che-chung section, once referred to Wang
Yang-ming's experience in quietude as follows:
The master has described that he once saw in quietude the inside of his body,
which is like a crystal palace. At that moment he forgot about the self and matter,
and forgot about heaven and earth, uniting himself with the emptiness. Bright
and magical as it is, absent-minded and changeable as it is, it makes people
seem to have something to tell, but they forget how to tell what they wish to tell.
This is real scenery.22
Wang Chi seemed to praise the mystical experience of quietude. Nieh Pao
[Wen-wei 1487-1563], another famous disciple of Wang Yang-ming's from the
Chiang-yu section, also took sitting in meditation as his teaching method. In
Ming-ju hsiieh-an, Huang Tsung-hsi described Nieh's learning as follows:
Nieh Pao's learning developed in prison, where he had plenty of tranquillity and
nothing to do, until he suddenly perceived the reality of the mind-in-itself, in its
radiance and brightness, as that which contains all things. He said joyfully,
"This is the equilibrium (or Mean) prior to the rise of emotions. Should I only
be able to keep this and not lose it, I would possess the source of all the
principles under Heaven." After his release from prison, he regulated a method
of quiet sitting that he taught those who studied with him, guiding them to
return to tranquillity for the sake of attaining harmony with themselves and a
22
Wang Chi zEfil, "Ch'u-yang hui-yti" [Conversations at Ch'u-yang], in Wang Chi, Wang
Lung-hsi ch'iian-chi [The complete works of Wang Chi] (Taipei: Hua-wen shu-chii,
1970), chuan 2, p. 7a.
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composure that enabled them to respond perfectly to events and happenings, so
that in practical life they might be in accord with their [minds].2"'
Nieh's teaching of sitting in meditation, although it raised doubts in some disciples of
Wang Yang-ming, had a companion. Lo Hung-hsien [Lien-an
1504-1564], another scholar from the Chiang-yu section, agreed with Nieh. Lo said:
"Nieh's teaching resembled a thunderbolt that struck at the ambiguity of many
would-be heroes [of the sagely Way], until he made available to all a wide and open
road, and no further doubt need remain."24 He himself once had a similarly
enlightening experience. He recalled: "because of a ten-day-long sitting in meditation,
I seemed to have seen something."25 He once described what he saw in sitting in
meditation as follow:
When I was in a state of extreme tranquillity, absent-mindedly I felt that the
mind was empty, fluent without any obstruction, like the wind that blows in the
air without limitation, without distinction between inside and outside, or
between action and quietude. All things under Heaven, within the four
directions, from past to present, were converged into oneness.26
The tradition of acquiring this kind of mystical experience from sitting in meditation
lasted for a long time in the Wang Yang-ming School. Even a disciple of Wang Chi,
Wan T'ing-yen it|££11f [Ssu-mo ?-?] inherited the teaching of sitting in
meditation. He once described his experience of sitting in meditation as follows:
23
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men hsiieh-an erh" tDH3£FE]|P0!l— [The Chiang-yu section
of the Wang Yang-ming School: part two], in chiian 17, p. 372; Records, p. 128.
24
Ibid., p. 373; Records, p. 129.
25 Lo Hung-hsien, "Yii Yin Tao-yii" 4Li!PI [A letter to Yin Tao-yii], in Lo Hung-hsien, Nien-an
wen-chi [The literary works of Lo Hung-hsien], in Wen-yiian-ko ssu-k'u chiian-shu, chiian
3, p. 34b.
26 Lo Hung-hsien, "Ta Chiang Tao-lin" [A reply to Chiang Tao-lin], in ibid., chiian 4, p.
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When I first learned sitting in meditation, I felt nothing, nor could I acquire
tranquillity, nor could I keep in focus, nor could I order my breath. I simply tried
to concentrate the mind. What upset me was that my thoughts were flying and
changing so wildly that I could not harness them. However, as time went by,
suddenly I felt that my mind was in stillness without moving. Within those two
or three days, I felt as if I was drunk and my thoughts stopped changing. It
seemed that there was something dimly emergent inside my mind, brightening
gradually. I happily thought, isn't this what Po-sha called "fostering a starting
point by sitting in tranquillity"?27
Here Ch'en Hsien-chang's famous axiom "fostering a starting point by sitting in
tranquillity" is quoted as the object of Wan's practising of sitting in meditation. It
shows that Ch'en Hsien-chang's teaching of sitting in meditation must have given
Wan the direct inspiration to practise sitting in meditation.
From the above-mentioned mystical experiences of sitting in meditation in the
Wang Yang-ming School we can certainly imagine that Ch'en's teaching of sitting in
meditation had great influence on them. No wonder that a scholar of the Ch'eng-Chu
School in Wang Yang-ming's time, Lo Ch'in-shun jUtfcJIIJt [Cheng-an
1465-1547], traced Wang's School of Mind to Ch'en by saying that: "although Ch'en
Hsien-chang is attributed with the promotion of the study of the Way in recent times,
I am afraid that the faults of scholars [in recent times] also started from him."28
Although Wang Yang-ming and his disciples had no direct inheritance from
Ch'en Hsien-chang, in the sense of their common interest in pursuing the original
status of mind as their object for their moral cultivation through practising sitting in
lb.
27
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Che-chung Wang-men hsiieh-an erh" [The Che-chung
section of the Wang Yang-ming School: part two], in MJHA, chiian 12, p. 254.
28 Lo Ch'in-shun iHifcJIIJ], K'un-chih chi [Knowledge painfully acquired] (Peking: Chung-hua
shu-chii, 1990), p. 39.
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meditation, they were all immersed in the new intellectual trend inspired by Ch'en
Hsien-chang.
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2.2 The development of the School of Mind in the middle Ming
Although Ch'en Hsien-chang had inspired a new intellectual trend for future
generations, the transmission of his doctrine was not widespread. According to
Ming-shih:
Those who inherited Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrines were called the
Chiang men flPI School. All of them were concerned only to maintain their
personal integrity. Therefore the transmission of Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrines
was not far-reaching.1
Wang Yang-ming's doctrine had a different destiny. According to Ming-shih:
Those who inherited Wang Yang-ming's doctrines were called the Yao-chiang
MtX School. They established special theories to deliberately articulate their
difference from Chu Hsi's doctrines. The members of this school were all over
the land. Their transmission lasted for more than one hundred years. Wang
Yang-ming's doctrines were widespread.
However, the different legacies of the above-mentioned schools was not only because
of the intellectual style of their members, but also because of the strategies of Ch'en
Hsien-chang and Wang Yang-ming in responding to criticism from their
contemporaries with regard to their doctrines.
In Ch'en Hsien-chang's case, we see that criticism from his contemporaries was
very radical. Ch'iu Chun Ft[Chung-shen 1420-1495], a famous thinker in
1




Ch'en Hsien-chang's time,3 had satirized Ch'en's doctrine as heresy.4 Chang Mao
jpL^lk [Feng-shan |®[JL|, 1437-1522], a scholar of the Ch'eng-Chu School, publicly
accused Ch'en's doctrine of being Ch'an Buddhism.5 Another scholar of the
Ch'eng-Chu School, Hu Chii-jen, who was also a disciple of Ch'en's teacher Wu
Yii-pi, seriously regarded some of Ch'en's sayings on the enlightened mind as
"obvious Buddhist heresy",6 attributing this fault to his practice of sitting in
meditation.7 Ch'en's attitude towards learning from books also inspired general
enmity in the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucian circle.8
In dealing with these criticisms, Ch'en was generally very passive. As a
philosopher-poet, he was more given to eulogizing the scenery of the situation of
enlightenment, less interested in discriminating his doctrine in detail.9 The
Ming-shih reports that when someone tried to persuade him to transmit his doctrine
in writing, Ch'en simply kept silent.10
A significant episode in the middle period of Ch'en's life provides another view
of his strategy in facing criticism from his contemporaries. In 1466, twelve years after
he had abandoned the civil service examinations, and during which he had invented
his teaching on sitting in meditation, Ch'en once again went to Peking to visit the
3 On Ch'iu Chun's life and thought, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, Neo-Confucianism Orthodoxy and
the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 91-98.
4 See Lo Ch'in-shun, K'un-chih chi, p. 39.
5 Ibid.
6 Hu Chu-jenJfjlU'fZ, Chii-yeh hi HHIjtif: [Works of Hu Chu-jen] (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chu, 1975),
chiian 3, p. 283.
7 See ibid., chiian 4, p. 435.
8 See Yii Ying-shih "Ts'ung Sung-Ming ju-hsiieh te fa-chan lun ch'ing-tai ssu-hsiang shih"
jfe [On the intellectual history of Ch'ing from the perspective of the
development of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism], in Yii Ying-shih, Li-shih yii ssu-hsiang
[History and thought] (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979), p. 100.
9
Regarding Ch'en Hsien-chang's character of as a philosopher-poet, see Paul Yun-ming Jiang, op. cit.
10
Ming-shih, chiian 293, p. 7262.
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Imperial Academy.11 According to a report by one of Ch'en's disciples, Chang Hsu
IrHlS [T'ing-shih 1455-1514], because Ch'en gathered disciples to practise the
rite of archery, a rumour was spread about him gathering and training an armed band
12for rebellion. Ch'en therefore made this visit to prove his loyalty. The rumour
verifies the enmity to Ch'en from his contemporaries. During this visit, Ch'en wrote
a poem which raised questions on the consistency of his doctrine "emphasizing
tranquillity" (chu ching jEif):
Our Way has a grand master,
The immortal Chu Tzu-yang [i.e. Chu Hsi],
He spoke of "c/zmg" (reverence) unceasingly,
Showing us the Way to virtue.13
Another disciple of Ch'en, Chan Jo-shui ^^7j<. [Kan-ch'Uan 1466-1560], had
sensed Ch'en's difficult situation here. Chan said: "The master [Ch'en] usually
emphasizes tranquillity, but he especially speaks of reverence in this piece of
work."14 Chan therefore tried to explain the reason why Ch'en did that.15 It appears
that at least in some of these contemporaries' eyes there is some contradiction
between Ch'en's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and that of "emphasizing
reverence" of the Ch'eng-Chu School. Under these circumstances, it would seem that
Ch'en's choosing to reemphasize Chu Hsi's term of "reverence" was in order to
11 Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ch'en Hsien-chang chi, appendix 2, "Nien-p'u" [Chronological
biography], p. 860.
12
Chang Hsu 3510, "Po-sha hsien-sheng hsing-chuang" E=] [A narrative of the life of
Ch'en Hsien-chang], in ibid, p. 869.
13 Ibid., appendix 1, pp. 701-2.
14 Chan Jo-shui "Pai-sha tsu ku-shih chiao chieh" E=l '/^~Pc!n [Explanations of Master
Pai-sha's poetry], in Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ch'en Hsien-chang chi, appendix 1, p. 702.
15 See ibid., pp. 702-3.
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compromise with the orthodox Ch'eng-Chu School.
In the light of Ch'en Hsien-chang's passive strategies of response to criticism
from his contemporaries, it was perhaps inevitable that Ch'en's doctrine would
decline gradually. The destiny of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine was another story,
owing to Wang's very different strategy in responding to criticism from his
contemporaries. To elaborate the difference between their strategies, we need to
return to the notion that the mind and principle are not convergent.
Like Ch'en Hsien-chang, Wang Yang-ming once felt that the mind and principle
were not convergent. According to Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-ju hsueh-an:
Wang's learning began with wide reading in prose and poetry, which was
followed by a thorough reading of the works of Chu Hsi. He followed the steps
of the investigation of things but observed that the principles of things and the
mind remained dual, providing no entry-point [into sagehood]. Then he drifted
in and out of Buddhism and Taoism for a long time until his exile among the
aborigines [of Kuei-chou] and the difficulties surrounding this experience
stimulated his mind and strengthened his nature. He wondered how a sage
would behave under these circumstances and was suddenly enlightened to the
meaning of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. He then
said: "My nature possesses all it needs for acquiring the way of sageliness. I
need not look for help outside." Thus his learning changed three times before he
discovered the gate to wisdom. From then on, he eliminated entirely the leaves
and branches and focused his mind on the roots [of learning], [First,] he
concentrated on sitting in meditation and purifying his mind, believing that only
after attaining the equilibrium of consciousness that exists before the rise of
emotions could one acquire the harmony of due proportion accompanying the
rise of emotions.16
It is obvious that, in Wang's experience in pursuit of learning, the realization of Chu
Hsi's doctrines of "the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge"
was his main object. It is under Chu Hsi's instruction that Wang "observed that the
16
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Yao-chiang hsiieh-an", in MJHA, chiian 10, p. 181; Records, p. 104.
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principles of things and the mind remained dual, providing no entry-point [into
sagehood]", which is similar to Ch'en Hsien-chang's feeling that his mind and
principle were not in convergence. Also, like Ch'en, Wang took sitting in mediation
as essential for cultivation. To sum up, they are similar in that they both transferred
the field of moral cultivation from things and books to the mind itself.
In 1521, Wang for the first time declared his doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge", admitting that his discovery of the crucial role of innate knowledge in
moral cultivation came from his experience of enlightenment from practising sitting
in meditation in Lung-ch'ang. He said:
The phrase liang-chih (innate knowledge) in my doctrine was the only truth,
neither more nor less, that I have wanted to elucidate ever since I was in
Lung-ch'ang. I had been incapable of figuring it out simply because I had been
incapable of finding out the exact words. I have wasted many words in attending
to elucidate the truth for scholars. Now, fortunately, I realize the truth. With this
single phrase I see through the whole [mind-in-itself]. That is satisfying.17
It can be said that liang-chih (innate knowledge) is what Wang considered to be the
essential output of his moral cultivation, which again reminds us of Ch'en's teaching
of "fostering a starting point from sitting in meditation". Liang-chih is seemingly a
1 8
starting point that Wang fostered from his experience of meditation.
Wang Yang-ming's experience of transformation from following Chu Hsi's
doctrine of "the investigation of things" to inventing his own doctrine of "the
17
Quoted by Ch'ien Te-hung, see Ch'ien Te-hung ,"K'o wen-lu hsii-shuo", in WYMCC, chiian 41, p.
1575.
18 It is also noteworthy that the essential terminology of Ch'en's doctrine of "cultivating a starting
point" and Wang's doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge can be traced to Mencius. In
Mencius' mind, there is knowledge which is innate, which is also a starting point for moral cultivation
that needed to be cultivated. In this sense, Ch'en Hsien-chang and Wang Yang-ming were similar in
working on developing Mencius' moral philosophy. See Mencius (D. C. Lau trans., Harmondsworth:
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extension of innate knowledge" is very similar to Ch'en Hsien-chang's experience in
pursuit of learning. However, Ch'en's passive attitude towards the challenges of the
Ch'eng-Chu School was very different from Wang's more active engagement with
Chu Hsi's doctrine. Before dealing with Chu Hsi's doctrine again after his
enlightenment in Lung-ch'ang, Wang first verified his enlightenment with the ancient
classics, which were much older and therefore might be more authoritative than Chu
Hsi's doctrine. According to his biography, in 1508, right after Wang was
enlightened regarding the meaning of Chu Hsi's doctrines of "the investigation of
things" and "the extension of knowledge", he "verified it with the meaning of the
Five Classics (Wu-ching SIS), and found there to be no contradiction between the
two. He wrote an essay in this regard, "Wu-ching i-shuo" SlSMlft [A speculation
on the Five Classics]."19 In the preface to the essay, Wang wrote:
While I was in exile at Lung-ch'ang, which is situated in the mountains of the
southern aboriginal region, I could not bring with me any books. I sat in a stone
cave, reciting the books I had read and making notes. When I felt that I had
acquired the skill, I used this to interpret the classics. After seven months had
passed, I understood the meaning of the Five Classics. I have named my
interpretation "A speculation". I wrote it only in order to express the opinions
deep in my mind; they did not have to be in absolute conformity with past
scholars' interpretations.20
It seems that Wang was so confident in his enlightenment that he simply relied on his
own opinions to reinterpret the classics, without caring about ancient interpretations.
This means that he seemed to sense a potential for challenging the old doctrine which
Penguin Books, 1970), Book II, Part A: 6, p. 83 and Book VII, Part A: 15, p. 184.
19 WYMCC, chiian 33, "Nien-p'u i", p. 1228.
20
Wang Yang-ming, "Wu-ching i-shuo hsu" [A preface to a speculation on the Five
Classics], in ibid., chiian 22, p. 876.
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he had followed in his early days.
In 1518, when he published his two works, the preface to the Ta-hsiieh ku pen
[Ancient version of the Great Learning] and Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun 7^
[Chu Hsi's final conclusion arrived in his last years], Wang publicly
expresses his difference with Chu Hsi.21 In the preface of the Chu-tzu wan-nien
ting-lun, Wang explained why, after his enlightenment, he found that his thoughts on
moral cultivation, although they accorded with the ancient classics, contradicted Chu
Hsi's official doctrine. Confident in Chu Hsi's wisdom, Wang had investigated Chu
Hsi's works where he found the reason of this contradiction. Wang concluded that:
[Chu Hsi] himself realized the faults of his early doctrine in his later life. He
was so regretful that he admitted that his guilt in self-deception and the
deception of others was beyond redemption. The works like Ssu shu chi-chu [Z9
■UJUli [Comprehensive commentary on the Four Books] and Ssu shu huo-wen
[Questions and answers on the Four Books], which were popularly
transmitted across the land, were his unsettled doctrine from an early period in
his life. He condemned himself for having faults in these early works and
thought of rectifying them but failed to do it.22
Therefore, Wang collected thirty-four of Chu Hsi's letters from his later life to
prove that Chu Hsi's later sayings were different from his early sayings.23 With this
collection, Wang rebuilt his faith in Chu Hsi's doctrine.24 Although Wang edited the
Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun to defend Chu Hsi, his obvious criticism of Chu Hsi's Ssu
shu chi-chu and Ssu shu huo-wen, which were trusted by most scholars, certainly
21
Ibid., chiian 33, "Nien-p'u i", pp. 1253-4.
22
Wang Yang-ming, "Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun hsu" [A preface to Chu Hsi's
final conclusion arrived in his last years], in ibid., chiian 7, p. 240.
23
Wang Yang-ming, "Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun" [Chu Hsi's final conclusion
arrived in his last years], in ibid., chiian 3, pp. 128-41.
24
Wang Yang-ming, "Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun hsu", in ibid., chiian 7, p. 241.
28
threatened the authoritative role of Chu Hsi in public.
In the beginning of the preface to the Ta-hsiieh ku pen, he pinpointed the
essential meaning of the Great Learning as follows:
The essential meaning of the Great Learning is simply to make the will sincere
(ch'eng i I&Jcm)- The effort of making the will sincere is simply the investigation
of things. The end of making the will sincere is simply abiding in goodness.25
Wang's taking "making the will sincere" as the essential meaning of the Great
Learning is obviously different from Chu Hsi's interpretation. Chu himself more
strongly emphasized the preliminary role of "the investigation of things" in the Great
Learning. Chu had once said: "The most important issue of the Great Learning is
simply the phrase "ko ww" (the investigation of things). If we can realize the
meaning of this, the rest of the book is easy to understand."26
Furthermore, at the end of the preface, Wang even made criticisms of Chu Hsi.
Wang said:
[The Great Learning] became more fragmentary because of the addition of
"ching" (reverence), and became more burdensome because of being
supplemented by another chapter. I am afraid that learning will become further
from the goodness.27
The original chapters of commentary that explained "the investigation of things" and
"the extension of knowledge" in the Great Learning had been lost in Chu Hsi's time.
25
Wang Yang-ming, "Ta-hsiieh ku pen yuan hsu" [The original preface of the
ancient version of the Great Learning], in ibid., chiian 32, p. 1197.
26 See Chu Hsi, "Ta-hsiieh i" [On Great Learning: part one], in Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yu-lei-fc-f
iB® [Classified conversations of master Chu Hsi] (Taipei: Hua-shih ch'u-pan she, 1987), chiian 14, p.
255.
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It was Chu Hsi who made a supplement as a chapter to explain "the investigation of
things" and "the extension of knowledge". Also, it was Chu Hsi who emphasized the
28
importance of reverence in explaining the doctrine of "the investigation of things".
Wang appeared to be dissatisfied with Chu Hsi's interpretation of the Great
Learning.
Lastly, Wang used his doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" to
replace Chu Hsi's interpretation of the meaning of "the investigation of things" in the
Great Learning. In his commentary, Chu Hsi wrote:
If we wish to extend our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the
principles of all things we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of
man is certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which its
principles do not inhere. It is only because all principles are not investigated that
man's knowledge is incomplete. For this reason, the first step in education of the
adult is to instruct the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed
from what knowledge he has of their principles, and investigate further until he
reaches the limit. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will one
day achieve a wide and far-reaching penetration. Then the qualities of all things,
whether internal or external, the refined or the coarse, will all be apprehended,
and the mind, in its total substance and great functioning, will be perfectly
intelligent. This is called the investigation of things. This is called the perfection
9Q
of knowledge.
Obviously, Chu Hsi considered the "things" {wu $}) of "the investigation of things"
(ko wu) as all things in the world, and the "knowledge" (chih 3®) of "the extension of
knowledge" (chih chih as knowledge of all things in the world without any
27
Wang Yang-ming, "Ta-hsiieh ku pen yuan hsii", in WYMCC, chiian 32, p. 1197.
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Regarding Chu Hsi's supplementing the chapter of the investigation of things in the Great Learning,
see Chu Hsi, Ssu shu chi-chu EliSlfili [Collected commentaries on the Four Books] (Taipei:
Hsiieh-hai ch'u-pan she, 1982), p. 6. For Chu Hsi's pinpointing of the importance of "clung"
(reverence) in explaining the doctrine of investigation of things, see Chu Hsi, "Ta-hsiieh huo-wen" A
[Questions on Great Learning: part two], in Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yii-lei, chtian 16, pp.
402-408.
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limitation. Wang Yang-ming, however, had a significantly different interpretation. In
his Ch 'uan-hsi lu [Instructions for practical living], Wang bluntly criticizes
Oft
Chu Hsi for wrongly interpreting the doctrine of "the investigation of things". He
explained as follows:
The master of the body is the mind. What emanates from the mind is the will.
The original substance of the will is knowledge, and wherever the will is
directed is a "thing" (wu). For example, when the will is directed toward serving
one's parents, then serving one's parents is a "thing". When the will is directed
toward serving one's ruler, then serving one's ruler is a "thing". When the will
is directed toward being humane to all people and feeling love toward things,
then being humane to all people and feeling love toward things are "things", and
when the will is directed toward seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then each
of these is a "thing". Therefore I say that there are neither principles nor things
outside the mind.31
In Wang Yang-ming's interpretation, the "things" and "knowledge" became more
confined to the field of moral matters. Wang also had a special interpretation of the
word "ko" as follows:
The word ko in ko wu is the same as the ko in Mencius' saying that "a great man
rectified (ko) the ruler's mind." It means to eliminate what is incorrect in the
mind so as to preserve the correctness of its original substance. Wherever the
will is, the incorrectness must be eliminated so correctness may be preserved. In
other words, in all places and at all times the principle of Heaven must be
preserved. This is the investigation of principles to the utmost. The principle of
Heaven is clear character, and to investigate the principle of things to the utmost
is to manifest the clear character.
29 Chu Hsi, Ssu-shu chi-chu, p. 8; Source Book, p. 89.
30
Wang Yang-ming, Ch'uan-hsi-lu [The instructions for practical living] (hereafter
abbreviated as CHL) (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chii, 1988), p. 36.
31 CHL, p. 37, For an English translation, see Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living
and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming (hereafter abbreviated as Instructions) (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), part I: 6.
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Given his innovative annotation of the word ko in ko wu as "rectify", which is
dramatically deprived of the epistemological meaning of the word in Chu Hsi's
annotation as "investigate", Wang's interpretation of the meaning of ko wu was
significantly different from Chu Hsi's interpretation.33
Wang Yang-ming also pinpointed "the extension of knowledge", with his
extensive interpretation of "knowledge" as "innate knowledge", in place of "the
investigation of things" as the essential ethic of the Great Learning.34 It appeared
that he was confident enough to substitute his own interpretation of the Great
Learning for Chu Hsi's.
His interpretation was obviously such a serious threaten to orthodox
Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism that, in 1523, the examiners of the metropolitan civil
service examination put a question about the School of Mind in the examination,
implicitly to repudiate Wang Yang-ming.35 Arguments against Wang Yang-ming
became popular in these days. In dealing with them, Wang was unexpectedly resolute.
He said:
During the time that I was in Nanking [in 1516], I still thought to compromise
with normal people. But nowadays I only trust innate knowledge as the true
knowledge for discriminating right from wrong. I therefore have no need to hide
or excuse myself. I would rather be a wild man leading people to describe me as
a man who acts without fear of what he says. I simply act in accordance with
32
CHL, p. 37; Instructions, part I: 7, pp. 14-15.
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Huang Chin-hsing "Li-hsiieh k'ao-chii-hsiieh yii cheng-chih: i Ta-hsiieh kai-pen te fa-chan
wei li" fX [Neo-Confucianism, textual criticism and
politics: the development of the revised editions of the 'Ta-hsiieh' as an example] Bulletin of the
Institute ofHistory and Philology, Academia Sinica (December, 1989),vol. 60, part 4, p. 899.
34
Tang Chiin-i, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh yiian-lun: tao-lun p'ien SlImM [A
fundamental exposition of Chinese philosophy: introduction] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng shu-chti, 1984), p.
299.
35
WYMCC, chiian 35, "Nien-p'u san" tpJffjEi. [chronological biography: part three], p. 1287.
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innate knowledge.36
This passage shows how strongly Wang was resolved to break with orthodox
Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism.
Wang Yang-ming's challenge to orthodox Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism,
though inviting criticism from his contemporaries, influenced literati life and
gradually won victory. In the 1523 metropolitan examination, several of Wang's
disciples who took the examination walked out of the hall in protest. Another used
the opportunity to celebrate Wang's teachings and was rewarded with a chin-shih 3iit
it degree. The anti-Wang policy among examiners seemed to be failed. Furthermore,
some of Wang's disciples became examiners in the 1568 metropolitan examination.
With their promoting Wang's doctrine in the examinations, Wang's doctrine steadily
penetrated the system. Besides that, Chia-ching era (1522-66) commentaries on
the Four Books also show the turn from orthodox Ch'eng-Chu interpretations to
'in
newer views drawn from Wang Yang-ming and his disciples.
To sum up the comparison between Ch'en Hsien-chang's and Wang
Yang-ming's Schools of Mind, we find that both of them had experienced the
problem of mind and principle not converging after following the teaching of
Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism in their pursuits of learning, and both found ways of
escaping from this predicament by transferring the field of moral cultivation from
things and books to the mind. Ch'en, as a forerunner of a new intellectual trend of the
School of Mind, was immersed in "getting the Way himself', and was passive in
36 Ibid.
37
Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History ofCivil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Los Angeles:
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response to the challenges from the official orthodoxy of Ch'eng-Chu
Neo-Confucianism. This caused his School of Mind to decline in the long run. Wang,
on the other hand, as an indirect inheritor of this new intellectual trend, was more
active in confronting Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism by inventing his own doctrine
of the extension of innate knowledge and reinterpreting Chu Hsi's doctrine of the
investigation of things. Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind, therefore, stood firm as
a new intellectual paradigm.
University of California Press, 2000), p. 413.
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2.3 The factionalization of the School of Mind in the late Ming
Although Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind stood firm as a new intellectual
paradigm in Neo-Confucianism, different interpretations of his doctrine among his
disciples emerged as it became popular, and thus the factionalization of this School
of Mind occurred. When talking about Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension
of innate knowledge", Wang Chi found eight different interpretations of the idea of
liang-chih (innate knowledge) among Wang Yang-ming's disciples.1 Another
disciple of Wang Yang-ming, Hu Han [Chin-shan [_Lj, 1381-?], also found
four different interpretations of the doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge"
among Wang Yang-ming's disciples.2 These different interpretations naturally
brought some problems for Wang Yang-ming's disciples in capturing the true
meaning of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. After the late Ming there were many
scholars who divided the Wang Yang-ming School into different sections with
different standards. Huang Tsung-hsi divided it into six sections according to
geographical location.3 Modern Chinese Marxist-Leninist historians divided it into
"yu-p'ai" [right-wing] and "tso-p'ai" [left-wing] sections according to
their attitude toward the proletariat.4 The Japanese scholar Okada Takehiko
1 See P'eng Kuo-hsiang Liang-chih hsiieh te ch'an-k'ai: Wang Lung-hsiyii chung wan Ming
te Yang-ming hsiieh EMM^T1 Pfl ifJ !If][The unfolding of the doctrine
about innate knowledge: Wang Chi and the middle and late Ming studies of Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng shu-chu, 2003), pp. 342-3.
2 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Che-chung Wang-men hsiieh-an wu" [The Che-chung
section of Wang Yang-ming School: part five], in MJHA, chan 15, p. 330.
3 There were the Che-chung cf3, Chiang-yu Nan-chung Ch'u-chung Northern
[Pei-fang JtE] and Yiieh ^-Min [1] schools.
4 See Chi Wen-fu Tso-p'ai Wang hsiieh iifJBcrElll [The left-wing section of the Wang
Yang-ming School] (Taipei: Kuo-wen t'ien-ti tsa-chih she, 1990), pp. 74-84; Chi Wen-fu, Wan Ming
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j§? divided it into three groups: Kensenha which considered that to act is to
follow ready-made innate knowledge; Kijakuha WWiM,, which considered that the
way was to return to the stillness of the mind; and Syujoha which considered
the way to be through gradual cultivation and reflective thinking.5
The reason for the factionalization of the Wang Yang-ming School may be
traced to Wang's doctrine itself. In his later life, Wang propounded his famous "Four
Sentences of Teaching"(ssu-chii chiao Its meaning is so ambiguous that it
left a legacy of controversy which continued long after his death.6 The Four
Sentences of Teaching" is from "Conversation at T'ien-ch'iian in 1527.7 In
this conversation, Wang Yang-ming said:
The absence of good and evil characterizes the mind-in-itself (hsin-t'i >L^fH)
The presence of good and evil characterizes the movement of the will.
The knowledge of good and evil is liang-chih (innate knowledge).
The doing of good and ridding of evil is the investigation of things.8
The crucial point is in the interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's description of the
ssu-hsiang shih lun flj&PT® [A history of thought of the late-Ming] (Peking: Tung-fung
ch'u-pan she, 1996), pp. 15-49.
5 See Okada Takehito [31EE1 O Yomei to Minmatsu no Jiigaku, pp. 103-258.
6 Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom: The Way of Wang Yang-ming (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1976), pp. 149-50.
7 See CHL, p. 359; Instructions, Part III: 315, pp. 243-45.
8
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Yao-chiang hsiieh-an", in MJHA, chiian 10, p. 179; Records, p. 101. Wang
Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching" is a very important part of this study. A further discussion
of it will feature in chapter 4. It is worth noting that the concept is developed from the four steps of
moral cultivation in the Great Learning, which are "the rectification of the mind" (cheng hsin TFT,A
"making the will sincere" (ch'eng i MS)> "the extension of knowledge" (chih chi IfJTK) and "the
investigation of things" (ko wu tfffljf). See the Great Learning, in Source Books, p. 86. My later
discussion on the arguments concerning Wang's "For Sentences of Teaching" on the mind (hsin Tx)>
the will (i fa), knowledge (chih £P) and things (wu ff) are also to be understood in terms of their
meaning in the context the Great Learning.
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nature of "the absence of good and evil" in the mind. Some scholars interpreted this
as "The mind-in-itself, with good and evil, is human nature".9 It is noteworthy that
Mencius' theory of the goodness of human nature is generally accepted by
Confucians.10 The former interpretation obviously put Wang's description in danger
of deviating from the Mencian tradition. It was under these circumstances that Huang
Tsung-hsi argued: "Scholars have understood them [i.e. Wang's "Four Sentences of
Teaching"] incorrectly, taking what is said about nature as being neither good nor
evil to mean that the supreme good is neither good nor evil."11
This phenomenon is probably due to theoretical problems in Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine itself. The "Four Sentences of Teaching" caused a significant debate
between Wang's two disciples, Ch'ien Te-hung [Hsu-shan &§[JL|, 1497-1574]
and Wang Chi. As Ch'ien records:
[When they discussed Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching"]
Ju-chung [f&cfT i.e. Wang Chi] said: "This is not the final conclusion. If we say
that in the original substance of the mind there is no distinction between good
and evil, then there must be no such distinction in the will, in knowledge, and in
things. If we say that there is a distinction between good and evil in the will,
then in the final analysis there must also be such a distinction in the substance of
the mind." I said: "The substance of the mind is the nature endowed in us by
Heaven, and is originally neither good nor evil. But because we have a mind
dominated by habits, we see in our thoughts a distinction between good and evil.
The work of the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the
9 Ibid.
10 See Mou Tsung-san, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh te t'e-chih [The characteristics of
Chinese philosophy] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng shu-chii, 1963), p. 67; Ch'ien Mu, "Ju-chia chih hsing
shang lun yii ch'i chin hsing chu-i" [Confucian's theory of the
goodness of human nature], Chung-kuo hsiieh-shu ssu-hsiang lun-ts'ung
[Miscellaneous essays on Chinese scholarship and thought] (Taipei: Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1978),
vol. 2, pp. 1-15; Wing-tsit Chan, "Idealistic Confucianism: Mencius", in Source Book, pp. 49-50.
11
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Yao-chiang hsiieh-an", in MJHA, chiian 10, p. 180; Records, p. 102.
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sincerity of the will, the rectification of the mind, and the cultivation of the
personal life is aimed precisely at recovering that original nature and substance.
If there were no good or evil to start with, what would be the necessity of such
efforts?12
It appears that Wang Chi was so overwhelmingly impressed by Wang Yang-ming's
description of the nature of "the absence of good and evil" in the mind that he denied
the other three sentences of his "Four Sentences of Teaching", which emphasize the
existence of good and evil, the tasks of discriminating good from evil and doing good
and removing evil. He emphasized the need to realize the fact that there is no
distinction between good and evil in the mind, the will, knowledge and things.
Ch'ien Te-hung, though agreeing that the human mind was originally neither good
nor evil, was more concerned that the mind is apt to be dominated by habits, which
might put good and evil thoughts into it. He therefore emphasized the effort to
recover that original nature and substance of the mind through discriminating good
from evil.
In brief, the debate between Wang Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung came down to two
main questions: "Is the human mind dominated by habits?" and "Is there a necessity
to exert effort to recover the original nature and substance of the human mind?"
When they took their debate to Wang Yang-ming for elucidation, Wang replied:
You two gentlemen complement each other very well, and should not hold on to
one side. Here I deal with two types of peoples. The man of acute intelligence
apprehends straight from the source. The original substance of the human mind
is in fact crystal-clear without any impediment and is the equilibrium before the
12
CHL, p. 359; Instructions, Part III: 315, pp. 243-44.
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feelings are aroused. The man of acute intelligence has accomplished his task as
soon as he has apprehended the original substance, penetrating the self, other
people, and things internal and things external all at the same time. On the other
hand, there are inevitably those whose minds are dominated by habits so that the
original substance of the mind is obstructed. I therefore teach them definitely
and sincerely to do good and remove evil in their will and thoughts. When they
become expert at the task and the impurities of the mind are completely
eliminated, the original substance of the mind will become wholly clear.
Ju-chung's view is the one I use in dealing with the man of acute intelligence.
Te-hung's view is for the second type. If you two gentlemen use your views
interchangeably, you will be able to lead all people—of the highest, average, and
low intelligence—to the truth. If each of you holds on to one side, right here you
will err in handling properly the different types of man and each in his own way
will fail to understand fully the substance of the Way.13
It seems that Wang attempted to keep neutral in this debate. But he finally admitted
that: "It is not easy to find people of acute intelligence in the world. Even Yen Hui
H® [Yuan $fj, ?-?] and Ming-tao [i.e. Ch'eng Hao] dared not assume that they
could fully realize the original substance of the mind as soon as they apprehended the
task. How can we lightly expect this of people? People's minds are dominated by
habits. If we do not teach them concretely and sincerely to devote themselves to the
task of doing good and removing evil right in their innate knowledge rather than
cultivate a mind of vacuity and quietness. This defect is not a small matter and must
be exposed as early as possible."14
To sum up, although Wang did have confidence in the clarity of the original
substance of the human mind, he never ceased to worry about the possibility of its
being obstructed by habits. Wang's attitude is very typical of Confucians. It shows
13 CHL, pp. 359-60; Instructions, Part III: 315, p. 244
14
CHL, p. 360; Instructions, Part III: 315, pp. 244-5.
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"the Confucian belief that the individual can and should summon a godlike flow of
moral power within himself, but this belief was paradoxically combined with a
fearful realization that he would be unable to do so, trapped in a fundamental
predicament."15 This would explain Wang's emphasis on the necessity for normal
people "to devote themselves to the task of doing good and removing evil right in
their innate knowledge" in order to recover the original nature and substance of the
human mind.
Because the doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" was Wang
Yang-ming's most important doctrine, one that he thought of as his personal
invention for moral cultivation, for the purpose of "doing good and removing evil
right in people's innate knowledge," we need to go back to this doctrine of "the
extension of innate knowledge". Once, when a disciple who had heard Wang's
instructions on "the extension of innate knowledge" but who still felt that his effort
was not sufficiently earnest asked Wang to elucidate the way to the extension of
innate knowledge, Wang answered him in a very ambiguous way. His Chuan-hsi lu
records:
The Teacher Wang Yang-ming said, "If you already know what the extension of
innate knowledge is, how can it be elucidated? From the beginning innate
knowledge is clear. The thing to do is to exert effort earnestly and concretely.
Otherwise, the more one talks about it, the more muddled it will become." The
disciple replied, "My request is precisely on the elucidation of the effort to
extend innate knowledge." The Teacher said, "You have the way yourself. I
have no other method to offer. Once there was a Zen jjip [Ch'an] master. When
someone came to him to ask about the Law of Buddha, he merely raised a dust
15 Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.
49.
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whisk. One day his followers hid his dust whisk to see what other schemes he
would resort to. When someone asked him about the Law he looked for the dust
whisk but could not find it, and merely raised his empty hand. This innate
knowledge of mine is the dust whisk of my scheme. Aside from it, what can I
raise?" A little later, another friend asked about essentials of the task. The
Teacher looked to the side and asked, "Where is my dust whisk?" Those present
were excited and happy.16
From this dialogue, we can see that Wang was supremely confident in the
self-evidence of the clarity of innate knowledge, which was simply beyond any doubt.
He considered "the extension of innate knowledge" to be realized only through
practice in real life, which needed no theoretical elucidation. Therefore, subjected to
repeated questioning from his disciples on elucidation of the effort to extend innate
knowledge, he could do nothing but use the Ch'an Buddhist story to respond, seeking,
presumably, to persuade his disciples to think reflectively on their behaviour in real
life.
Wang's answers are epigrammatic, but he did admit that he had no method to
offer concerning the way of "the extension of innate knowledge", leaving it to his
disciples to find methods themselves. No wonder that the interpretation of the
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" became problematic, as exemplified
by the debate between Ch'ien Te-hung and Wang Chi on his "Four Sentences of
Teaching". Although Wang Yang-ming asked these two disciples to use their views
interchangeably, it seemed that he did not acknowledge any conflict between their
views. Neither disciple was willing to compromise. It is said that Ch'ien Te-hung
regarded the formula of the "Four Sentences of Teaching" as a fixed teaching that
16
CHL, p. 335; Instructions, Part III: 280, p. 224.
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could not be changed, while Wang Chi called it an expedient doctrine.17 Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine was destined to be thus subjected to different interpretations.
As it became popular, Wang Yang-ming's doctrine seems to have been distorted.
The emergence of the doctrines of Wang Chi and the scholars of the T'ai-chou ^fjjj
School, are obvious examples. In his Ming-ju hsiieh-an, Huang Tsung-hsi made a
general description of this phenomenon with his criticism of Wang Chi and the most
representative figure of the T'ai-chou School, Wang Ken EEH [Hsin-chai /Lrilf,
1483-1541]. He excluded the T'ai-chou School from his enumeration of the sections
in the Wang Yang-ming School, although he did concede its significant role. At the
very beginning of his description of the T'ai-chou School, he said:
The teaching of Master Yang-ming became popular everywhere under Heaven
on account of Wang Ken and Wang Chi. But it gradually lost its transmission in
part due to Wang Ken and Wang Chi. Wang Ken and Wang Chi were frequently
dissatisfied with their master's teaching, seeking all the while to unveil more of
the Buddha's mysteries and attribute them to the master. Thus they pressed
Yang-ming into the ranks of Ch'an Buddhism.18
From a historical perspective, it is clear that the teaching of Wang Yang-ming did not
in fact "lose its transmission". However, as a profoundly dedicated Neo-Confucian,
Huang Tsung-hsi was inevitably critical, considering his view that the teaching of
Wang Yang-ming had lost its true meaning because of the radical misinterpretations
of Wang Chi and Wang Ken.
17 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Che-chung Wang-men hsiieh-an erh" [The Che-chung
section of the Wang Yang-ming School: part II], in MJHA, chiian 12, p. 239.
18
Huang Tsung-hsi, 'T'ai-chou hsiieh-an i" [The T'ai-chou School: part I], in MJHA,
chiian 32, p. 703; Records, p. 165.
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However, it is clear that it probably was Wang's confidence in his doctrine of
"the extension of innate knowledge" that gave some of his disciples, like Wang Chi
and the members of the T'ai-chou School, the courage to try the choice of teaching
for the "man of acute intelligence". Because of their choices, the teaching of Wang
Yang-ming that became popular was his teaching for the "man of acute intelligence",
not his teaching for the "people of average and the low intelligence".
Wang Chi and the T'ai-chou School, with their popularity, inspired a lot of
criticism in the late Ming. Confident of his own interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's
"Four Sentences of Teaching", Wang Chi developed from it his own "Four
Negatives" (ssu-wu Hi®);
If we are enlightened to the fact that the original mind is without good or evil,
then we must realize that the will (or intention) is without good and evil,
knowledge is without good and evil, and things are without good and evil.19
Based on this idea, Wang Chi concluded that rules of good and bad conduct were
artificial, not standards that emerged naturally from the mind. He therefore put
forward his own interpretation of liang-chih as follows:
Liang-chih is something that is produced by nothing, being the Mean of
consciousness before the emotions arise. There is no other such prior state
before such knowledge outside the harmony of emotions in due proportion, and
there is no posterior state of consciousness following such knowledge. One can
naturally gather one's composure without forcing it, and one can naturally
manifest emotions without deliberation. Thus self-realization can happen at
19
Wang Chi, "T'ien-chiian cheng tao chi" [The Record of Confirmation of the Way at
T'ien-chiian], in Wang Chi, Wang Lung-hsi ch'uan-chi, chiian 1, pp. la-b.
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once, without reliance on effort and cultivation. By the same reason, the
extension of liang-chih was taught for the sake of those who had not yet attained
enlightenment. Those who could believe in liang-chih could come and go by
themselves, as the bead travels across the abacus, without need of any control,
keeping naturally from waywardness.20
As we have mentioned earlier, in Wang Yang-ming's opinion, only "the man of acute
intelligence" could "accomplish his task as soon as he has apprehended the original
substance, penetrating the self, other people, and things internal and things external
all at the same time." Wang Yang-ming also told Wang Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung that
there were inevitably "people of average and the low intelligence" "whose minds are
dominated by habits so that the original substance of the mind is obstructed," and that
with those people, one should "therefore teach them definitely and sincerely to do
good and remove evil in their will and thoughts." However, in Wang Chi's
interpretation, this distinction between "the man of acute intelligence" and "people of
average and the low intelligence" was simply dismissed; to believe in liang-chih
became so crucial that the caution for doing good and removing evil was easily
ignored.
Wang Chi's "Four Negatives" became a main target of criticism from many
scholars, especially scholars of the Tung-lin School, who insisted that mind
was ultimately good.21 They even criticized Wang Yang-ming for inspiring Wang
20
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Che-chung Wang-men hsiieh-an erh", in MJHA, chiian 12, p. 239; Records, p.
116.
21
Mizoguchi Yuzo "Iwayuru Torinha jinshi no shiso—zenkindaiki ni okeru Chugoku shiso
no tenkai—(jo)" Id & H -5 [The
thought of the so-called Tung-lin school: the development of Chinese thought in the pre-modern
period (part one)] Toyo bunka kenkyiijo kiyo [The bulletin of the Institute for
Research on Oriental Culture], 27: 4 (March 1978): 117.
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Chi's ideas of the "Four Negatives".22 However, Wang Chi had his faithful followers,
too. Debates on the "Four Negatives" became a heated issue in the late Ming. The
debate between Hsu Fu-yiian [Ching-an l&ME, 1535-1604] and Chou Ju-teng
[Hai-men $gf"5, 1547-1629], one of Wang Chi's disciples, is a prime
example of the opinions of each side.
The debate took place around the year 1592, beginning in one of the lectures
organized by Hsu and Chou. In this debate, Chou expounded Wang Chi's doctrine
regarding the absence of good and evil as the essential teaching. Hsu disputed the
issue in his Chiu ti (Nine Inquiries) to argue with him. Chou then wrote the
Chiu chieh (Nine Explanations) in further explanation.23 In brief, Hsu insisted
on the highest goodness of the mind and human nature. He tried to rescue Wang
Yang-ming's "Four Sentences" from being trapped in a moral nihilism.24 Chou
insisted on the transcendental characteristics of the mind and human nature, which is
beyond artificial good and evil.25 Their debate reflects a fundamental disagreement
on the problem of the characteristics of the mind and human nature.
According to Huang Tsung-hsi, these lectures attracted famous participants,
stimulating intense discussions. The disciples of Hsu Fu-yiian and Chou Ju-teng also
had their own disputes.26 It shows that the scholars of the late Ming period were very
interested in the problem of whether mind is without good or evil or is ultimately
good.
22 Chi Wen-fu, Wan-ming ssu-hsiang-shih lun, p. 22.
23 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an wu" [The T'ai-chou School: part five], in
MJHA, chiian 36, p. 854; chiian 41, "Kan-ch'uan hsiieh-an wu" [The Kan-ch'iian School:
part five], in ibid., p. 976.
24
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Kan-ch'iian hsiieh-an wu", in MJHA, chiian 41, p. 976.
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Moreover, Wang Chi's lack of attention to doing good and removing evil was
championed by members of the T'ai-chou School, comprising the most "radical" of
27
Wang Yang-ming's disciples. In his description of the T'ai-chou School, Huang
Tsung-hsi's comments on the disciples of Wang Chi and Wang Ken show the impact
they had on the fragmentation of Wang Yang-ming's teaching on the nature of mind:
In Wang Chi's case, no disciple emerged who was stronger than [Wang Chi]
himself, and his teaching was balanced and remedied by the Chiang-yu school.
So there was no total disintegration effected. In Wang Ken's case, many of his
disciples could fight the dragon and the snake with their bare hands.28 By the
time his teaching passed down to men like Yen Chun MirJ [Shan-nung [III!,
1504-96] and Ho Hsin-yin {5^0HI [Liang Fu-shan ^^[_L[, 1517-79], it was no
longer within the boundaries of Confucian moral philosophy.... These men
turned Heaven and Earth upside down. There has been no one like them among
the ancients and moderns.29
It seems that Wang Ken's disciples were more influential because they were more
radical and active than Wang Chi's.
However, it was Wang Ken himself who was responsible for encouraging the
radicalization of the T'ai-chou School. Wang Ken was a very innovative interpreter
of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. In order to persuade his disciples to use a plain way
to teach the populace, Wang Yang-ming had once agreed with one of his disciples
who said that "the people filling the street are all sages".30 Wang Ken, as a humble
25
Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an wu", in ibid., chiian 36, p. 854.
26 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Kan-ch'iian hsiieh-an wu", in ibid., chiian 41, p. 976.
"7
Cynthia J. Brokow, The Ledgers ofMerit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late
Imperial China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 19-20.
28 The metaphor is used to show their daring. See Records, p. 173.
29
Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsueh-an i", in MJHA, chilan 32, p. 703; Records, p. 165.
30 See CHL, p. 357; Instructions, Part III: 313, p. 240.
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worker himself, went further in expressing his optimistic attitude towards the pursuit
of the sagehood in the populace, arguing that "the daily activity of the common
people was the Way",31 and "the sagely Way is not different from the daily activity
of the common people".32 His special characteristics and ways of teaching also
added to his influence. As Huang Tsung-hsi reported: "For although Wang Chi's skill
as a debater was considered second only to that of Yang-ming, nevertheless there
were some who lacked faith in his teachings. It was Wang Ken who, through his
glances and facial expressions, was capable of inspiring the greatest number."33
Wang Ken was therefore considered a kind of populist who differed from the moral
elitism of the Wang Yang-ming School.34
Following Wang Ken's special instruction, his disciples, many of them workers
like Wang Ken himself, developed populism even further, to the extent of
challenging the old ethics. For example, Yen Chiin and the like became known for
ir
their positive affirmation of human desire, Ho Hsin-yin for his activity in gathering
mobs that threatened political authority,36 and Li Chih [Ch'uo-wu
1527-1602], the most controversial figure of the T'ai-chou School, for his challenge
to traditional ethics, which give rise to a series of accusations that he was destroying
31 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an i", in MJHA chiian 32, p. 710; Ching, Records, p. 176.
32
Wang Ken, "Yii-lu" [Dialogue], in Wang Ken, Wang hsin-chai ch'iian-chi
[The complete works of Wang Ken] (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chii, 1975), chuan 2, p. 15a.
33
Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an i", in MJHA, chuan 32, p. 710; Ching, Records, p. 176.
34 Shimada Kenji IIEHfifTK, Chugoku ni okeru kindai shii no zasetsu '('[SltTHtt -5 fH<7)
[The frustration of modern thought in China] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1949; reissue, 1970), pp.
98-100; Hou Wai-lu Chao Chi-pin MIS® and Tu Kuo-hsiang fiHIPj?, Chung-kuo
ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih [A comprehensive history of Chinese thought] (Peking: Jen-min
ch'u-pan she, 1960), vol. 4, Part II, pp. 958-1002.
35 Shimada Kenji, op. cit., p. 112
36 Shimada Kenji, op.cit., p. 121-24; Hou Wai-lu, et al., op. cit., pp. 1003-30; Ronald Dimberg, The
Sage and Society: The Life and Thought ofHo Hsin-yin (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii,
1974), p. 46.
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37social norms. Some modem scholars regard Wang Ken and the members of the
T'ai-chou School as leaders of an intellectual change that had the potential for
oo
individualism most closely resembling that of the modem West.
Scholars of the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing who faced the tragedy of
the decline of the Ming dynasty related the developments of Wang Yang-ming's
School of Mind to the destiny of the Ming dynasty. Some even maintained that this
intellectual trend was a cause of Ming dynastic decline.39 Ku Yen-wu
[T'ing-lin 1613-82], one of the most important critics of Neo-Confucianism,
criticized this intellectual trend as follows:
Today's gentlemen assemble up to a hundred guests and disciples to discuss
"Mind" and "(Human) Nature," brushing aside the method of acquiring
"knowledge through extensive learning" in seeking "consistency". They turn
from the discussion "of the world's trouble and poverty" in favor of discussion
of "lofty and esoteric doctrines, and the excellence of single-mindedness". With
this I cannot agree.40
As a leader of a new intellectual trend of empirical study of the Ch'ing fjf period
37 Shimada Kenji, op. cit., pp. 161-229; Hou Wai-lu, et al., op. cit., pp. 1031-95.
38 Shimada Kenji, op. cit., p. 214, p. 250; Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Individualism and Humanism in
Late Ming", in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., Selfand Society in Ming Thought (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970), pp. 145-48. Mizoguchi Yuzo 3f although he disagrees with
Shimada's opinion on the modernity and individualism of the T'ai-chou school, also maintains that the
T'ai-chou school led some ethical changes in the late Ming. See Mizoguchi Yuzo, Chugoku zenkindai
shiso no kusazu to tenkai A USMISA ® *7)Ifti fff t. MPS [The twist and unfolding of pre-modern
thought in China] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1980), pp. 51-212.
39
Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in
Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984),
pp. 50-53.
40 Ku Yen-wu T'ing-lin wen-chi A® [The literary works of Ku Yen-wu] (Taipei:
Kuang-hua yin-shu kuan, 1956), chuan 3, "Ta yu-jen lun-hsiieh shu" [A reply to a
friend on studies], p. 1. For the translation, see Immanuel C. T. Hsu trans., Intellectual Trends in the
Ch'ing Period [Liang Ch'i-ch'ao A (3 Si, Ch'ing-tai hsiieh-shu kai-lun iff f'l§ Iff Iff! ] (Cambridge,
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[1644-1911], Ku strongly opposed the School of Mind.41 The above description is
obviously an accusation that the School of Mind bore the responsibility for the
decline of the Ming dynasty. Ku even made a direct attack on Wang Yang-ming
himself. Ku said:
There have been men who could single-handedly change the world, with their
influence lasting as long as a hundred odd years: in ancient times, [for example],
we have Wang Yen's -Fffif [I-fu 256-311] ch'ing-t'an (pure
discourse) and Wang An-shih's [Chieh-fu /["[ft, 1021-86] new
doctrine. ... In modern times, Wang Yang-ming's liang-chih was another case.
Mencius said: "A long time has elapsed since this world of men received its
being, and there has been in the course of its history now a period of good order,
and now a period of confusion." Is it not for future sages to turn the world of
disorder to order?42
The intellectual trend of pure discourse, of which Wang Yen was one of the main
representatives, is generally considered by historians as one of the reasons for the
decline of the Western Chin If dynasty [265-316].43 It is also considered that Wang
An-shih's new doctrine caused the failure of political reform in the Northern Sung
dynasty.44 In comparing Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge" to Wang Yen's "pure discourse" and Wang An-shih's "new doctrine",
Ku seems to accuse Wang Yang-ming himself for the decline of the Ming dynasty.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 29.
41 See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsiieh-shu shih, pp. 52-64; Hou Wai-Iu
Chin-tai Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang hsiieh-shuo shih iillT 43 IS©£4^-IS4? [A history of thought and
doctrines of modern China] (Taipei: Ku-feng ch'u-pan she, 1987), pp. 165-213.
42 Ku Yen-wu, Yuan ch'ao pen Jih-chih lu 0 [Records of daily knowledge (manuscript
edition)] (Taipei: Ming-lun ch'u-pan she, 1970), chiian 20, "Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun"
Im [Chu Hsi's final conclusion of his last years], p. 539; Immanuel C. T. Hsii, op. cit., p. 29.
43 Ch'ien Mu ISfJI, Kuo-shih ta-kang [Essentials of Chinese history] (Taipei: Taiwan
Commercial Press, 1974), p. 225.
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Another critic of Neo-Confucianism, Fang I-chih jj J^i,W [Mi-chih
1611-71], also made a serious attack on Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind:
The reason Wang Yang-ming was content to allow that "the mind is nature" and
"the mind is the classics" is because he wanted to save scholars from
fragmentary studies. But his inferior disciples indulge in empty talk and forsake
practical learning. They dismiss the study of the classics. They totally distort the
teaching [of Wang Yang-ming].45
In Fang's opinion, Wang Yang-ming's positive influence was in saving scholars from
studies of literary prose and study for the civil service examination, which was
fragmented in Wang's time. However, Wang's emphasis on the primacy of the role
of the mind endangered his doctrine into over-internalization, with the pursuit of
learning focused only on the Doctrines of Mind (hsin-hsiieh 'LvfS) and neglecting the
study of the classics. Although Fang tried to spare Wang Yang-ming from the brunt
of this attack by focusing his criticism on Wang's disciples, he still showed that it
was Wang Yang-ming's doctrine that caused the degeneration of the
Neo-Confucians.
To condemn Wang Yang-ming's doctrine or its later developments as the only
or main cause for the decline of the Ming dynasty is perhaps not so convincing.




Fang I-chih , Yao-tip'ao-chuang [A criticism of Chuang-tzu] (Taipei:
Kuang-wen shu-chii, 1973), "Tsung-lun chung" HSfrarf1 [Introduction: part two], p. 17b.
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3.1 Family and early life
Liu Tsung-chou was born in the Shui-ch'eng community in the Shan-yin
[I]^ district of Shao-hsing fnft Prefecture, the province of Chekiang tffftt on 4
March 1578.2 A fatherless and only child, before long he was taken by his mother to
live with his maternal grandfather Chang Ying IfiM [Nan-chou 1514-1605],3
Liu's family was very poor. In his childhood, he had no winter clothes of his own,
and wore adult clothes donated by his uncle until he was fifteen or sixteen years old.4
Liu began to study at the age of seven in the Chang family's private school.5
When he was ten his mother could no longer afford to pay the fees, and so he started
to study with his maternal grandfather. Chang Ying was a famous teacher; many of
his students won degrees in the civil service examination. Although he was known as
a talented scholar from a very early age, Chang Ying himself had failed in the civil
service examinations eleven times. It was only when he was over fifty years old that
1 The basic sources for Liu Tsung-chou's life are two chronological biographies, both entitled Liu
Tsung-chou nien-p'u [Chronological biography of Liu Tsung-chou]. The original
biography was compiled by his son, Liu Chuo (hereafter abbreviated as LNP) (1882 ed.). The
second was a supplementary edition of the former compiled by Yao Ming-ta (hereafter
abbreviated as YNP) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1934). Both are collected in Tai Lien-chang HScfjl
and Wu Kuang 7^, eds., Liu Tsung-chou ch'iian-chi H|J^]n]^'^ [The complete works of Liu
Tsung-chou] (hereafter abbreviated as LTCCC) (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy,
Academia Sinica, 1997), vol. 5.
2
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 83; Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 532.
3 Ibid., p. 86.
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he decided not to attend the examinations again and started his career as a teacher.
Probably because of his dissatisfaction at failing his pursuit of an official life, he was
often drunk. When drunk, he enjoyed discussing the classics and history, and
criticizing his contemporaries. He once described himself as a man who hated evil
people as if they were his deadly foes.6 Chang Ying often talked about the moral
behaviour of the ancient sages to Liu Tsung-chou who accompanied him at dinner
every evening. Liu was impressed and also grew to admire them. From childhood on,
Liu despised single-minded study for the civil service examinations in pursuit of an
official post.7
However, in a poor family like his, to win a degree in the civil service
examinations would certainly be of benefit to his family. In this respect, Liu's mother
had great influence on him. As a widow with an only child, she made great efforts to
educate him. Though occupied by her weaving, she supervised his studies every
evening. She also disciplined him harshly: nothing would escape the vigilance of her
discipline, and any bad behaviour would give rise to serious censure. The neighbours
were all impressed by the way she raised her son.8 Chang Ying moved to
Shou-ch'ang ifH, far away from Liu Tsung-chou's home, when Liu was twelve.
Liu's mother nevertheless urged him to go to study with him. The long journey to
Shou-ch'ang caused problems with his feet. After his feet were cured, before long he
had an eye ailment for a whole year. Despite his weak health he traveled to
Shou-ch'ang three times during the next five years. Other people were shaken, but his
4
YNP, in ibid., p. 87.
5
LNP, in ibid., p. 88.
6
YNP, in ibid., pp. 118-9.
7
LNP, in ibid., pp. 90-1.
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mother never relinquished her pressure on him to study.9 It is remarked by Yao
Ming-ta one modern editor of his biography, that Liu's profound
Confucianism was greatly indebted to his mother's harsh discipline.10
Liu Tsung-chou's decision to attend the civil service examinations also can be
traced to his family tradition. According to his ancestral records, Liu's family had
been literati for the previous three hundred years.11 It was said that his father, Liu
Ch'in-t'ai [1548-1577], was known for his intelligence from an early age.
Liu Ch'in-tai's father, Liu Chien-feng [1225-1605], had such a weak
constitution that he ceased to study while he was still a young man. When he realized
that his son was clever, he told him: "You will accomplish my ambition." His great
wish was that Liu Ch'in-t'ai would win degrees in the civil service examinations. In
order to educate Liu Ch'in-t'ai he engaged famous teachers at great expense. All the
family property, including the estate where they lived, was sold to raise money for
the boy's education.12 Liu Ch'in-t'ai's grandfather, Liu Mao-shan
[1498-1576], also had confidence in his grandson. He said: "Here is a good
descendant who will rebuild our family." He earnestly hoped that Ch'in-t'ai would
1
win degrees in the civil service examinations. Ch'in-t'ai's grandmother prayed for
him day and night: " May he win degrees in the civil service examinations to glorify
8
Ibid., p. 91.
9 Ibid., pp. 92-3.
10
YNP, in ibid., p. 91.
11
Shui-ch'eng Liu shih chia-p'u 7jcj§§l!lJ3;l5cf§f [The genealogy of Liu Tsung-chou's family], vol. 1,
Preface, in LTCCC, vol. 4, p. 438.
12
"Ling-shan chu-mu lei-chuang" lelLffifllSMTK [A narrative of Liu Tsung-chou's ancestors], in
LTCCC, vol. 3b, pp. 977-8.
13 Ibid., p. 976.
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our family."14 However, Liu Ch'in-t'ai attended the civil service examinations three
times but failed on each attempt. Though Liu Chien-feng never lost his confidence in
him, Liu Ch'in-t'ai died before he could get any degree. Liu Chien-feng became
depressed, regarding his son's death as the biggest failure of his life. For three years,
he lived in solitude in a cabin, casually dressed and shunning social intercourse.15
Liu Tsung-chou's maternal grandfather, Chang Ying, was one of Liu
Ch'in-t'ai's teachers. Liu Ch'in-t'ai was so brilliant that Chang Ying let his own
daughter marry him. However, by the time the couple married, the Liu family
property was nearly all sold. Chang Ying certainly realized to what extent the Liu
family pinned their hopes on Liu Ch'in-t'ai. When his daughter, carrying her unborn
child, decided to commit suicide immediately after her husband's death, he reminded
her that Liu would have no descendants.16 Persuaded by his reasoning, she took on
the responsibility of raising Liu Ch'in-t'ai's heir to achieve the Liu family's hopes.
After Liu Tsung-chou was born, while disciplining the boy harshly, she often
reminded him of his role: "Work hard! Strive to be a credit to your father and to have
a glorious future. That's what I wish of you."
Under these circumstances Liu Tsung-chou had no other choice but to work
hard in preparing for the examinations. However, his initial contempt for those who
sought office through the civil service examinations was still significant. For most





16 "Hsien-k'ao kao-tseng t'ung-i-tai-fu shun-t'ien-fu fu-yin ch'in-t'ai fu-chuan chi hsien-pi kao-tseng
shu-jen chen-chieh chang-t'ai-shu-jen hsiang-chuang "
[A narrative of the life of Liu Tsung-chuo's mother], ibid., pp.
987-8.
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priority. For example, "Chu Hsi had put the moral and spiritual 'learning' as a
genuine alternative to the spurious literary learning for the civil service
18examinations." Many Neo-Confucian scholars, although they may not have
publicly refuted the civil service examinations, had criticized the scholars'
overemphasis on this branch of learning.19 In this sense, Liu Tsung-chou's initial
attitude towards the civil service examinations revealed his potential for becoming a
typical Neo-Confucian.
Liu's wife nee Chang was great source of help and comfort to him. Liu
Tsung-chou married her in 1596. Nee Chang was a member of his maternal family.
He was so poor that he could not even afford a normal marriage ceremony. But his
wife was capable and virtuous: she helped him to raise a family and cared for his
ageing mother.20 Because he concentrated on his career, politics and studies, he did
not spend much time on his family's economic welfare; his wife was in charge of all
such matters. She passed away in 1636 he wept and declared that he had lost his best
friend.21
Liu Tsung-chou won the chii-jen IfIA degree in Chekiang at the age of twenty.
When he returned, his native people celebrated him. It was said that he received gifts
from some of them. Hearing of this gossip, his mother said in anger: "Did you do that
for your mother? Your mother has enough food to survive. I am afraid that your
17
Ibid., p. 989.
18 Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of
Hong Kong, 1983), p. 24.
19 Two Neo-Confucian Masters Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming's attitudes are typical. See Wang
Mao-hung 3E Chu-tzu nei-p'u [Chronological biography of Chu Hsi] (Taipei:
Shih-chieh shu-chii, 1962), p. 2 and p. 6; Ch'ien Te-hung ilflfiS, et al., Wang Yang-ming nien-p'u 31
[Chronological Biography of Wang Yang-ming], in WYMCC, p. 1221 and pp. 1223-4.
20
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 99.
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fortunes will not last for long if you do that." Liu Tsung-chou felt ashamed and
admitted his wrong behaviour. She advised him to be serious in words and deeds, and
to live on his own. As Liu Tsung-chou recorded after her death, she was a serious
woman herself. She was always careful and reticent in her behaviour. She was
successful in persuading others to reconcile their differences. She did not reveal her
own feelings, be they happy or sad. Even when she was distressed she kept quiet. For
thirty years, in order to save money, she never wore silk clothes. She only had one
plain cotton outfit for the cold season. She raised her family by weaving cloth. When
she had extra money, she asked her brother to invest it for her. Aided by her brother's
investments, she even bought ten acres (mu b$.) of good field to pass on to her son
when she died.22
At the age of twenty-four Liu Tsung-chou went to Peking, the capital of the
Ming dynasty, to attend the metropolitan and palace examination. He won a chin-shih
jftdt degree.23 The following day, he was informed of his mother's death.





YNP, in ibid., pp. 108-9.
23
LNP, in ibid., p. 106.
24
YNP, in ibid., pp. 109-10.
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3.2 Political career
After three years of mourning, Liu Tsung-chou departed for Peking in 1604, at
the age of twenty-seven, to start his career in politics. On arrival, he was appointed a
messenger in the Messenger Office [Hsing-jen ssu hsing-jen fifA RjfrA],1 a minor
job of low status. Because there were many books in the Office, he turned his back
on social intercourse and spent much of his time studying. He became friendly with a
colleague, Liu Yung-ch'eng MA® [Ching-chih jf§?A, 1576-1612], sharing a
common interest in moral cultivation.2 Liu Yung-ch'eng later became a member of
the Tung-lin party.3 It was through Liu Yung-ch'eng that Liu Tsung-chou started to
become acquainted with other members of the Tung-lin party.4
Liu soon became critical of court politics. After the Grand Secretary [Nei-k'o ta
hsiieh-shih ASA^A]5 Shen I-kuan A—*Jf [Ssu-ming HHf}, 1531-1615] came
to power, Liu once tried to submit a memorial to point out Shen's faults. After
considering his responsibility to care for his aged grandfather, however, he withdrew
it.6 For a while his official life became passive. He did only the minimum required
by the law and tired of having social intercourse with other officials. He even spent
his leisure time in a Taoist temple playing the lute and singing songs, disregarding
1 The English translation of the official title is from Charles O. Hucker, <4 Dictionary ofOfficial Titles
in Imperial China (hereafter abbreviated as DOT1C) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p.
245.
2
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 113.
3 See the appendix of a list of the partisans of the Tung-lin party in Lin Li-yiieh AMA Ming mo
Tung-lin yiin-tung hsin-t'an [A new exploration on the Tung-lin movement of the
late Ming period] (Taipei: Ph.D. Dissertation of National Taiwan Normal University, 1984), p. 411.
4




YNP, in ibid., p. 116.
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events in the political centre.7 In November 1604, less than a year after he started his
career in politics, he asked to resign to go home to care for his aged grandfather.8
Though Liu did not submit his memorial in the end, his attitude shows his sense
of responsibility and his sensitivity to current politics. His temporary retreat to a
semi-Taoist artistic life reflected a traditional Chinese literati stance: in
circumstances where, though having mastered learning for "sageliness inside"
(nei-sheng |XI=h they were unable to realize the way of "kingliness outside"
(wai-wang they often chose to retreat, adopting a relaxed, artistic perspective
while maintaining an attitude of serious moral grief.9 As we will see below, Liu
chose to retreat again and again when he felt dissatisfied with political life, his later
behaviour showing this exemplary model more vividly.
Court politics were in a state of crisis at the time Liu Tsung-chou stepped onto
the scene. Shen I-kuan contributed to the crisis by flattering the emperor Wan-li MM
[r. 1573-1620] and doing little for the country.10 However, the Wan-li emperor was
chiefly responsible. It was in the early period of the Wan-li reign, when the emperor
began to take control of imperial affairs after the Grand Secretary Chang Chii-cheng
[Chiang-ling fXlUE 1525-82] died, that the country started to get into
7
LNP, in ibid., p. 113.
8
YNP, in ibid., p. 116.
9 Mou Tsung-san XthH, Cheng-tao yii chih-tao IfciXX/njIt [Essays on political theory] (Taipei:
Hsiieh-sheng shu-chii, 1980), pp. 18-9. "Sageliness inside and kingliness outside" is a Confucian ideal
for ordering the world. It refers to the combination of interior wisdom and exterior administrative
skills that is required for a sage-king. "Sageliness inside" and "kingliness outside" are supposed to be
consistent and equally important. See Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of
Chinese Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 106; Ch'en Jo-shui fj]C§§7j<.,
"Nei-sheng wai-wang kuan-nien te yatin-shih chiu-chieh yii Ju-chia cheng-chih ssu-hsiang te ken-pen
i-nan" [The origins of the idea "sageliness
inside and kingliness outside" and the basic predicament of Confucian political thought], Shih-hsiieh
p'ing-lun [Historical review], vol. 3 (April, 1981), p. 83.
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trouble." Upset by a fundamental organizational deficiency within the government,
such that there was no orderly way to reach a consensus among the bureaucrats on
any matters of policy or appointment, the emperor himself became the major target of
criticism after 1585. The emperor began to leave remonstrating memorials
12unanswered. By the time Shen I-kuan entered the Grand Secretariat in 1594, the
court had already been suffering from several years of misrule and the situation
continued to deteriorate. Eunuch emissaries who collected taxes on mines went
through the country causing serious disturbances; officials generally received no
response to their memorials submitted to the throne, many of them being punished
and detained in jail owing to the outspokenness of their remonstrance.13 This was the
basic predicament of Liu Tsung-chou's political life.
After he was allowed to resign in 1605,14 Liu went back home and began to
teach for a living. Although he still cared about court politics, he kept away from
officials, refusing to meet any who came to visit him.15 Even when Liu Yung-ch'eng
once came to visit him and strongly criticized the current state of affairs, while the
debates around the issue of Tung-lin party had just begun, Liu Tsung-chou replied
that as a commoner he was not qualified to comment on politics, and that he would
rather talk about the moral cultivation of the self.16
Liu resumed his official career in 1612. On his way to Peking he went to Wu-hsi
10
Ming-shih, chiian 218, p. 5756.
11
Ray Huang, 1587, A Year ofNo Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Heaven: Yale
University Press, 1981), pp. 1-38.
12 Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China vol., 7, The Ming
Dynasty, 1368-1644, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Part I, pp. 515-6.
13
Ming-shih, chiian 218, p. 5756.
14
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 116.
15 Ibid., p. 121.
16 Ibid., p. 125.
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tefl; in Kiangsu intending to make the acquaintance of the leaders of the
Tung-lin party, Ku Hsien-ch'eng Jg|[Ching-yang 1550-1612] and Kao
P'an-lung [Ching-i ^^,1562-1626 ]. Ku died that year, and Liu met only
Kao. They got on so well that Liu became an ally of the party from then on. His
biography reports that "throughout the Master's [i.e., Liu Tsung-chou's] life only
Chou Ying-chung Mi®11]3 [Ling-yii jf^p, ?-?], Kao P'an-lung, Ting Ch'ang-ju ~fJH;
IM [?-?], Liu Yung-ch'eng and Wei Ta-chung [K'ung-shih JLH#, 1575-1625]
became his friends in the pursuit of the Way."17 Except for Chou, all of these men
were members of the Tung-lin party.18
Liu Tsung-chou's intimate relations with the Tung-lin party were reflected
immediately in the next year when he resumed his official status. Engaging in the
debate on the Tung-lin party that had begun in Peking, when members of the
Tung-lin party were accused of monopolizing authority to appoint and dismiss
officials, Liu submitted a memorial in defense of the members of the Tung-lin party.
This act unleashed an attack from the members of the factions opposed to the
Tung-lin, including the factions known as K'un Hsiian jf[ and Che With
this unhappy experience, he felt that politics was dominated by inferior men, and he
decided to retreat again. He resigned in 1614 and returned home to teach again for
another seven years.20
In 1621, when the emperor T'ien-ch'i [r. 1621-28] succeeded to the throne,
Liu Tsung-chou was promoted to Supplementary Secretary in the Bureau of
17 Ibid., pp. 127-8.
18 See Lin Li-yiieh, op. cit., pp. 411-34.
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Ceremonies in the Ministry of Rites [Li-pu i-chih ssu t'ien-chu chu-shih ijianPlsffj'jW]
^s£^®-]-21 After taking this new post, his moral enthusiasm made him impatient
to criticize the current state of affairs. Only nine days after taking office, he submitted
a memorial to urge impeachment of the powerful eunuch Wei Chung-hsien SStiSM
[1568-1627] and his accomplice, Madam K'o [?-?], the royal nurse of the
22
emperor T'ien-ch'i. This act incurred the emperor's wrath. It was said that Liu
would be given a beating at court. It was only because of the help of the Senior Grand
Secretary Yeh Hsiang-kao [Chin-ch'ing iHjlP, 1562-1627] that he escaped
this punishment. However, he was fined his salary for six months. It was said that he
was the first person who dared to impeach Wei Chung-hsien, and that his brave act,
though not enough to challenge Wei's power, had inspired the court officials'
praise.23 When the Manchus invaded Liao-tung jftjfi in 1622, Liu submitted a
memorial to suggest that the emperor punish those generals who were responsible for
losing territory, including the famous general Hsiung T'ing-pi [Fei-pai fftH,
1569-1625]. Many officials supported this memorial, and the generals were
eventually punished. From then on, for the next five months, Liu submitted
memorials many times to discuss many affairs of the country. When any significant
juridical event occurred, he would express his opinion in pursuit of justice, and
government officials sought his judgment. It was under his direction that Tsou
Ytian-piao [Nan-kao 1551-1624] and Feng Ts'ung-wu illtp
19
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 133.
20
Ibid., p. 145.
21 Ibid., p. 176; DOTIC, p. 183; p. 266; p. 306.
22 Ibid.
23
YNP, in ibid., p. 182.
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[Shao-hsii 1556-1627(7)] opened the Shou-shan HtUr Academy in Peking to
instruct and encourage scholars not to be fearful about the Manchu invasion.24
Despite Wei Chung-hsien's enmity, Liu was promoted to Supplementary Aide
in the Court of Imperial Entertainments [Kuang-lu ssu t'ien-chu ssu-ch'eng
in 1622,25 and subsequently Vice Minister of the Seals Office [Shang-pao
ssu shao-ch'ing f^^jlP]26 and Supplementary Vice Minister of the Court of
Imperial Stud [T'ai-p'u ssu t'ien-chu shao-ch'ing in 1623.27
However, thinking that successive promotion was detrimental to the efficient
discharge of his duties, and mindful that Wei Chung-Hsien and Madam K'o were
28
still in power, Liu resigned again on the pretext of illness. However, not long after
he resigned, he was recommended for promotion to the Right President of the Office
of Transmission [T'ung-cheng ssu yu t'ung-cheng in 1624.29 About
the time when he received this appointment, his Tung-lin comrade Yang Lien H§#1
[Wen-ju 1571-1625] was impeached by Wei Chung-hsien, and many of the
Tung-lin partisans were also expelled. He was so dismayed that he not only declined
the post but also submitted two memorials to intercede on behalf of the Tung-lin
partisans, accusing Wei Chung-hsien of various crimes. Liu's memorials certainly
caused great offence at court. He was finally accused of insulting the court through
24
LNP, in ibid., pp. 186-8.
25 Ibid., p. 188; DOTIC, p. 288.
26 Ibid., p. 194; DOTIC, p. 410; P. 414.
27
Ibid., p. 195; DOTIC, p. 481.
28 Ibid., p. 195.





self-aggrandizement and was degraded to the status of commoner in 1625.
Later the same year, Wei Chung-hsien's allies started to attack their political
opposites. First, in May, the Tung-lin partisans, Yang Lien, Tso Kuang-tou fcif
[I-chih jfilK, 1575-1625], Yuan Hua-chung [Min-hsieh .Kfii, 7-1625], Wei
Ta-chung, Chou Ch'ao-jui jn]^f^ [Ssu-yung ^IzK, 7-1625] and Ku Ta-chang MPk
jpi [Po-chin {&$X, 1576-1625] were arrested and tortured to death. Next, in July the
Shou-shan Academy was dismantled on the emperor's order, and the Tung-lin
partisans Li San-ts'ai PjtiELzp [7-1623] and Ku Hsien-ch'en were posthumously
stripped of all titles and honours. Then, in August, the Tung-lin Academy was
abolished on the emperor's order. Finally, in September, a list of the Tung-lin
partisans was published so that they could be denounced. Liu Tsung-chou was so
angry that he composed afu ® (rhymed prose) to mourn them and sent a letter to
Kao P'an-lung to express his anger. Kao wrote back expressing his determination to
die in defence of his virtue, telling him that it was time to shut his door to the outside
world. It was from then on that Liu decided to become a recluse.33
However, political disorder did not lessen. A second major wave of
anti-Tung-lin terror took place in February the following year. Seven of the Tung-lin
partisans, including Kao P'an-lung himself, were on the list of people to be arrested.
Six of them, Chou Ch'i-yiian (nllEx; [1572-1626], Chou Tsung-chien
[1582-1626], Chou Shun-ch'ang JcplJtll [1584-1626], Miu Ch'ang-ch'i fPHHf]
[1562-1626], Li Ying-shen [1593-1626] and Huang Tsun-su
31 Ibid., p. 205.
32
Ming-shih, chiian 22, pp. 303-4.
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[1584-1626], like their 1625 predecessors, died under torture in the palace prison. '4
Kao P'an-lung drowned himself in a pond on his family estate.35 It was said that Liu
Tsung-chou was on the list of those to be arrested. Although this proved to be false,
Liu did feel under threat for a while. While he was living in retreat, a rumour that he
was being sought for was still current later the same year. It seems that he sent his
two sons to be cared for by friends in order to be ready for arrest. Fortunately, a
friend from his hometown rescued him. Also because of the resistance to Wei
Chung-hsien's allies which occured in Wu ^ and Peking, the arrests ceased, and Liu
was free from impending disaster.36
In 1628, when the emperor Ch'ung-chen Hl/lli [reign dates 1628-45] came to
the throne, Wei Chung-hsien heard of a proclamation branding him a criminal and
ordering his arrest. He committed suicide by hanging, and many of his allies were
executed.37 It seemed that a new political age was coming. However, after the allies
of the eunuchs were expelled from office and the Tung-lin partisans and their allies
were recalled in 1629, the former continued to plot revenge. When the Grand
Secretary Wen T'i-jen [mfafL [Ch'ang-ch'ing^|||l, 7-1638] seized power in 1630,38
they were recalled to office again and reopened the conflict. The emperor
Ch'ung-chen eventually chose to trust the allies of the eunuchs, who became the most
powerful force once again.39
In 1628, Liu Tsung-chou resumed office as the Governor [Fu-yin of
33 LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, pp. 206-7.
34
Ming-shih, chiian 22, p. 304.
35 Ibid., chiian 131, p. 6315.
36 LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, pp. 214-5.
37
Ming-shih, chiian 305, p. 7824.
38 Ibid., chuan 308, p. 7933.
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Shun-t'ien prefecture.40 He optimistically assumed Ch'ung-chen to be a good
emperor, and submitted a memorial in the following year to suggest that Ch'ung-chen
learn by the example of Yao H and Shun ^ how to rule the country through
benevolence (jen {H) and righteousness (i jl). Liu considered benevolence and
righteousness crucially important in all political affairs, asserting that military,
financial and domestic problems would be resolved if the emperor were to keep
benevolence and righteousness in his mind. However, this memorial annoyed the
emperor. He considered Liu pedantic and ignored his advice.41
Despite the emperor's indifference, Liu Tsung-chou took a great interest in his
new position. The governor of Shun-t'ien prefecture had been the mayor of the
capital. In Liu's time, however, the position was shared by five governors and so the
power of a governor became smaller than before. People often simply took it as a
sinecure. However, Liu Tsung-chou took this post so seriously that he asked the
emperor to give it more duties and powers. Though the emperor ignored his request
again, he tried his best to fulfill the duties befitting this status. He started his mission
by worshipping at Confucius's temple and holding a meeting with scholars. Not only
did Liu lecture the scholars on the ancient learning, he also protected them. After an
incident when a group of scholars were injured in a street brawl with a relative of the
emperor, Liu is recorded to have argued in their support, regardless of the danger of
offending the emperor.42 Liu's efforts to teach and protect the scholars reflected a
39 Ibid., chiian 305, p. 7825.
40
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the reign of emperor Ch'ung-chen] (Taipei: The Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica,
1966), chtian 2, pp. 9-10 (61-62).
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typical Confucian idea of politics, which considered the conduct of the scholars as
the model of the common people.43
In December 1629, the Ming dynasty's great enemy, the Manchu, unexpectedly
broke through the Great Wall at Shan-hai kuan [JL[$sSIi [Shan-hai Pass] and began to
rampage throughout Pei Chihli [northern Chih-li], In January 1630, Manchu
units took the city of Ku-an only thirty miles south of Peking.44 The capital
was in danger. While Liu attempted to calm the frightened people, he heard the
rumour that the emperor intended to escape. He went to bow in front of the gate of
the palace to persuade the emperor to perform his duty to save the country. Without
getting any positive response from the emperor, he assembled local officials, scholars,
gentry and common people, and set up the tablet of a minister Yti Ch'ien TpiH
[T'ing-i $£££, 1398-1457], who had successfully dissuaded the court from moving
the administration from Peking to Nanking when Peking was under siege by the Oirat
in 1449.45 They vowed in Yii's name to protect the country.46 It appeared that as the
country became more endangered, Liu Tsung-chou's acts became more radical.
Nonetheless, Liu's intervention did not improve the situation. The Senior
Guardian of the Heir Apparent [T'ai-tzu t'ai-pao Yuan Ch'ung-huan MM
^ [Yiian-su 1584-1630], who had had great success in resisting the Manchu
43 This idea typically expressed in The Analects. While being asked about government, in his answer,
Confucius referred to his famous maxim "The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the
small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend." See The Analects
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979), D. C. Lau trans. Book XII: 19, pp. 115-6.
44 The Cambridge History ofChina, vol. 7, p. 616.
45
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invasion in Liao-tung was arrested and sent to jail in January 1630 47 Many of
his colleagues were interrogated. The emperor, becoming doubtful about his
officials' loyalty, appointed the eunuchs to supervise the army. Under these
circumstances, Liu Tsung-chou once again submitted a memorial to persuade the
emperor to open his mind and treat the officials like his family, arguing that any
problem would then be resolved through their cooperation. He also reminded the
emperor of the risks of letting eunuchs supervise the army; according to him, such
acts, without exception, had caused the declines of whole dynasties. Not only did Liu
get no reply, as usual, but also when the army was defeated again, just two days later,
the emperor did not even ask about the situation.48
Liu's warnings against the eunuchs soon got him into trouble again. Later in the
same month, after the Manchu troops temporarily withdrew, another factional
conflict started. Liu submitted a memorial to defend the allies of the Tung-lin by
referring to the discrimination between good and evil, right and wrong as the
standard for the emperor to appoint his officials.49 This kind of memorial would
certainly offend the officials who were in power, who, in Liu's eyes, were easily
categorized as inferior men. By the time Wen T'i-jen became the Grand Secretary,
Liu met such trouble from him that he finally resigned on the pretext of illness at the
end of the year.50
From 1630 until 1635 Liu spent most of his time lecturing and writing.51 He
47
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rejected the opportunity when he was recommended for an official post in 1632. In
1635 minor political reforms took place in Peking. Wen T'i-jen was attacked by the
Censorate officials for his policies, which his opponents claimed had caused
increased poverty and the spread of banditry. The emperor tried to improve the
political situation by asking for recommendations for new officials outside the
normal procedure for appointment. Liu Tsung-chou was recommended for an official
post again.53 In 1636 he also had a chance to meet the emperor Ch'ung-chen
personally at court. At this meeting, when asked about the problems of freebooters
and military affairs at the frontier, he answered that the freebooters were originally
ordinary people that should be pacified, and that the basic policy to resist the foreign
invaders should be to start by improving domestic affairs. He once again advised the
emperor to follow the example of Yao and Shun to assure eternal peace for the
country. It seems that the emperor was more desirous of an effective and speedy way
to resolve his problems rather than adopt some fundamental political reforms, which,
although they might lead to eternal peace in the long run, would have little immediate
effect. The emperor therefore was not satisfied with Liu's answer.54 However, he
was appointed the Left Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Works [Kung-pu tso
shih-lang XnB^cf^lP].55 However, Liu still tried many times to submit memorials
to re-emphasize his ideas on political reform, although he never received a positive
response. Further, when he criticized the military failure on the northeastern frontier,
which he traced to the faults of Wen T'i-jen, the emperor degraded Liu once again to
52
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be a commoner.56
1636 to 1641 was thus another period of retreat for Liu. Although he did not
hold any official post in this period, he devoted part of his time to social welfare such
S7
as relieving famine and the poverty.
In 1641, he was once again recommended an official post. The emperor,
rejecting the recommendation once, later considered Liu's bravery in remonstrating
and permitted him to take an official post again. He was appointed the Left Attendant
Gentleman of the Ministry of Personnel [Li-pu tso shih-lang In the
next year, although Liu initially tried to turn down the post because of illness, when
he heard the news that the Manchu army and the rebels had occupied more cities on
the northeastern and northwestern frontiers, he thought it time to serve the country
once again. Therefore he finally accepted promotion to Left Censor-in-chief [Tu-ch'a
yuan tso tu-yii-shih But his resumption of office was once again
short-lived. Before he accepted the post, he had started to submit memorials to
suggest again that the emperor model himself on Yao and Shun, memorializing
strongly on dynastic reform and defense. He was opposed to the employment of the
Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell [1592-1666], because of the latter's
recommendation of the mastery of firearms, which Liu thought was definitely against
the policy of Yao and Shun. His opinions seemed to antagonize the emperor, who
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and degraded to a commoner for the third time.60
The fortunes of the Ming continued to decline, and by 1644, it was on the brink
of collapse. In April, the leader of the freebooters, Li Tzu-ch'eng [Hung-chi
$§3|, 1605(?)-1645], had occupied Shanhsi and marched on Peking. The
capital was in serious danger.61 Liu Tsung-chou was then in Chekiang. Sensing that
the dynasty was facing extinction he immediately sent a letter to the Guard General
of Chekiang to ask him to recruit an army to save the emperor. He also invited the
gentry to donate money for the army. But his invitation got little response.62
When Peking fell in May, Liu was again appointed the Left Censor-in-chief at
the Nanking Court under the reign of the Prince of Fu [Fu-Wang fg3E] for having
proved his loyalty to the dynasty.63 The Grand Secretary Ma Shih-ying
[Yao-ts'ao^ppL, 1591-1646] and Vice Minister of War [Shao ssu-ma'pWJ|§]64 Juan
Ta-ch'eng |[Chi-chih 1587-1646 (47)], former allies of the eunuch Wei
Chung-hsien, dominated the court in Nanking, however, reputedly through extortion,
bribery, and the sale of degrees and offices.65 Liu kept on submitting memorials to
attack the corrupt practices of Ma Shih-ying and Juan Ta-ch'eng, but got no positive
response from the Prince. So he finally resigned again in September,66 terminating a
turbulent official career of forty years during which he had held office for six and a
half years, been in active service for four years and had been degraded to the status of
60
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commoner three times.67
Once again retreating from official life, this time he saw that the Ming dynasty
was coming to an end. He returned home to live as a recluse, even refusing to tutor,
despite the pleas of his disciples.68 Despite his disappointment with the political
situation, he still managed to finish a book named Chung-hsing chin-chien
[A golden mirror for revival] in February 1645. The work, containing Liu's
collection of the records of the thoughts of ancient emperors and their ways of ruling
the country, was initially written for submission to the Prince of Fu to encourage him
to restore the dynasty.69 This work was of no use to the Ming dynasty, but it shows
Liu's political idealism.
In May of 1645, after the Manchu troops took over Nanking, the Prince of Fu
escaped from the court and the Prince of Lu [Lu-Wang succeeded to the throne
in Hangchou t/L'Jt[. Liu Tsung-chou, angry with those officials and gentries who had
surrendered to the Manchu, was still hoping to preserve the Ming dynasty. Hearing
Manchu troops had taken Hangchou and the Prince had surrendered, Liu
demonstrated his loyalty to the Ming dynasty by refusing food. Dissuaded by his
disciples from committing suicide, he became involved in acts of resistance against
the Manchus. However, after hearing that one of his disciples had committed suicide,
he again made a decision to die.70 Having failed to drown himself, he finally refused
food for twenty days and drink for thirteen. He passed away aged sixty-seven on 30
67 Arthur W. Hummel, ed., op. cit., p. 532.
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3.3 Intellectual achievements
Throughout his life, although he eagerly expressed his enthusiasm for politics,
Liu Tsung-chou seemed dissatisfied with political life, and was conspicuously
unsuccessful in it. As a scholar, on the other hand, he was an acknowledged
Neo-Confucian master. The aim and content of his academic research were
interrelated with his moral cultivation in everyday life.
From this standpoint, Liu's enthusiasm for scholarship may be traced to his
period of mourning for his mother. During this time, following the rites, he built with
his own hand a small cabin near the tomb. He stayed there for three years without
leaving except to receive guests who came to pay their respects. He was so distressed
that he could not stand without a stick. Seeing his filial behaviour, his friend T'ao
Wang-ling PlfItftp [Shih-k'uei Tajf, 1562-?] sighed: "It has been a long time since
morality declined and the rites were abandoned. I have never seen anyone understand
the rite of mourning as well as Mr. Liu."1 Liu not only practised the rite of mourning,
he also read the Book ofRites [Li-chi /TlIJS] and the Six Classics [Liu-ching 7\$S].
Possibly through comparison with his own experience of mourning, he started to
doubt the authenticity of the Li-chi. Liu was not only sincere in practicing the rites,
but also had a serious urge to investigate their authenticity. From this point of view, it
is also worthwhile to note that Liu's practices seemed exactly to express those kinds
of "fundamentalism" and "restorationism", which were persistent and probably
1
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essential elements in Neo-Confucianism.2
During his period of mourning, Liu was introduced to the famous
Neo-Confucian scholar Hsu Fu-yiian.3 Hsu probably agreed to meet Liu because Hsu
himself was greatly concerned about the realization of rites as social rules in his time,
and had written an essay on the drinking rituals for village feasts.4 Specifically for
the rites of mourning, he praised the custom of building a cabin to accompany the
tomb as genuinely filial, while others wondered about this practice.5 Liu's
observance of this rite might have been the cause of Hsu's appreciation.
Hsu Fu-yuan was a disciple of the Kan-ch'iian School,6 founded by Chan
Jo-shui. Chan Jo-shui was a famous Neo-Confucian in Wang Yang-ming's time.
Chan and Wang were close friends. Huang Tsung-hsi compared the schools of Chan
and Wang to those of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan.7 They were so close that the
famous late Ming historian, T'an Ch'ien [Ju-mu Jlpfc, 1594-1658], mistakenly
Q
considered Chan a disciple of Wang. Chan was a disciple of Ch'en Hsien-chang.
Ch'en Hsien-chang, as mentioned in the introduction, was considered a forerunner of
Wang Yang-ming. Although Chan had played a role as a transmitter between the two
2 Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Some common tendencies in Neo-Confucianism", in David S. Nivison and
Arthur F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (California: Standford University Press, 1959), pp.
25-50; p. 34.
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Fu-yuan, Ching-ho-t'ang chi [The works of Hsu Fu-yuan] (A 1594 edition, preserved in the
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masters and did exert some influence on Wang Yang-ming's inner evolution, his
philosophy was inclined towards the Ch'eng-Chu School.9 Therefore he had some
doubts on Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" and the "Four
Sentences of Teaching".10
Inheriting from the intellectual tradition an inclination towards the Ch'eng-Chu
School, Hsu Fu-yuan, though living in a time when Wang Yang-ming's influence
was widespread, was always alert against it. It was said that he "believed in innate
knowledge and disliked those who used it to preach Buddhism."11 Also, as I have
mentioned in section 3 of chapter 2, he had a famous debate with Chou Ju-teng on
Wang Chi's doctrine of "the absence of good and evil" of the mind and human nature,
which was from Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching". Chou Ju-teng's
"Nine Explanations" were presented as a response to, and protest against Hsu's
"Nine Inquiries", which proposed the idea of the highest goodness of the human
mind.12
When Liu Tsung-chou met Hsii in 1601 and asked him about the essence of
learning, Hsii only answered "to preserve the principle of Heaven, and erase human
desires", which was so popular a maxim that most Neo-Confucian scholars would
accept it. We can certainly not get any clue from this record of their conversation
9 Li Chih Hsu fen-shu WllifcWi [A sequel to the book to be burned] (Taipei: Han-ching wen-hua
shih-yeh yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1984 ), chiian 1, 'Ta Ma Li-shan" P- 2. See also, Wing-tsit
Chan, "Chan Jo-shui's influence on Wang Yang-ming", Philosophy East and West (January-April,
1973), vol., pp. 9-30; Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confucian thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming's Youth
(1472-1529) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 91-2; Julia Ching, To Acquire
Wisdom: The Way of Wang Yang-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 41.
10
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how Hsu really influenced Liu at this meeting. However, under the same year in
Liu's biography, it says that "in his early years he disliked the learning of [Lu]
1 ^
Hsiang-shan and [Wang] Yang-ming". It probably was Hsii Fu-ytian's inclination
towards the Ch'eng-Chu School that influenced Liu to have this feeling.
After three years of mourning, Liu Tsung-chou departed for Peking to start his
civil service career at the age of twenty-seven. On his way to Peking, he visited Hsu
Fu-yiian again. Hsu told him that learning was not for unrealistic knowledge but for
practice, and that therefore one should trace every act in everyday life, including
indulgence in drink, beauty, money and anger, to see how much these acts grew
within one person. From tracing these acts one can observe the progress or regression
of one's own potential for morality. It was said that Liu was suddenly enlightened by
Hsu's tutoring.14 In his later years, Liu wrote the Jen-p'u [Schematic of Man] AM,
a guide to the cultivation of a sense of morality. In it he elaborates many kinds of
faults people might have in daily life and suggests ways for correcting them.15 Liu's
ideas in the Jen-p'u can probably be traced to Hsii's inspiration here.
Besides the influence of HsU Fu-yiian, Liu's enthusiasm for scholarship was
boosted by the influence of the Tung-lin party. As mentioned above, Liu went to
Wu-hsi 4e£|% in 1612, intending to make the acquaintance of the leaders of the party,
Ku Hsien-ch'eng and Kao P'an-lung. His desire to meet them was partly because of
Liu Yung-ch'eng and probably also was because of Ku and Kao's opinions on
Neo-Confucianism. In Liu Tsung-chou's biography, Ku and Kao are mentioned in
MJHA, chiian 36; "Kan-ch'uan hsiieh-an wu", in MJHA, chiian 41, p. 976; Records, p. 200; p. 206.
13
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the following context: "Since Wang Yang-ming died, scholars have indulged in
empty talk. All studies in the world are Ch'an Buddhism, but the two masters [i.e. Ku
and Kao] worship the learning of Ch'eng-Chu."16 Thus Liu's earlier contact with
Hsu Fu-yiian, which inclined him towards the Ch'eng-Chu School, may well have
inclined him to wish to meet Ku and Kao. Though Ku and Kao were not in total
agreement with Chu Hsi's doctrine of moral cultivation, they shared a similar
philosophical standpoint with Hsu Fu-ytian, in the sense that they had some doubts
about Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge", and that
they strongly reaffirmed the Mencian doctrine that man's nature is essentially good.17
As Ku died the same year, Liu only met Kao. It is said that Liu wrote three
letters to Kao to ask about learning for moral cultivation. Liu benefited so much from
these discussions that he put more effort into the cultivation of the mind from then
18
on. Liu's letters to Kao are not extant. From Kao's replies, we find that Kao mainly
talks about the subjects of fathoming principle and the function of holding fast to
seriousness,19 both main subjects of the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism.20 In this
sense, Kao P'an-lung influenced Liu in edging closer to the Ch'eng-Chu School.
Liu's disastrous political career was reflected in his scholarship. It was in 1625,
three months after he was degraded to the status of commoner, that Liu heard that
Wei Chung-hsien's allies had started to attack their political opposites by framing
16
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 127.
17 Charles O. Hucker, "The Tung-lin movement of the late Ming period", in John K. Fairbank, ed.,
Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 145-6.
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one], "Fu Nien-t'ai erh" H [Reply to Liu Tsung-chou: the second one], and "Ta Nien-t'ai
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posthumous work of Kao Pan-lung] (A 1632 edition, preserved in Taipei National Central Library),
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them. He felt that the world was dominated by inferior men and the essence of the
human mind had been polluted. He therefore gave a speech to some scholars, in
which he told them to strive to revive the essence of the human mind, and attributed
the political decay to the worsening of human mind. His biography reports that it was
at this time that he invented his famous doctrine of "being vigilant in solitude" (shen
tu fH$g).21
In the following year it was rumoured that Liu was in the list of those who
would be arrested. Although this was false, Liu did feel threatened. He told his
disciples that he had thought that he could ignore fate, but in reality, when he
perceived the threat of death, he still felt a thrill. This led to realization of the
necessity of emergency training for the mind, and he began to work on the cultivation
of "being vigilant in solitude". He also pointed out the importance of the practice of
sitting in meditation for moral cultivation. At his retreat at Han-shan ^[1] in his
native province, he lectured on Confucius, Mencius and the Sung Neo-Confucians,
and developed his practice of spending half of each day in study, half in sitting in
meditation.22
Liu also paid attention to the works of Ming Confucians. He intended to edit a
collection of these works to show the transmission of the Way in Ming history. This
volume, entitled Huang-Ming Tao-t'ung lu [The orthodox transmission
of the Way in imperial Ming], was finished in 1627. It is an imitation of Chu Hsi's
Ming-ch 'en yen-hsing lu [The records of the words and deeds of famous
20 See Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tZM hsin hsiieh-an, vol. 2, pp. 328-30.
21




officials], containing the life, the words and the deeds of each Confucian included in
the volume, appended by Liu's criticism of each one. His edition is full of his own
opinions, differing from popular opinions.23 This collection seems to have
influenced Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-ju hsiieh-an. Huang even used some of Liu's
criticisms, named "Shih shuo" [the teacher's sayings], as the preface to his
work.24
It was also in 1627, Liu's biography reports, that Liu read an edition of Wang
Yang-ming's collected works and started to change his attitude toward him. He
especially paid attention to Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge",
considering it the essence of the learning of moral cultivation. However, he was
not satisfied with Wang's "Four Sentences of Teaching" and condemned Wang's
disciple Wang Chi for assimilating Wang Yang-ming's doctrine with Buddhism.
Later in the same year he also wrote an essay on learning from books for the purpose
of teaching his son Liu Chou §[[^ [Po-sheng 1613-?], expressing his
disagreement with those who considered the knowledge obtained through the senses
of hearing and seeing as of minor importance. He tried to refute Wang's famous
essay "Pa-pen sai-yiian lun" [On pulling up the root and stopping up
the source], which belittled the erudite knowledge of everything of ancient and
modem times.26 Here Liu expresses ambivalence towards some aspects of Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine.
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collaborated with T'ao Shih-ling Pff f^Sr? [Shih-liang ?-?] and some of his
academic comrades to set up the Cheng-jen hui HLMI" [Association for realizing
humanity], which advocated Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge".27 But Liu's interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the
extension of innate knowledge", which emphasized the cultivation of innate
knowledge, was different from T'ao Shih-ling's, which emphasized the perception of
the original substance of innate knowledge itself. Dozens of Liu's disciples moved
closer to T'ao and left Liu to set up a new academic society in Mount Po-ma [Po-ma
yen E=| |§J8t] the next year. They followed T'ao's teaching and later had arguments
with Liu.28
Liu also worked on re-editing family rules, produced in 1632, the Hsiang-yiieh
(contract for villages) for the countryside, produced in 1633, and the
Tsung-yiieh (contract for clans) for his clan, produced in 1634.29 In addition,
he produced nine essays on searching for the original mind, sitting in meditation,
learning from books and so on for the doctrine of moral cultivation in 1632.
Another two masterpieces, Sheng-hsiieh tsung-yao [The essential themes
of the learning of sages] and Jen-p'u, were produced in 1634. In the former, he edited
the major works of five Neo-Confucian masters Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai
[Heng-ch'u flfpl, 1020-1077], Ch'eng Hao, Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming,
summarizing the gist of Neo-Confucianism. In the latter, he worked on explaining
26
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the moral structure of the human mind, with which he intended to correct the moral
utilitarian inclination of Ch'in Hung-yu's fftl/AifA [Lii-ssu M,®, ?-? ] Ch'ien-kai ko
(The ledgers of correctness), which was an imitation of Yuan Huang's JsCjlr
[Liao-fan ~J/A, 1533-1606] Kung-kuo ko XfJiMf# (The ledgers of merit and demerit),
T1
contending that good behaviour can make redemption for evil.
In 1636, after his brief resumption of office, Liu managed to produce yet another
scholarly work. "Tu cheng pien"3§|§;||| [A essay with self-verification] was a
collection of ideas from the books he read in his leisure time while in his official post.
In this work he expressed his interpretations of the Great Learning [Ta-hsiieh Acifl]
and the Doctrine of the Mean [Chung-yung AAtlfL which were different from Chu
Hsi's and Ch'eng I's respectively.32
In another period of retreat from 1636 to 1641, Liu developed his interpretation
of the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean, and finished the Yang-ming
hsien-sheng ch'uan-hsin lu \%Hfjjft[The authentic record of master
Yang-ming] to refute Wang Chi's "T'ien-ch'iian cheng-tao chi" [The
Record of Confirmation of the Way at T'ien-chiian], arguing that Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" can not be confused with
Buddhism.34 Liu also concentrated on verifying the ancient Confucian classics,
starting from his doubt about the disorder of the Book ofRites.35
31







35 Ibid., p. 408.
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After his third dismissal in 1642,36 besides continuing on classical studies,
specifically studies on the Book of Changes [I-ching J§|M],37 Liu wrote another essay
on "making the will sincere" in the Great Learning, in which he studies the
interpretations of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming and the Ta-hsiieli shih-chingf^^fS
H [Stone-inscribed Great Learning], which was considered to be an old version
written in the Ts'ao-Wei mm dynasty [approximately 300 A.D.].38 This essay
strongly reflected Liu's confidence in his own interpretation of the meaning of
"making the will sincere" in the Great Learning. Deploring the intellectual decline of
his times, he wrote "Cheng-hsiieh tsa-chieh" [Miscellaneous notes on verifying
learning] which contains twenty-five lists of his opinions on
Confucianism. This was written in order to try to save scholars from lapsing into
moral decay. He also wrote an essay "Liang-chih shuo" [On innate
knowledge], where he argues against the faults of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of
"the extension of innate knowledge".
In 1645, Liu spent his last months on a work of interpretation of the Great
Learning, "Ta-hsiieh ts'an-i" [Doubts on the Great Learning], which was
finished only three months before his suicide. He also revised his Jen-p'u one month
before his death. For the former, he reconsidered many versions of the Great
Learning, including the ancient version from the Book ofRites of approximately the
36
Ibid., p. 450.
37 Ibid., pp. 477-8.
38 Ta-hsiieh shih-ching was a forgery fabricated by Feng Fang (1500-1570). However Liu
Tsung-chou showed his positive attitude toward it. See Wang Fan-sen, "The 'Darling Fool' Feng Fang
(1500-1570) and his ink rubbing of the Stone-inscribed Great Learning", Ming Studies, Number 35
(August 1995), pp. 74-95.
39
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 480.
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first century B.C., and those of Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi as well as the
Ta-hsiieh shih-ching, to confirm the authenticity of the ancient version of the Great
Learning 40 For the latter, after revising it three times, he also added some words and
deeds of ancient people to increase its advisory function.41 Both represented parts of
his ultimate concerns on Confucianism.
40
Regarding to the problems of the different versions of the Great Learning, see Li Chi-hsiang
f-f, Liang-Sung i-lai ta-hsueh kai-pen chili yen-chiu [A study on the
revised versions of the Great Learning since the two Sung periods] (Taipei: Hsiieh-sheng shu-chu,
1988).
41
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, pp. 516-7.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Liu Tsung-chou and the Doctrine of Mind
4.1 "Emphasizing tranquillity" and sitting in meditation: from Ch'en
Hsien-chang to Liu Tsung-chou
(A) The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the teaching of sitting in
meditation in the Ch'en Hsien-chang School
The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation for moral cultivation became fashionable after Ch'en Hsien-chang.
However, because of their closeness to Ch'an Buddhist meditation, some scholars
were cautious, even Ch'en Hsien-chang himself. In a letter to one of his disciples,
Ch'en showed an attitude of compromise to the Ch'eng-Chu School regarding the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation and
Chu Hsi's doctrine of "emphasizing reverence". He said:
Master Ch'eng I praised people as well-accomplished in study whenever he saw
them practising sitting in meditation (ching-tso). The word "clung" jfff
(tranquillity) in this term originates from master Chou Tun-i's doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity". Later, Ch'eng I and his disciples inherited and
transmitted it. Even later, masters Lo Yii-chang and Li T'ung adopted it to teach
students. Their students also benefited by practising it. However, master Chu
Hsi was worried that students would mistake it for Ch'an Buddhism, and he
rarely talked about "tranquillity". Instead, he talked more about "reverence",
which accorded to the teaching of Ch'eng I in his late life. This is really the way
of prevention [from indulging in Ch'an Buddhism].1
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Although Ch'en traced the practice of sitting in meditation to many of his
Neo-Confucian forerunners in order to find support for his own position, he
nonetheless admitted that Chu Hsi's doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" was a
remedy for excessive sitting in meditation, saving students from indulging in Ch'an
Buddhism. This shows that Ch'en had tried to reemphasize the "reverence" of the
teaching of the Ch'eng-Chu School to preempt attacks on his "emphasizing
tranquillity" as Ch'an Buddhism.
It is under the pressure of the criticism by the Ch'eng-Chu School that the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the teaching of sitting in meditation in the
Ch'en Hsien-chang School are driven away from Ch'en's paradigm. Although
Ch'en's teaching of sitting in meditation became a fashion in later generations, his
school gradually declined after his death.2 Only his main disciple Chan Jo-shui
endeavoured to develop the school. Chan, therefore, can be seen as a major
representative of the Ch'en Hsien-chang School after Ch'en's death.3
As a faithful disciple of Ch'en, Chan practised sitting in meditation sincerely. It
was said that he used to sit in meditation with eyes closed every night until dawn.4
He also expressed his own opinion on a special method of sitting in meditation as
follows: "to adjust the breath is the prime method for the way of sitting in meditation.
If we can master it, we can possibly know how to cultivate in tranquillity."5 He not
1 Ch'en Hsien-chang, "Yii Lo I-feng" JHjjgl—-|I^I [A letter to Lo I-feng], in Ch'en Hsien-chang, Ch'en
Hsien-chang chi, chiian 3, p. 157.
2 See Ming-shih, chiian 282, p. 7229.
3 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Kan-chiaan hsiieh-an i", in MJHA, chiian 37, p. 876.
4
"Mu-chih-ming" [Tomb script], in Chan Jo-shui, Chan Kan-ch'iian hsien-sheng wen-chi jjS
Vi [The literary works of Chan Jo-shui], in Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu E9JJji
@ ItH [Collection of the preserved titles from the Complete Books of the Four Treasuries]
(Tainan: Chuang-yen wen-hua shih-yeh yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1997), vol. 57, chuan 32, p. 12a.
Chan Jo-shui, "Yii-lu", in ibid., chiian 23 , p. 67a.
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only practised sitting in meditation himself, but also set a rule for his disciples to
practise it in the academy he founded, and praised his disciples for practising it.
However, Chan's idea of the practice of sitting in meditation is close to Chu
Hsi's. In an essay entitled "Ching-kuan-t'ang chi" [A note on the hall
"Ching-kuan"], he said:
The name "Ching-kuan" means to use the time of stillness and tranquillity and
the time during sitting in meditation to observe things, i.e. to use the time with
the mind in stillness without being disturbed to observe things. How can we
observe things when our mind is fully occupied by disturbing matters?
Therefore the "tranquillity" here is not the "tranquillity" that contradicts
action. ... For the observation is an activity.8
In Chan's opinion in this essay, the function of sitting in meditation is simply to keep
the mind in stillness, to permit clear thinking for observing things. Chu Hsi expressed
a similar idea. Chu said:
How can we see the point [of observing things] when the mind is noisy. It must
be tranquil so that we can see the point. The function of sitting in meditation is
simply for training the mind not to be disturbed by outer matters.9
In brief, Chan's idea of sitting in meditation is close to Chu Hsi's in that they both
considered it a way for making the mind clearer for observing things, which is totally
different from Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrine of "fostering a starting point by sitting
6 In his "Ta-k'o hsiin-kui" [discipline rule of Ta-k'o academy], he asked his disciples "to
sit in silence for meditation at the time of Shen ^ (i.e. five to six pm.) and Yu Hf (i.e. seven to eight
pm.) everyday". See Chan Jo-shui, "Ta-k'o hsiin-kui", in ibid., chiian 6, p. 4b.
7 See Chan Jo-shui, "Wen-i hsii lu" [A sequential record of enquiry], in ibid., chiian 11, p.
22a.
8 Chan Jo-shui, "Ching-kuan-t'ang chi" ff [A note on the hall "Ching-kuan"], in Chan
Jo-shui, Chan Kan-ch'iian hsien-sheng wen-chi, chiian 18, pp. 48a-b.
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in tranquillity." Ch'an saw the practice of sitting in meditation as simply a
complementary method for moral cultivation. Unlike Ch'en, he did not take
"fostering a starting point by sitting in tranquillity" as the purpose of the practice of
sitting in meditation.
In his defense of Ch'en's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" Chan was
enthusiastic in combining it with the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" of the
Ch'eng-Chu School. Chan maintained:
Master Ch'en's doctrine is based on 'reverence' and has been helped by
"emphasizing tranquillity". He can practise cultivation no matter whether he is
active or tranquil. This full function of 'emphasizing tranquillity' is nothing but
the mind staying in 'reverence'. People who had not examined the origins of his
doctrine therefore defamed him as a Ch'an Buddhist."10
This passage reflects Chan's eagerness in compromising the conflict between
Ch'en's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the doctrine of "emphasizing
reverence" in the Ch'eng-Chu School. Also revealed in this passage are two sorts of
worries in Chan's mind. First is that Chan implicitly worried that Ch'en's advocating
"emphasizing tranquillity" might invite a misunderstanding that he preferred
tranquillity to activity. Second is that Chan knew that Ch'en's doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" was accused of being close to Ch'an Buddhism. It
probably is because of these basic worries that Chan took Ch'en's doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and his teaching of sitting in meditation to return to the
Ch'eng-Chu paradigm. He took Ch'eng I as the paradigm of the practice of sitting in
meditation:
9 Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yii-lei, chiian 103, p. 2062.
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It was Ch'eng I who started talking about sitting in meditation. This, in fact,
opened a new door for moral cultivation. It is for this reason that I worshipped it
and described it in the tomb script of my teacher master Ch'en as "the other
door [for entering the learning of the sages] since Confucius and Mencius'
[teachings]."11
With this passage, Chan again related Ch'en's teaching of sitting in meditation to the
paradigm of Ch'eng-Chu School.
Furthermore, Chan appeared to express a negative attitude toward Ch'en's
expression of mystical experience in his sitting in meditation. Ch'en himself was so
confident of his teaching of sitting in meditation that he once said:
After sitting in meditation for a long time, I saw my mind-in-itself emerging
dimly, as though it were a thing. It was just like the experience of Yen Hui H[aJ
(a disciple of Confucius): "seeing it before him and suddenly it is behind
\nxvi\chan ch'ien hu hou 1 felt I really had seen something
substantive, not simply sophisticated words.12
The phrase "seeing it before him and suddenly it is behind him" (chan ch'ien hu hou)
11
was used by Yen Hui to describe his view of Confucius' greatness. Ch'en seemed
to intend to relate the enlightening experience of sitting in meditation to Yen Hui's
experience of being inspired by Confucius' teaching. To this description Chan
expressed his disagreement straightforwardly. He said:
10 Chan Jo-shui, "Pai-sha tsu ku-shih chiao chieh", pp. 701-702.
11 Chan Jo-shui, "Ta Nieh Wen-wei" [Reply to Nieh Wen-wei], in Chan Jo-shui, Chan
Kan-ch'iian hsien-sheng wen-chi, chiian 7, pp. 29b-30a.
12
Quoted by a disciple of Chan Jo-shui, see Chan Jo-shui, "Hsin-ch'uan wen-pien-lu"
[A record of the discussion of learning in Hsin-ch'uan], in Chan Jo-shui, Chan Kan-ch'iian
hsien-sheng wen-chi, chtian 8, p. 25a
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Fictional seeing and real seeing is different. ... Yen Hui's "seeing it before him
and suddenly it is behind him" means that he saw fictional scenery.14
Chan appears to be doubtful about Ch'en's mystical experience. This, without any
doubt, constitutes a serious challenge to the latter's claim.
To sum up Chan's interpretation of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity"
and the practice of sitting in meditation, we find that Chan was enthusiastic in
defending Ch'en's position. Like Ch'en, Chan was under pressure of the criticism of
incompatibility between the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the doctrine
of "emphasizing reverence" of the Ch'eng-Chu School. Chan therefore interpreted
the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation in
favour of the Ch'eng-Chu paradigm. In this interpretation Chan intended to ward off
any suggestion that Ch'en preferred tranquillity to activity, or was close to Ch'an
Buddhism. It is in this regard he also expressed his negative attitude towards Ch'en's
expression of the mystical experience in his sitting in meditation.
(B) The arguments on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the
teaching of sitting in meditation in the Wang Yang-ming School
It was not only Chan Jo-shui who reconsidered Ch'en Hsien-chang's teaching of
sitting in meditation. Wang Yang-ming, although he had the experience of
enlightenment through sitting in meditation at Lung-ch'ang and once took it as his
main teaching, was cautious about it. Wang once said of the practice of sitting in
13 See The Analects, Book IX: 11, p. 97.
14 Chan Jo-shui, "Hsin-ch'uan wen-pien-lu", in Chan Jo-shui, Chan Kan-ch'iian hsien-sheng wen-chi,
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meditation:
What I said earlier in the temple about sitting in meditation was not meant for
the sake of your attaining samadhi (intent meditation) of Ch'an Buddhism
(;tso-Ch'an ju-ting A aF).15 Rather, since we are usually distracted by many
objects and affairs and do not know how to take care of ourselves, I wished to
recommend such a remedy to our lack of learning by an effort of chasing the
strayed mind.16
Wang particularly emphasized the difference between his teaching of sitting in
meditation and the intent meditation of Ch'an Buddhism. This shows his basic
position on Confucianism to avoid the critiques of his being close to Ch'an
Buddhism. However, the practice of sitting in meditation is still important in Wang's
teaching. A record of his Ch'uan-hsi lu says:
A friend who was engaging in sitting in meditation attained some insight. He
ran to make an inquiry of the teacher (i.e. Wang Yang-ming). The teacher said,
"Formerly, when I stayed in Ch'u-chou, seeing that students were mostly
occupied with intellectual explanations and debates on similarities and
differences, which did them no good, I therefore taught them sitting in
meditation. For a time they realized the situation a little bit [they saw the true
Way] and achieved some immediate results. In time, however, they gradually
developed the defect of fondness for tranquillity and disgust with activity and
degenerated into lifelessness like dry wood. Others purposely advocated
abstruse and subtle theories to amaze people. For this reason I have recently
expounded only the doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge. If one's
innate knowledge is clear, it will be all right either to try to obtain truth through
personal realization in a quiet place or to discover it through training and
polishing in the actual affairs of life. The original substance of innate knowledge
is neither tranquil nor active. Recognition of this fact is the basis of learning.
chiian 8, p. 26a.
15 The Chinese word ting Je is a translation of the Sanskrit samadhi rendered into English by Derk
Bodde as "intent meditation". See Julia Ching, The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming, p. 7;
Derk Bodde tran., Feng Yu-lan's History ofChinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1953), vol. II, p. 395.
16
Wang Yang-ming, "Yil Ch'en-chung chu sheng" [To students at Ch'en-chung], in
WYMCC, chtian 4, p. 144. English translation based on Julia Ching, The Philosophical Letters of
Wang Yang-ming (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), p. 6.
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From the time of Ch'u-chou until now, I have tested what I said several times.
The point is that the phrase 'the extension of innate knowledge' is free from any
defect. Only a physician who has broken his own arm can understand the causes
of human disease."17
This record clearly shows Wang's reason for his once taking sitting in meditation as
his main teaching, his worry about its being abused, and his continuing, predicated,
support of it. First, his reason for taking sitting in meditation as his main teaching
was to save his disciples from pedantic studies. Secondly, the teaching of sitting in
meditation was susceptible to abuse, incurring "the defect of fondness for tranquillity
and disgust with activity", about which Wang worried so much. Thirdly, Wang
expounded the doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge", which he regarded
transcendent over the relativity of tranquillity and activity, to substitute for the
teaching of sitting in meditation. To sum up, sitting in meditation was for Wang
simply a complementary method for moral cultivation.
However, the pursuit of tranquillity was still attractive to Wang's disciples, and
Wang himself also praised it. Conversations between Wang and his disciples are full
1 8
of commends on pursuing tranquillity. After Wang died, it remained a popular
issue among his disciples, as demonstrated by Nieh Pao's practice of sitting in
meditation and the ensuing debate among Wang's disciples.
As we have mentioned in section 1 of chapter 2, Nieh Pao took sitting in
meditation as his teaching method after his release from prison. Although there is no
evidence to show that Nieh's practice of sitting in meditation was directly based on
17
CHL, p. 324; Instructions, Part III: 262, pp. 216-7.
18 See Instructions, Part I: 17, p. 26; Part I: 23, p. 28; Part I: 28, pp. 30-1; Part II: 151, pp. 131-132;
Part II: 156, pp. 134-135; Part II: 157, pp.135-136; Part III: 202, p.190; Part III: 203, p. 191; Part III:
204, pp.191-192; Part III: 231, p. 203.
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Ch'en Hsien-chang's teaching, Nieh praised Ch'en's doctrine of "fostering a starting
point by sitting in tranquillity," which was changed into "fostering a starting point
from the cultivation of tranquillity" (ts'ung ching chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni
fcB$rfiH!rE) in his quotation:
[It is based on Ch'en's saying,] "fostering a starting point from the cultivation of
tranquillity" ... we can be sure that the starting points of goodness are all
cultivated from tranquillity.19
It appears that Nieh had Ch'en's doctrine in mind when he talked about the doctrine
of "emphasizing tranquillity".
A scholar of Nieh's time summarized his studies as follows, "The studies of
master Nieh take returning to tranquillity (kui chi as essential, and take
attaining vacuity and maintaining tranquillity (chih hsii shou ching as the
changeless entrance to moral cultivation."20 Because the phrases "retuning to
tranquillity" and "attaining vacuity and maintaining tranquillity" can be traced to
Taoism and Buddhism respectively, many of Nieh's contemporaries therefore
21assumed that his doctrine must be influenced by Taoism and Buddhism. Facing
this accusation, Nieh was very careful in response. He said:
To extend knowledge is to represent the vacuously intelligent (hsii ling HHS)
substance of the mind and to keep it in tranquillity without moving. There is no
19 Nieh Pao Hf^, "K'un-pien-lu" [Record of painful discernment], in Nieh Pao,
Shuang-chiang Nieh hsien-sheng wen-chi i'XxS7fc US [The works of Nieh Pao] in Ssu-k'u
ch'iian-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu, vol. 72, chiian 14, pp. 18a-b.
20 Yin T'ai "Shuang-chiang Nieh hsien-sheng wen-chi hsii" [A preface to
the works of master Nieh Pao], in ibid., p. 2b.
Ibid., p. 3a.
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difference between Confucians and Buddhists [on this subject], [However,] we
Confucians extend knowledge for investigating things, while Buddhists regard
the sensation of things as illusions of our faculty, and advocate their abolition.
22
Compared to Confucians' endeavour to penetrate all things, it is very different.
This passage shows that Nieh, though admitting the similarity between Buddhists and
Confucians on keeping the mind in tranquillity, also was very careful about the
danger of being accused of being close to Buddhism, just as Chan Jo-shui and Wang
Yang-ming were in their references to the teaching of sitting in meditation.
Nieh was not only cautious about the above accusation, he also tried to connect
his doctrine of "returning to tranquillity" to his Neo-Confucian forerunners to
legitimatize the doctrine. First, he traced it to Chou Tun-i's doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity". He said:
Chou Tun-i said: "[Once one] is without desire, [he] will be tranquil." Without
desire, one will attain a state of absolute tranquillity and inactivity. The state of
absolute tranquillity and inactivity is the mind of Heaven and Earth. Only this is
right: the expression of the moment before the feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow and joy are aroused. However, how can an apprentice imagine reaching
this goal at the first attempt? People should make efforts by starting from sitting
in meditation. After long enough sitting in meditation, the spirit will be stable.
Once the spirit is stable, one can see the mind of Heaven and Earth. Only when
one sees the mind of Heaven and Earth can he be qualified to talk about
learning.
Nieh maintained that it is from practising sitting in meditation that one can attain the
state of what Chou Tun-i said "[Once one] is without desire (wu yii ft£$0, [he] will
be tranquil." Chou's saying is from his T'ai-chi-tu shuo [An explanation
22 Nieh Pao, "Ta Ou-yang Nan-yeh" [Reply to Ou-yang Nan-yeh], in ibid., chuan 8, p.
22b.
23 Nieh Pao, 'Ta K'ang Tzu-i wen-hsiieh" [Reply to K'ang Tzu-i's enquiry on
learning], in ibid., p. 31b.
of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate], In it Chou said:
The sage settles affairs by the principles of the Mean, correctness, humanity, and
righteousness, emphasizing tranquillity. [Once one] is without desire, [he] will
be tranquil. Thus he establishes the human ultimate.24
It is from this passage that Chou Tun-i's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" was
particularly noticed.25 Considering the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity",
Taoists and Buddhists both emphasized the pursuit of tranquillity. It was Chou Tun-i
who first compounded the doctrines and established his doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity", which had a great influence on later Neo-Confucians. Both the
Ch'eng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School, though assuming it essentially
important to make activity and tranquillity into one without demarcation and avoid
the defects of overemphasizing tranquillity, paid much attention to pursuing
tranquillity.26 It is no wonder that Nieh traced his doctrine to Chou.
Besides Chou Tun-i, Nieh also connected his doctrine to Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge". In a letter to Wang Chi, he
explained his doctrine of "retuning to tranquillity", saying that the "substance of
tranquillity" is "the supreme meaning of Yang-ming school."27 He maintained,
To extend knowledge is to extend the knowledge of the substance of tranquillity.
24 Chou Tun-i MliStEil, T'ai-chi tu shuo [A explanation of the Diagram of the Great
Ultimate], in Chou Tun-i, Chou-tzu ch'iian-shu [Complete works of Master Chou] (Taipei:
Kuang-hsiieh-she yin-shu kuan, 1975), chiian 2, p. 23; Source Book, p. 463.
25 Source Book, p. 465.
26
Chang Tai-nien Chung-kuo che-hsueh ta-kang [A outline of Chinese
philosophy] (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsiieh ch'u-pan she, 1994), pp. 439-43.
27 Nieh Pao, "Chi Wang Lung-hsi" ifrHifiiM [A letter to Wang Lung-hsi], in Nieh Pao,
Shuang-chiang Nieh hsien-sheng wen-chi, chiian 8, p. 47a.
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If [the mind] is empty and intelligent, not being affected by a thing, when acted
on, immediately penetrate all things, this is the meaning of the investigation of
things.28
Nieh was a famous member of the Chiang-yu section of the Wang Yang-ming School.
Influenced by Nieh, many of his Chiang-yu comrades were also enthusiastic about
the practice of sitting in meditation. They also took Chou Tun-i's doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of
innate knowledge" as their supports. One of them, Tsou Shou-i [Tung-k'uo
JgJfB, 1491-1562], said:
[What Chou Tun-i said of] "emphasizing tranquillity" and "having no desire"
are both the other names of innate knowledge. If we maintain "extending innate
knowledge", there is no need to say "emphasizing tranquillity" any more. If we
maintain "emphasizing tranquillity", there is no need to say "having no
desire".29
In Tsou's mind, "emphasizing tranquillity" is identical to "extending innate
knowledge".
The other, Lo Hung-hsien, who "regarded Chou Tun-i's teaching on absence of
desire and tranquillity as the true transmission of the teaching of the sages,"30 also
said:
By nature man is tranquil at birth. No one is not good in nature. It is only when
one acts recklessly that he becomes evil. Emphasizing tranquillity can return
28 Nieh Pao, "Ta Ou-yang Nan-yeh", in ibid., p. 16b.
29 Tsou Shou-i "Fu Huang Chih-chai shih-chiin" [Reply to Huang Chih-chai],
in Tsou Shou-i, Tung-k'uo Tsou hsien-sheng wen-chi [The works of Tsou Shou-i] in
Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu, vol. 66, chiian 5, p. 9a-b.
30
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men hsiieh-an san" ft"T-fllplgjg —r [Chiang-yu section of
the Wang Yang-ming School: part three], in MJHA, chiian 18, p. 389; Records, p. 134.
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him back to goodness. The Way will therefore be kept and not lost. ... Innate
knowledge is tranquil and clear. Once it is polluted by reckless action, the
activating force (chi will be lost and can not return easily.31
Lo was saying that through emphasizing tranquillity one can recover innate
knowledge from pollution by outrageous action.
Although Nieh Pao's position on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity"
incurred opposition among many of Wang Yang-ming's disciples, gradually his
doctrine became popular.32 The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the
practice of sitting in meditation in the Chiang-yu section of the Wang Yang-ming
School was so popular that Huang Tsung-hsi even concluded in his Ming-ju hsiieh-an
as follows:
Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge came from
his later life. In the beginning he had taught his disciples sitting in meditation to
purify the mind. He found that they tended to prefer tranquillity to activity.
Knowing the source and what flows from that, one tends to take too much from
it. But to say that innate knowledge is the Mean [of consciousness] before
emotions are manifest and to say that practising vigilance in solitude is the same
as extending innate knowledge is to continue to regard inner composure as
essential. That is why Tsou Shou-i's caution and apprehension and Lo
Hung-hsien's tranquillity both represent Wang Yang-ming's true transmission.33
Huang considered the practice of sitting in meditation only a temporary method of
moral cultivation in Wang Yang-ming's early teaching, cognisant of the danger of its
31 Ibid., p. 416.
32 Lti Miao-fen [Lu Miaw-fen] Yang-ming-hsiieh shih-jen she-ch'iin: li-shih, ssu-hsian yii
shih-chien ® [The Yang-ming School during the Ming dynasty:
history, thought, and practice] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2003), pp.
392-4. Mou Tsung-san made a long study of three other members of the Chiang-yu school, Liu
Wen-min §lj[Liang-feng MML ?-?], Liu Pang-ts'ai [Shih-ch'uan ?-?]» and Wang
Shih-huai zEBrffit [T'ang-nan 1522-?], who also had doctrines similar to Nieh Pao's doctrine of
"returning to tranquillity". See Mou, Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, pp. 399-447.
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lapsing into the preference of tranquillity above activity. But he still agreed that
extending innate knowledge is to continue to regard inner composure as essential,
and praised the inclination to emphasize tranquillity among the members of the
Chiang-yu section of the Wang Yang-ming School, considering them to be true
representatives of Wang Yang-ming's transmission. He even maintained:
The Chiang-yu (Kiang-si) school alone acquired the true transmission of Wang
Yang-ming. ... At this time, the Shao-hsing (Chekiang) school had developed
many errors, and the members appealed to their master's authority as support for
their own opinions in the face of their critics. Only the Chiang-yu school could
point that out, thus preventing the Way of Wang Yang-ming from decaying.34
Huang Tsung-hsi's comment on the role of the Chiang-yu section of the Wang
Yang-ming School is controversial.35 However, it shows that the members of the
Chiang-yu section did have great influence on their contemporaries. We can, then, be
sure that the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation was also influential in the Wang Yang-ming School.
As I have mentioned, since Nieh Pao regulated a method of sitting in meditation
and guided students to return to tranquillity, he invited many attacks from his
comrades in the Wang Yang-ming School. Huang Tsung-hsi formulated three kinds
of doubt about Nieh's doctrine of "returning to tranquility", as follows:
33
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Che-chung Wang-men hsiieh-an i" SfT't'diPIIISIil— [Che-chung section of the
Wang Yang-ming School: part one], in MJHA, chiian 11, p. 226; Records, p. 112.
34
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men hsiieh-an i" tC^JEEF^PIS?— [Chiang-yu section of the
Wang Yang-ming School: part one], in ibid., chiian 16, p. 333; Records, p. 118.
33 Mou Tsung-san held an opposite opinion to Huang Tsung-hsi's. Mou considered the development
of the doctrine of "returning to tranquillity" and its similar doctrine from Nieh Pao, through Liu
Wen-min and Liu Pang-ts'ai, to Wang Shih-huai, had drawn the Chiang-yu school away from the
essence of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. See Mou, Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, pp.
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First, if the Tao were that which should not be abandoned even for one instant,
then to say that no effort need be applied to activity would be to abandon it.
Second, if the Tao were beyond activity and tranquillity, then the effort of
maintaining tranquillity would separate it into two modes. Third, if mind and
affairs ought to be one, and mind ought to be present everywhere, in every affair,
to say then that one might forgo efforts in one's conscious responses while these
are in the flow of process would be to abandon affairs and to draw near to Ch'an
■if-
Buddhist doctrines of enlightenment."
In general, these doubts reveal the worries of those who kept a cautious attitude
towards the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation. In brief, the first and the second doubts, which can be seen as one, are the
worry of lapsing into preferring tranquillity to activity. The third doubt is a worry of
straying towards samadhi (intent meditation) of Ch'an Buddhism.
Besides these worries, there is another point in the arguments between Nieh and
his opponents, best shown in a debate between Nieh Pao and two of his major
opponents, Ou-yang Te [Ch'ung-i ^—, 1496-1554] and Wang Chi.
The debate is encapsulated by Nieh's concluding comments on his
contemporaries' opinions on Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge". As mentioned in section 2 of chapter 3, many interpretations of the idea
of innate knowledge emerged among Wang Yang-ming's disciples after Wang died.
Wang Chi divided them into eight kinds of interpretations, while in Nieh's eyes,
there were only two kinds, as follows:
One of them says: "Innate knowledge is nothing but consciousness. Except
consciousness there is no innate knowledge. If a scholar accords to what he has
known [in his consciousness] to the utmost and extends them, then he will
399-447.
36
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men erh" QZ/f:EE[Chiang-yu section of the Wang
Yang-ming School: part two], in MJHA, chuan 17, pp. 372-3; Records, p. 129.
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acquire knowledge. Therefore, there is no distinction between tranquillity and
action, inward and outward. They are completely within one body." The other
says: "Innate knowledge is a substance of tranquillity with vacuous intelligence
(hsii-ling jUSI). Only if it acts to penetrate things can there be knowledge.
Knowledge is its output. Extending innate knowledge is simply returning to
tranquillity for penetrating action, and maintaining substance for applying for
function."37
In brief, the former kind considered that innate knowledge is nothing but sensational
consciousness. Sensational consciousness cannot be divided into "tranquil/inward"
part and "active/outward" part. Extending innate knowledge is simply extending the
sensational consciousness to its utmost. The latter kind considered that innate
knowledge is a substance of tranquillity. Only by returning to tranquillity can innate
knowledge be extended.
Although Nieh did not attribute these two kinds of sayings to any specific
contemporary, he seems to adhere to the latter, and his opponents, like Ou-yang Te
and Wang Chi, appeared to adhere to the former. Nieh once described innate
knowledge as follows:
The vacuous intelligence and consciousness (chih-chiieh %U9k) of the mind are
both innate knowledge. However, vacuous intelligence refers to substance, and
consciousness refers to function. Substance and function come from the same
source. Once substance is established, function naturally emerges. The effort of
extending knowledge is simply establishing substance to attain function.38
To sum up the above two passages, we find that Nieh was pronouncing a
"substance/tranquillity/intelligence" and "function/activity/consciousness" dualism.
37 Nieh Pao, "Tseng Wang hsueh-cheng chih su-ch'ien hsii" [A preface as a gift
for congratulating Mr. Wang's promotion], in Nieh Pao, Shuang-chiang Nieh hsien-sheng wen-chi, ch
iian 4, pp. 24b-25a.
38 Nieh Pao, "Ta Sung-chiang Wu Chieh-tui" [Reply to Wu Chieh-tui of
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In this dualism, once the "substance/tranquillity/intelligence" is established,
"function/activity/consciousness" naturally emerges. It is by way of this dualism that
we can say that Nieh's emphasis on making effort to cultivate vacuous intelligence
can be seen as an expression of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity". He also
used this position to criticize those who stressed consciousness. He said:
Those who take consciousness as innate knowledge and [make efforts to] extend
it are straining themselves to suit [consciousness] and to drift along with things.
Even the supreme master of this kind can only become a wild-fox Ch'an
Buddhist outsider of the Way. This is so heartbreaking."39
Nieh did not attribute the wild-fox Ch'an Buddhist to any definite Ch'an Buddhist
philosophy in his text. It can be seen as simply a word for criticizing his opponents
for straying from the Confucian Way.
The "substance/tranquillity/intelligence" and "function/activity/consciousness"
dualism is so crucial that before depicting the responses of Nieh's opponents' to it,
we will elaborate the concept further.
The terms of Nieh's dualism might be related to two separate concepts of the
relation between "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity". One is featured in
the Book of Changes, the other is by Wang Yang-ming. In Nieh's description of the
two kinds of interpretations of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "extending innate
knowledge", he said, "innate knowledge (a substance of tranquillity) ... acts to
penetrate things," and "returning to tranquillity for penetrating action." This might be
related to the Book of Changes. According to the Book of Changes:
Sung-chiang], in Nieh Pao, Shuang-chiang Nieh hsien-sheng wen-chi, chtian 8, pp. 59b-60a.
39 Ibid.
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Change has neither thought nor action, because it is in the state of absolute quiet
(tranquil) and inactivity, and when acted on, it immediately penetrates all
things.40
Ch'en Jung-chieh comments as follows: "What is quiet (tranquil) is substance and
what penetrates things is function. This sets the pattern for the Neo-Confucian theory
of substance and function."41 From the above passage, we can assert that there was a
"substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism in the Book of Changes. In
this dualism, "substance/tranquillity" is considered the womb from which
"function/activity" was born. In this sense Nieh's dualism is similar to the position of
the Book of Changes.
In addition, in Nieh's description of innate knowledge, he said, "substance and
the function come from the same source." This might be related to Wang
Yang-ming's statement that:
When we speak of substance as substance, function is already involved in it, and
when we speak of function as function, substance is already involved in it. This
is what is called "Substance and function coming from the same source."42
It appears that Wang Yang-ming basically did not agree with the
"substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism in the Book of Changes.
With his saying "substance and function come from the same source", he was
emphasizing that "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" are involved in each
40 Book of Changes, chapter 10; in Source Book, p. 267.
41 Ibid.
42
CHL, p. 130; Instruction, Part I: 108, p. 69.
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other, and that therefore, both of them should be seen as equally important.43
Differing from Wang by saying "substance and the function come from the same
source," Nieh was emphasizing that "once substance is established, function naturally
emerges. The effort of extending knowledge is simply establishing substance to attain
function." In this sense, Nieh was not obedient to Wang Yang-ming's teaching. It is
probably because of this discrepancy that Nieh's opponents disagreed with him.
Ou-yang Te took a position that considered tranquillity and activity as equally
important to criticize Nieh. He said:
Innate knowledge cannot be divided into activity and tranquillity, therefore it
always active and tranquil, not relying on emphasizing activity or emphasizing
tranquillity."44
This position was generally taken by Nieh's opponents. Wang Chi criticized Nieh by
saying:
Right in activity, there exists tranquillity. Tranquillity is identical to activity.
Right in knowing right and wrong, there exists vacuous tranquillity. Substance
is just the same as function. ... If it is said: "Only according to vacuous
tranquillity can there be knowing right and wrong", it becomes a divergent
opinion. A divergent opinion will cause [the truth] to vanish.45
Obviously both Ou-yang Te and Wang Chi took a similar position to Wang
43 This basic position shows in most of Wang's conversations on tranquillity. See Instruction, Part I:
23, p. 28; Part I: 28, pp. 30-1; Part 11:151, pp. 131-132; Part II: 156, pp. 134-135; Part: 157,
pp.135-136; Part III: 202,p.l90; Part III: 204, pp.191-192; Part III :231,p. 203.
44
Ou-yang Te "Ta Chou Lu-t'ien" ilFMIHEH [Reply to Chou Lu-t'ien], in Ou-yang Te,
Ou-yang Nan-yeh hsien-sheng wen-chi [The works of Ou-yang Te], in Ssu-k'u
ch'iian-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu, vol. 81, chiian 4, p. 11a.
45
Wang Chi, "Pieh Tseng Chien-t'ai man-yti chai-lueh" S!l1t]iLiElSinJfPf§ [An abbreviated record
of the dialogue with Tseng Chien-t'ai at his departing], in Wang Chi, Wang Lung-hsi ch'iian-chi,
chiian 16, p. 23a.
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Yang-ming. They both challenged the "substance/tranquility/intelligence" and
"function/activity/consciousness" dualism, and opposed Nieh's doctrine of "returning
to tranquillity".
To sum up the arguments between Nieh Pao and his two major opponents,
Ou-yang Te and Wang Chi, it is clear that the "substance/tranquillity" and
"function/activity" dualism is a crucial point, which incurred Nieh's opponents'
doubts on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation.
(C) Liu Tsung-chou's views on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and
the practice of sitting in meditation
(i) Kao P'an-lung's experience of practising of sitting in meditation
Apart from the scholars of the Wang Yang-ming School, the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation also was
advocated by other scholars among Liu Tsung-chou's contemporaries. Kao
P'an-lung's experience of sitting in meditation is especially outstanding and was a
direct influence on Liu Tsung-chou.46
Although Kao was a follower of the Ch'eng-Chu School, he was also an
adherent of Chou Tun-i's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity", and tried to use it to
46 Ch'ien Mu, "Tu Liu Chi-shan chi" III ill111 [Reading the collected works of Liu Tsung-chou],
in Chung-kuo hsiieh-shu ssu-hsiang sliili lun-ts'ung cpJlSlfIraiS [Miscellaneous essays on
Chinese scholarship and thought] (Taipei: Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1978 ), vol. 7, p. 302.
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revise Chu Hsi's doctrine.47 Kao was famous for advocating the practice of sitting in
meditation.48 He had once come in contact with a scholar Lu Ku-ch'iao
[?-?], who was an adherent of Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity". Inspired by Lu, Kao took to sitting in meditation as a regular practice
for moral cultivation.49 He described his experience of sitting in meditation as
follows:
The next day [after meeting with Lu] I arranged thick mats in the boat, and set
up a strict daily order. I practiced "sitting in meditation for half day and learning
from books for the other half'{pan-jih ching-tso pan-jih tu-shu ^ 0 if?01ft
U). Whenever I felt ill at ease while sitting in meditation, I would follow the
instructions of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, in all that concerns "[making the will]
sincere", "[emphasizing] reverence", "emphasizing tranquility", "observing
feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy before they are aroused", and "sitting
in meditation with a purified mind to comprehend the principle of Heaven". I
practiced these points one by one. Whether standing or sitting, eating or resting,
I would not forget these thoughts. At night I did not undress and only fell asleep
when dead tired. Upon waking I returned to meditation, repeating and
alternating these various practices.50
The expression "sitting in meditation for half day and learning from books for the
other half' is from Chu Hsi. However, this expression was previously considered
only suitable for a particular disciple at a specific time, and it was not a general rule
for cultivation.51 Kao was criticized by later scholars for misunderstanding Chu
47 See Ch'en Chien-huang "Kao P'an-lung tui ching te t'i-jen chien chi tui Chu Hsi wei-fa i-fa
shuo te hsiu-cheng" ffipfifitifIE [Kao P'an-lung's
comprehension of "silence" (tranquillity): A revision of Chu Hsi's expressed and unexpressed
theories], E-hu hsiieh-chih [Goose Lake magazine], 28 (June, 2002), pp. 119-47.
48
Ting Fu-pao ~J~ fDffc, Ching-tsuo-fa ching-yao ffrii fifefit I? [The essential methods for sitting in
meditation] (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1990), p. 4.
49 Kao P'an-lung, "K'un-hsiieh chi" [S1|I!H [Records of painfully learning], in Kao P'an-lung,
Kao-tzu i-shu, chtian 3, pp. 14b-15a.
50 Ibid., p. 15a.
51 Ch'en Chien-huang WMlWk, "Ming Ch'ing li-hsiieh-chia tui pan-jih ching-tso pan-jih tu-shu ti
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Hsi.52 Nevertheless, Kao's use of this expression created a new perspective on the
practice.
Kao also urged his friends to adopt this practice. In a letter to a friend he said:
In our daily life for cultivation, we should take "sitting in meditation for half day
and book learning for the other half' as standard.53
He once also said:
Chu-tzu told students to "sit in meditation for half day and learn from books for
the other half'. If one does this for three years, he will definitely make progress.
I myself have tried it only for one or two months, and I saw the effect. If
scholars do not make efforts on this, their life will be totally wasted. It is a great
pity.54
Kao succeeded in persuading his disciple, Ch'en Lung-cheng ftiflflTF [Chi-t'ing
1585-1645], Ch'en confirmed that the expression was ultimately the essence of
learning.55
Kao's new perspective was probably inspired by Ch'en Hsien-chang. Besides
his contact with Lu Ku-ch'iao, who was influenced by Ch'en, Kao related "sitting in
meditation for half day and learning from books for the other half' to Ch'en's
doctrine of "fostering a starting point from the cultivation of tranquillity". He once
cheng-i chi ch'i yiin-yung" B If B [Ming and Ch'ing
Neo-Confuicans' disputations and practices with respect to "sitting in meditation for half day and
learning from books for the other half'], E-liu yiieh-k'an MftiJj=j f'J [Goose Lake monthly], 28: 3
(September 2002), pp. 16-8.
52 Ch'en Jung-chieh, Chu-tzu hsin t'an-shuo, p. 312.
53 Kao P'an-lung, "Yii Lu Ch'ueh-chai i" [Letters to Lu Ch'iieh-chai: the first one], in
Kao P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, chuan 8a, p. 25b.
54 Kao P'an-lung, "Yii" jj§ [Words], in ibid., chiian 1, p. 10b.
55 Ch'en Lung-cheng |5^f|IE, "Hsiieh-yen hsiang-ch'i er" [Words of learning in details:
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asked a friend, "How do you practise cultivation? [In my opinion,] you should
practise 'sitting in meditation for half day and learning from books for the other half.
Once you have practised this, you can achieve what Ch'en Hsien-chang said of
'fostering a starting point from the cultivation of tranquillity.'"56
It is with Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrine in mind that Kao made a special
interpretation of the expression "To sit in meditation with a purified mind to
comprehend the principle of Heaven" (mo-tso ch'eng-hsin t'i-jen t'ien-li
He said:
"To sit in meditation with a purified mind to comprehend the principle of
Heaven" means that while in sitting in meditation the mind is purified without
being intertwined with outer affairs, which is the so-called principle of Heaven.
In brief, it is saying that one should silently comprehend the substance of the
mind [which is the principle of Heaven itself] while sitting in meditation. It is
not saying that there is another principle of Heaven which is outside of the mind
that needs to be comprehended after the mind is purified while sitting in
meditation.57
The expression "To sit in meditation with a purified mind to comprehend the
principle of Heaven" is from Chu Hsi's teacher Li T'ung. Kao maintained that this is
the ultimate theme of Li T'ung's teaching.58 Li's original words are as follows:
The Way of learning does not reside in erudite discourse. It only resides in
sitting in meditation with a purified mind to comprehend the principle of
Heaven. Once there is a slight selfish desire emerging, it will be diminished
immediately. After one makes effort in this cultivation, he gradually will get a
part one], in Ch'en Lung-cheng, Chi-t'ing ch'iian-chi [The complete works of Ch'en
Lung-cheng] (A 1683 edition, preserved in Taipei National Central Library), chiian 5, p. 15a.
56 Kao P'an-lung, "Yti An Wo-su i" —" [Letters to An Wo-su: the first one], in Kao
P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, chiian 8a, p. 29b.
57 Kao P'an-lung, "Yii", in ibid., chiian 1, p. lib.
58 Ibid.
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clear mind, and his discussing of learning will start getting better.39
Obviously, in Li's mind, the purpose of sitting in meditation is to diminish selfish
desire and make the mind clear, thus aiding learning. Li T'ung took sitting in
meditation as a complementary method of cultivation. Kao's explanation of Li's
expression gives it a new perspective. Firstly, Kao identified the substance of the
mind with the principle of Heaven. Secondly, Kao considered the purification of the
mind the aim of sitting in meditation. In brief, sitting in meditation to comprehend
the substance of the mind was the only aim of cultivation. In this sense, Kao's
position is very close to Ch'en Hsien-chang's.
However, Kao's attitude is not always so definite. He sometimes expressed an
attitude similar to Chu Hsi's. He once said:
To sit in meditation is to think about those books we learn. To learn is to
examine the essential of what we thought [in sitting in meditation]."60
Here it appears that Kao, like Chu Hsi, considered sitting in meditation as only a
complementary way for cultivation. In this sense, Kao's idea of the practice of sitting
in meditation is different from Ch'en Hsien-chang's.
Kao's ambivalence toward Ch'en hsien-chang's paradigm of sitting in
meditation is perhaps connected to Kao's general position. Kao's doctrine were
generally in accordance with the doctrines of the Ch'eng-Chu School and he always
59 Li T'ung M, Yen-p'ing ta-wen [Li T'ung's answers to enquiries] (Taipei: Kuang-wen
shu-ehii, 1972), p. 114.
60 Kao P'ang-lung, "Yii Lu Ch'ueh-chai i", in Kao P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, chiian 8a, p. 25b.
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kept the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" in his mind.61 He worried about the
incompatibility between the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the doctrine
of "emphasizing reverence".
(ii) Liu Tsung-chou's critiques on the Neo-Confucian doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation
In one of Liu Tsung-chou's essays on the essence of the learning of the sages, he
took the following Neo-Confucian doctrines as examples to explain how to get
achievement in learning:
Master Chou Tun-i postulated the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity to
establish the human ultimate". According to Chou, master Ch'eng I taught
people to practise sitting in meditation. Li T'ung, too, taught people to "observe
the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy before they arise." In our dynasty,
master Ch'en Hsien-chang , too, took the doctrine of "fostering a starting point
from the cultivation of tranquillity" as essential. He built up the Ch'un-yang t'ai
, and practised sitting in meditation there for years. Master Wang
Yang-ming, however, said that sitting in meditation was not meant for the sake
of attaining the samadhi of Ch'an Buddhism. It is a remedy to our lack of
learning by an effort of chasing the strayed mind. He also maintained that the
doctrine of "extending innate knowledge" must be learned in the moment before
the feelings arise. Lo Hung-hsien also adopted Chou Tun-i's doctrine of
"absence of desire" for pursuing a starting point in tranquillity. ... All of them
had attained the state of "abiding in the highest goodness"62
In Liu's opinion, the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting
in meditation are the basic methods for attaining the state of "abiding in the highest
61
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsileh-an i" —* [The Tung-lin School: part one], in MJHA,
chiian 58, pp. 1402-4.
62 "Ken-chih shuo" MlhlS [Essay on the meaning of "stop" in the hexagram Ken of the Book of
Change], in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 377-8.
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goodness", depicted in the Great Learning,63 It shows that Liu was greatly
concerned with the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting
in meditation.
Although Liu generally praised his Neo-Confucian forerunners for advocating
the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation,
elsewhere he did make critiques of some of them. Ch'en Hsien-chang was one of the
primary objects of his critiques. Liu Tsung-chou's teacher Hsu Fu-yiian was a
disciple of Chan Jo-shui. Chan Jo-shui was a disciple of Ch'en Hsien-chang.
Therefore Liu can be said to be a beneficiary of Ch'en.64 However, Liu's attitude
toward Ch'en seems to be ambivalent. In Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-ju hsiieh-an, he
presented Liu's general position on Ch'en's doctrine as follows:
[Liu said that] Ch'en's philosophy is based on nature (tzu-jan [=[$&); its
essentials consist in acquiring insights for oneself (tzu-te Because he
emphasizes acquiring insights for himself, he can draw deeply upon this and
find its source where he returns, being as lively as the hawk and the fish (yii
yuan yii t'ung i huo p'o |W]—and returning to himself by grasping
hold of the pivot that controls the creative processes.65
Liu appeared to praise Ch'en for his emphasis on acquiring insights for oneself. He
therefore maintained: "He (Ch'en) may be said to have started a new school of
63 Ibid., p. 376.
54 See Huang Hsiin-min JifllEK, "Chi-shan hsin-hsiieh yii wan-Ming ssu-ch'ao"
iD] [Liu Tsung-chou's School of Mind and the intellectual climate of late Ming], in Chung Ts'ai-chiin
, ed., Liu Chi-shan hsiieh-shu shih-hsian lun-chi M fU■¥® ® twiHI [The symposia essays
on Liu Tsung-chou's thought] (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia
Sinica, 1998), pp. 214-5.
63
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo" [The teacher's sayings], in MJHA, p. 4; The English
translation is based on Records, p. 55.
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thought by himself, standing out among his fellows."66 However, when enquiring
further, Liu became negative:
When asked what is meant by the word te f=§ (acquire), he (Ch'en) replied that
it referred to the "starting point" (tuan-ni which is fostered from the
cultivation of tranquillity. He had earlier sought this ["starting point"] in
classical texts for years without success, but acquired it one day in sitting in
meditation. This seems to differ from what the ancients said about tzu-te.
Mencius has said: "The gentleman steeps himself in the Way because he wishes
to acquire it in himself." We have not heard Mencius say that he acquired it
naturally. Is the subtle technique of sitting in meditation not perhaps a
superficial method and a shortcut?67
Here Liu expressed his doubt about Ch'en's teaching of sitting in meditation. In Liu's
opinion, Ch'en's experience of "fostering a starting point from the cultivation of
tranquillity" seemed to be too superficial and simplified in comparison with the
ancient sages. Liu continued his criticism as follows:
To acquire [the Way] naturally (tzu-jan er te [=j is to acquire it without
exercising thought, to hit the mark without effort, and to embody the Way
naturally and with ease. Only sages can acquire it naturally like that. We have
not heard that it is acquired by sitting in meditation.68
Here, Liu pointed out that although to acquire the Way naturally is an ideal way,
which is the way the sages cultivated themselves, it cannot be achieved by sitting in
meditation. Liu therefore concluded: "After all, Ch'en has acquired what he has
acquired. That is all."69
Liu seems to criticize Ch'en for having acquired nothing at all. Liu furthermore
66 Ibid.
67
Ibid., pp. 4-5; Records, p. 55.
68
Ibid., p. 5; Records, p. 55.
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explained:
The Way is rooted in nature (tao pen tzu-jan no one can acquire it
with artifice. The moment one desires to be natural, one has become artificial.
Hence it is said: "if you know how to acquire it, you can do so in an active
manner; if you do not know how to acquire it, you will only play mind games
(,nung ching hun |!6).70
Here Liu appeared to praise acquiring the Way naturally. However, it is not so easy to
be natural. Therefore, in Liu's opinion, to claim that one can acquire the Way
naturally is so subtle and difficult to understand that it is easy to fall into the trap of
"playing mind games". The expression "playing mind games" (nung ching hun)
seems to suggest that one is using his imagination to figure out a fictional thing as the
Way but not devote himself to substantive moral cultivation. Based on this idea, Liu
had a further critique on Ch'en's doctrine of "fostering a starting point from the
cultivation of tranquillity":
As to the starting point which is fostered from the cultivation of tranquillity, I do
not know what it really is. [In his idea] this starting point is what the mind is
able to acquire but it is not describable. It is after all not so different from
playing mind games.71
Liu appeared to accuse Ch'en for indulging in imagination, or a variety of mysticism,
and being devoid of substantive moral cultivation. He then criticized Ch'en as
follows:
69
Ibid.; Records, pp. 55-6.
70
Ibid.; Records, p. 56.
71 Ibid.
112
When tested against the school of sages, he cannot avoid the defects of being
desirous of quick results and of looking for small advantages. He appears to be a
Ch'an Buddhist but is not a Ch'an Buddhist; that is all.72
Although Liu does not consider Ch'en a Ch'an Buddhist, he still worries about
Ch'en's being assimilated to Ch'an Buddhism.
To sum up the above passages quoted by Huang Tsung-hsi, although Liu
Tsung-chou admitted that Ch'en Hsien-chang started a new school, he criticized
Ch'en's teachings on sitting in meditation for being contrary to Mencius' teaching.
The crucial point is that Liu did not believe that people could acquire the Way
naturally or through the practice of sitting in meditation. It seems that Liu did not
experience the mystical experience of sitting in meditation which Ch'en claimed to
have and on which he based his doctrine.
However, this seems not to be Liu's definitive comment on Ch'en
Hsien-chang's doctrine. There are some direct references to Ch'en's doctrine in Liu's
own works. They reflect the similar ambivalence of Huang Tsung-hsi's quotation in
his Ming-ju hsiieh-an with some differences. In expressing his negative attitude, Liu
said:
"Without concentration, there is no possibility for dispersion." To speak from
the point of view of the substance of mind, this saying is not without fault.
Ch'en Hsien-chang said: "Only with storing first can one express [his feelings]."
Hu Chu-jen teased him and said: "If it is the case, the principle of matter will be
mistaken." Hu's criticism is quite true.73
Although in this passage Liu does not explicitly mention Ch'en's doctrine, he seems
72 Ibid.
73 «tt. •"Hui-lu" [Records of meetings], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 625.
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to criticize Ch'en for overestimating the cultivation of tranquillity before feelings
arise.
However, elsewhere, Liu indicated positive appraisal of Ch'en's doctrine by
saying:
[In Ch'en's saying], "fostering a starting point from the cultivation of
tranquillity", the starting point is the will. It is also solitariness. It is also
Heaven.74
Here, Liu expresses a different attitude from that quoted by Huang Tsung-hsi in
Ming-ju hsiieh-an. In Huang's quotation, Liu says that he does not know what the
starting point really is. The above passage, in contrast, shows Liu not only
elaborating on the meaning of the starting point, but also giving it a positive appraisal
by associating it with the will and the solitariness, which are both very important in
his doctrines of "making the will sincere" and "being vigilant in solitude". Liu also
compared Ch'en's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" with Chou Tun-i's doctrine
of "emphasizing tranquillity." He said:
Once one keeps the two words wu yii 4®^ (having no desires) in his mind, he
can become a sage immediately. Chou Tun-i is an earlier good example of this
truth, Ch'en Hsien-chang is a later one. Ch'en said in one of his poems: "The
more I cherish master Chou Tun-i's teaching of having no desires, the more I
feel refreshed."75
As it is shown above, in talking about his doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity",
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desires can be seen as the basic principle of his doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity".
It appears that Liu held this principle and praised Ch'en for subscribing to it.
Although Liu did not endorse Ch'en Hsien-chang's teaching on sitting in
meditation, like Ch'en, he considered tranquillity as essential for moral cultivation.
He once even said: "The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" directly relates to
issues concerning life and death."76 He also related the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" to sitting in meditation. In an essay named "Ching-tso shuo" if
[On sitting in meditation] Liu said:
The main theme of learning is simply to emphasize tranquillity. The method
here [for emphasizing tranquillity] is very difficult. For students to find a way to
start working on it, I ask them to sit in meditation.77
Liu also gave Chu Hsi's doctrine on sitting in meditation his support, but gave it a
different emphasis, to confirm its importance. In an essay entitled "Tu-shu shuo" iff
Uri^; [On learning from books] Liu said:
Master Chu once said: "Students who practise 'sitting in meditation for half day
and learning from books for the other half for three to five years will see a
visible achievement." Nowadays we should take this as a method. However,
apart from the effort of sitting in meditation there is no other method for
learning from books. Therefore, there is no difference between the effort of
sitting in meditation and that of learning from books. Once students really find
their way to sitting in meditation, when studying the books by ancients they can
feel that the ancients are right in front of them. All the inspiration of books can
be acquired, and the benefit of learning from books is founded without any
problem.78
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"Ching-tso shuo", in ibid., p. 357.
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The most important point here is that Liu considered the practice of sitting in
meditation as much more important than Chu Hsi did. In the above passage, Chu,
though he took sitting in meditation seriously, appeared to give equal importance to
learning from books. To Liu, sitting in meditation became the most crucial process
for moral cultivation, so that even the efficacy of learning from books is dependent
on it. Liu went on to say:
Students who intend to realize the mind of the sages and to follow the Way in a
right process cannot but learn the Four Books and Six Classics. However, the
mind of the sages is identical to our own mind. One who masters learning from
books does so by pursuing [the Way] in his own mind. To forsake one's own
mind and pursue the mind of the sages, even though he has learned thousands of
words [of the sages], is worthless.79
This passage brings Liu close to Ch'en Hsien-chang on learning from books. Ch'en,
as mentioned in section 1 of chapter 2, felt unable to converge the mind and principle
in learning from books, and therefore, he forsook learning from books for sitting in
meditation. Liu, like Ch'en, showed his doubts about learning without the purpose of
pursuing the Way in one's own mind. In this sense, the similarity between Liu and
Ch'en is that they both emphasized the importance of pursuing the Way in one's own
mind in cultivation.
However, in general, Liu expressed a more positive attitude toward learning
from books than Ch'en. He quoted Wang Yang-ming's words to explain his own
position as follows:
78 "Tu-shu shuo", in ibid., p. 358.
79 Ibid.
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Master Yang-ming did not like students to emphasize learning from books but
asked them to verify things directly with their mind in its original state. He said
that simply because [he considered that] those who do not know how to learn
would forsake their own mind to pursue the mind of the sages, which would
make them like beggars in front of others' doors [without knowing what they
really want]. He does not mean that we may totally forsake learning from books.
The master also said: "To study extensively is to study nothing but principle. To
inquire accurately is to inquire about nothing but principle. To think carefully is
to think of nothing but principle. To sift clearly is to sift nothing but principle.
To practise earnestly is to practise nothing but principle." "The mind is
principle."80
Here Liu considered that learning should be for pursuing principle, which is identical
to the mind. In other words, if the purpose of learning is to pursue principle, we do
not need to forsake learning from books for sitting in meditation. It reveals that,
compare to Ch'en, Liu is positive about learning from books.
On the other hand, given Liu's belief that the purpose of learning is to pursue
the Way in the mind and also to pursue principle, Liu appears to share Ch'en's
ultimate concern for converging mind and principle. It is based on this common
concern that, although Liu criticized Ch'en's practice of sitting in meditation as
playing mind games, he did not totally dismiss the practice of sitting in meditation, in
the sense that it is a way of converging mind and principle. He interpreted sitting in
meditation as follows:
Ch'eng I praised those who practised sitting in meditation as excellent in study.
Excellence in study simply refers to mastery of ch'iufang-hsin (chasing
the strayed mind). To begin in this way is taking the road toward the ultimate
truth. It is not simply an insignificant expedient way. Once one realizes this, he
is immediately at the entrance to the sagely sanctuary. When one does not yet
realize it, he is busy searching without a goal, not knowing the way to enter [the




simply learn how to sit first. If one does not know how to sit, how can he talk
about study?81
The term "ch'iu fang-hsirT is from Mencius. Mencius considered it a basic way to
-
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realize jen (benevolence). By connecting the practice of sitting in meditation to
the realization of jen, Liu showed his high regard for the former.
Given Liu's high regard for sitting in meditation, it is no wonder he still showed
his respect to Ch'en Hsien-chang's doctrine. He once concluded his comments on it
as follows:
Master Ch'en Hsien-chang takes acquiring insights for oneself (tzu-te E=]f#) as
essential for learning. He claims that it is easy [to acquire insights for oneself]
without spending any effort. However, in my opinion, in order to reach that
stage one should put enough effort into moral cultivation. What did he do during
the period of practising sitting in meditation in Ch'un-yang t'ai for three years?
We should think about how we can spend as much effort as he has. If we cannot
spend as much effort as him, we will miss the chance to acquire great insights
ourselves.83
To Liu, Ch'en Hsien-chang's taking acquiring insights for oneself as essential for
learning and his teaching of sitting in meditation are deserving of high respect.
However, Liu maintained that Ch'en was incapable of revealing the necessary steps
for achieving the stage he himself had attained. Therefore Liu was enthusiastic in
modifying Ch'en's teaching.
The second Neo-Confucian forerunner of the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation that Liu Tsung-chou commented
on was Wang Yang-ming. However, Liu's comments on Wang are few, probably
81
"Ching-tso shuo", in ibid., pp. 357-8.
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because, though Wang once had taken the practice of sitting in meditation as his
main teaching, he later changed it to the doctrine of "the extension of innate
04
knowledge". Liu basically agreed with Wang's opinion that "sitting in meditation
was not meant for the sake of your attaining the samadhi of Ch'an Budhism, it is a
or
remedy to our lack of learning by an effort of chasing the strayed mind." Liu, like
Wang, was cautious to distinguish between the Neo-Confucian practice of sitting in
meditation and Ch'an Buddhist intent meditation.
The third Neo-Confucian forerunner of the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation that Liu Tsung-chou commented
on is Lo Hung-hsien. Liu considered Lo's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" to
be Confucian. When some people accused Lo's emphasis on tranquillity of being
close to Ch'an Buddhism, Liu defended him, saying: "The ancients have always
taught 'contingent doctrines'. After Wang Yang-ming, Lo Hung-hsien is absolutely
necessary. I prefer his having been able to sustain this Way from further falls."86
However, Liu criticized Lo's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" for
over-emphasizing the pursuit of tranquillity.87 It seems that Liu, besides having
concerns about closeness to Ch'an Buddhism, was cautious about the danger of the
doctrine lapsing into preferring tranquillity over activity.
Kao P'an-lung is the final Neo-Confucian forerunner to the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation. As we have
82 See Mencius, Book VI, Part A: 11, p. 167.
83
"I-pien wen-ta" [Inquiries and replies: a sequential edition], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 420.
84 See Ch'ien Te-hung, "K'o wen-lu hsii-shuo", in WYMCC, chiian 41, p. 1574.
85 The saying is from a letter Wang Yang-ming written to his students. See Wang Yang-ming, "Yii
Ch'en-chung chu sheng", in WYMCC, chuan 4, p. 144. Liu Tsung-chou quoted it at least twice to show
his agreement. See "Jen-p'u", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 19; "Ken-chih shuo", in ibid., p. 377.
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Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 12; Records, p. 67.
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mentioned, Kao P'an-lung was one of Liu's good friends. Kao's experience of
practising sitting in meditation also influenced Liu. Liu took Kao's opinion on
distinguishing between two kinds of sitting in meditation to refer to the difference
between Confucian sitting in meditation and Ch'an Buddhist intent meditation.88
However, Liu was very aware that Kao was influenced by Ch'an Buddhism.89 Liu
was very serious about maintaining the distinction between Confucianism and Ch'an
Buddhism.
(iii) The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting
meditation in Liu Tsung-chou's life and thought
Although Liu Tsung-chou made critiques on some of his Neo-Confucian
forerunners on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation, he still saw them as good ways for moral cultivation. It is said that
influenced by Kao P'an-lung, Liu took "sitting in meditation for half a day and
learning from books for the other half' as a regular practice for cultivation.90 He
often emphasized tranquillity and practised sitting in meditation. It was even said that
this habit benefited his health.91 According to Liu Chuo,
Master [Liu Tsung-chou] had been weak and thin ever since he was bom. He
often suffered from illness during his adulthood. It was only in his later years
87 "Ken-chih shuo", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 378.
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"Jen-p'u", in ibid., p. 19.
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Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chi-shan hsiieh-an" [The Chi-shan School], in MJHA, chiian 62, p.
1507.
90 Ch'ien Mu, "Tu Liu Chi-shan chi", p. 302.
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Huang Min-hao, Liu Tsung-chou chi ch'i shen-tu che-hsiieh, pp. 14-22.
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that his health became better because of his maturity on cultivation. He could
[then] write all day without feeling tired. He ate simply throughout his life, and
after the calamitous change [of the fall of Ming in 1644] took only vegetarian
food. He remained energetic and vigorous during twenty days of fasting. This is
all due to his efforts in cultivating tranquillity (ching yang it).92
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Liu Chuo does not offer any medical explanation for this. " Although the relation
between cause and effect could be questioned, the passage reveals that Liu devoted
himself to the cultivation of tranquillity throughout his life.
In Liu's biography we find many references to his doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and sitting in meditation. First is a record from 1611, saying that he and
Liu Yung-ch'eng had a philosophical discussion in summer of that year. They
discussed the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" among other issues. It was at this
time that Liu started learning how to cultivate tranquillity.94 Liu probably also
started his philosophical investigation on cultivating tranquillity in this year.
A record of 1626 says that, hearing of the arrests of many of his comrades in the
Tung-lin party, Liu decided to live as a hermit, "being vigilant in solitude". He said
that "'solitariness' can only be preserved in tranquillity. If one does not know how to
practise cultivation while he is tranquil, what can he do while he is active?" It was at
this time he began to accept Chou Tun-i's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity to
establish the human ultimate" and to practise "sitting in meditation for half day and
learning from books for the other half'.95 A record dating from the following year
92 "Liu p'u i-lu" [Records not compiled in Liu Tsung-chou's biography], in LTCCC, vol. 5,
p. 568.
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Huang Min-hao [Wong, Simon Man-ho] has a more detailed study on this relationship. However,
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due simply to his cultivation of tranquillity. See Huang, Liu Tsung-chou chi ch'i shen-tu che-hsiieh, pp.
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says that from spring to summer, Liu practised sitting in meditation whenever he had
free time.96 It seems that the practice of sitting in meditation became a regular
practice with him then.
Liu also tried to transmit this practice to his students. In 1631, in a lecture to the
Cheng-jen hui, which he founded with T'ao Shih-ling that year, he concentrated on
the doctrine of "being vigilant in solitude". When he was asked how to start, he
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answered: "You can practise sitting in meditation first." It appears that Liu
believed in the general effect of the practice of sitting in meditation for moral
cultivation.
Liu's practice of sitting in meditation seems to have been maintained until his
death. It is said that during the time he refused food in order to commit suicide, he
practised sitting in meditation in a small room, undisturbed by worldly affairs. He
considered himself totally merged in the whole universe spiritually.98
From the above records, we can conclude that Liu was consistent and sincere in
his belief in the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in
meditation in his life. Besides that, the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" is
closely related to Liu's doctrine of "being vigilant in solitude".
In his introduction to the teaching of Liu Tsung-chou, Huang Tsung-hsi wrote:
"Liu's teaching takes 'being vigilant in solitude' as its essential doctrine."99 Liu
explained the doctrine of "being vigilant in solitude" as follows:
96 See ibid., p. 226.
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Ibid., p. 295.
98 See "Hui-lu", in ibid., vol. 2, p. 645.
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The core of the learning of sagehood resides only in "being vigilant in solitude".
Solitariness is the spirit of tranquillity and the incipient force for activity. To act
without being reckless is called tranquillity. It is the ultimate of vigilance. It is
called "emphasizing tranquillity to establish the ultimate".100
In Liu's opinion, "being vigilant in solitude" is the ultimate expression of the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity". It is also noteworthy that Liu maintained that
the purpose of "being vigilant in solitude" is "to emphasize tranquillity to establish
the ultimate". In this sense, we can be sure that the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" played an important part in Liu's thought.
(iv) Liu Tsung-chou's response to doubts on the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation
Despite his confidence, Liu still needed to face doubts on the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation. These doubts fall
into four categories. First, there was a doubt about the compatibility between them
and the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" of the Ch'eng-Chu School. Secondly,
there was doubt about their closeness to Ch'an Buddhism. Thirdly, there was doubt
about the "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism on which they
were based. Lastly, there was doubt about their lapsing into a preference of
tranquillity over activity. Liu spent much effort in dealing with them.
On the first point, there does not seem to be any significant contradiction
between the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the doctrine of "emphasizing
reverence" in Liu's mind. In his description of his father's learning, Liu Chuo said:
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"Hsiieh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 424.
What my father learnt about the sincerity (ch 'eng |^) of the learning of the sages
started from the effort of "emphasizing reverence", and, then, spending energy
on "being vigilant in solitude" in the middle of his life, he finally got to the
essential [of the learning of the sages] by "making the will sincere".
"Reverence" is the access to "sincerity".101
It is noteworthy that Liu Chuo appears to regard "making the will sincere" the major
achievement in Liu Tsung-chou's learning. It is commonly agreed among modern
scholars that the emphasis on "making the will sincere" is one of Liu's major ideas
on moral cultivation.102 In this sense, "reverence" is also important to Liu, as the
access to sincerity, and it played a crucial role in Liu's early life of moral cultivation.
At the age of twenty-four, after he met Hsu Fu-yiian, Liu made up his mind to pursue
the learning of the sages. It was also under Hsu's influence that Liu first mentioned
the importance of "reverence" for moral cultivation by saying,
There is no other ethic than "reverence" that is crucial for access to the Way. It
starts from behaving properly and seriously. It ranges from the trivial details of
appearance and words to the manifest aspects of every human affair. It ranges
from vigilance on any tiny thought at any time to learning to preserve the
principle of Heaven and erase human desires. Every time when a selfish
intention arises one must fight strenuously to overcome it, discover where it
comes from, and find out what he can do if it does emerge and lead to damaging
103
consequences.
"Reverence" in this passage can be seen as serious attitude generally towards
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everything in daily life irrespective of any special philosophical meaning. Therefore,
there cannot be any contradiction between the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence"
and Liu's two main doctrines, "being vigilant in solitude" and "making the will
sincere".104 This is the reason that Liu not only regarded "reverence" as important in
his early life, but also took "emphasizing reverence" very seriously at the very end of
his life. He said during the time he refused food in order to commit suicide:
The essence of learning is nothing but sincerity. The effort of sincerity resides in
"emphasizing reverence". After reverence is realized there comes the realization
of sincerity. After sincerity is realized comes the realization of the principle of
Heaven.105
He also gave a general description of "reverence" as follows:
Ever since one is born, his mind senses things and is led astray by things. The
five sense organs are the door for temptation. The mind is always straying
outside, and whenever one wants to search for the original mind inside, one can
only use the strayed mind to search for the original one. The word "reverence"
can be the only clue for preserving the original mind. [One should practise it]
whenever he is in activity or in tranquillity. ["Reverence" can be taken as
essential] no matter whether one is active or tranquil, or [dealing with matters
that are] manifested or hidden, in the past or in the future, giant or minute. It is
the law of the mind that is transmitted by thousands of sages.106
From this description, we know that Liu saw "reverence" as a common factor in
moral cultivation in every aspect of human life. From this perspective, it is no
wonder that Liu also did not see any contradiction between the doctrine of
"emphasizing reverence" and that of "emphasizing tranquillity". He even said:
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"Emphasizing tranquillity is reverence."107 This shows that, in his mind,
emphasizing tranquillity is suited to the ethic of reverence.
However, because "reverence" is too general, Liu ultimately expressed
dissatisfaction with the term. He said:
It is inspired by [the terms] "caution" (chieh-shen gScfjl) and "apprehension"
(k'ung-chti icMS) in the Doctrine of the Mean. Ch'eng I postulated the word
"reverence" [for moral cultivation]. But reverence is a rigid effort, which is not
so effective and substantial as "caution" and "apprehension" as mentioned in the
Doctrine of the Mean. [In the Doctrine of the Mean,] "caution" means "being
cautious of what cannot be seen", and "apprehension" means "being
apprehensive of what cannot be heard". That is all. It does not maintain that one
should keep the word "reverence" in mind. Therefore, it is "emphasizing
tranquillity to establish the ultimate" that is the least defective [for moral
cultivation].108
The doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" thus ultimately overwhelmingly takes the
lead in Liu's moral philosophy. Nevertheless, again, it cannot be said that the
doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" has any contradiction with the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" in Liu's moral philosophy. Rather, it appears that Liu is
using the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" to refine the doctrine of
"emphasizing reverence". In this sense, Liu's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity"
is not incompatible with the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence".
Secondly, on the similarities between the Confucian practice of sitting in
meditation and the Ch'an Buddhist practice of sitting in meditation, we can start with
a discussion of Liu's text on the practice of sitting in meditation in his Jen-p'u. In the
section entitled "Sung kuo fa" t&jisiSc (A method for the prosecution of bad deeds),
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Liu created a special ritual for moral cultivation as follows:
I put a bowl of water and a stick of burning incense on a clean table. In front of
it I place a rush mat. After dawn, I sit on the mat facing the table in the lotus
position, erect and reverent. I hold back my breath and assume a serious mien,
as if there were a majestic and awesome presence to whom I confess my
misdeeds without concealment. I proceed to accuse myself, saying: "You
certainly have the appearance of a human being. But once you have stumbled,
you act like a beast. Degradation after degradation, you never stop." I reply,
"Yes! Yes!" I then imagine that the above accusations are repeated by ten voices,
while ten eyes and ten hands are beholding and pointing {shih mu shih chih,
kung chih kung shih hlli ' at me. I again reply, "Yes! Yes!"
At this moment my heart throbs. Bitter sweat begins to flow and my face flushes,
as if my body were being tortured in a court of law. Thereupon I leap up and
shout, "I am guilty!" I then accuse myself further, "You are making an insincere
confession!" To that I reply, "No! No!" Thereupon a thread of bright ch'i
[air] comes slowly, as if proceeding to the Great Void, and I know that
everything preceding was [due to] false causes. If false, then it is not real. [I then
realize that] my original, true face is profound and pure, and it may emerge at
any moment without any difficulty. This is just the right time to persevere with
it. Suddenly a mote of dust arises; blow it away. Persevere again. Once more a
mote of dust rises; blow it away. It will be like this several times. Neither forget
it nor force it (wu-wang wu-chu [ft),110 also do not ask what the effect
will be. [At the end of the ritual,] tidy yourself instantly and rise. Stay shut in
your chamber all day.111
This ritual, Liu admitted, was accused of being close to Ch'an Buddhism. After
considering this criticism, Liu confidently defined the above ritual as the "Ching-tso
fa"jf§?^££ (the method of sitting in meditation).112 Some modern scholars have
pointed out that this ritual is indeed similar to a Buddhist confession rite, as recorded
108
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in the Fa-hua san-mei ch 'ati-i [A manual for the Lotus Samadhi]}1
The Lotus Samadhi [Fa-hua san-mei is a twenty-one day practice based
on the twenty-eighth chapter of the Lotus Scripture [Fa-hua ching
Fa-hua san-mei ch'an-i was written by Chih-i [538-597], the founder of the
T'ien-t'ai School of Chinese Buddhism.115 It describes the Buddhist rite of
confession as follows:
[The practitioner should] find a quiet place to build a room as sanctuary, build
another room next to the sanctuary for seated meditation, and set up a high
throne in the sanctuary, on which to enshrine a single copy of the Lotus
Scripture. No other images, relics, or scriptures of any kind may be added. A
canopy is placed over the altar, and banners are hung about the room. At dawn
on the day one enters the sanctuary, he should clean and sweep the floor of the
sanctuary, sprinkle it with perfumed water, and scour it with perfumed mud. On
the altar [the practitioner should] arrange oil lamps and flowers and burn rare
incense powders as offerings to the San pao (Three Precious Ones:
Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, i.e. Buddha, the Law, and the Ecclesia or
Order116). [The practitioner should] practise this rite with elaborate invocations.
Why should [he] have to practise like that? For how can people, who sincerely
revere the San pao, wishing to escape from the San chieh — (three realms of
the world: world of sensuous desire, form, and formless world of pure spirit117),
be careless on the rite. If one won't spend his wealth on offering the Ta-sheng
p 118
pp! (Mahayana ), he shall never acquire the wisdom and his heavy sins shall
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"Chi-shan hsiieh te Ju Shih chih pien" [Liu Tsung-chou's interpretation of
Confucianism and Buddhism], Fo-hsiieh yen-chiu chung-hsin hsiieh-pao 9cT1'L[Journal
of the center for Buddhist studies], No. 2 (July 1997), pp. 193-9.
114 Daniel B. Stevenson, "The four kinds of Samadhi in early T'ien-t'ai Buddhism," in Peter N.
Gregory, ed., Tradition ofMeditation in Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1987), p. 67.
113
Ibid., p. 68. The T'ien-t'ai school can be traced to Kumarajiva fJPfSjUfh [334-413], but the
founder was Chi-i, who lived and taught in the T'ien-t'ai Mountain in Chekiang. The philosophical
ideas of the school underlie the basic scriptures of the school but they are not expressed in lengthy
passages. Chi-i's works are mostly devoted to spiritual cultivation. See Chan, Source Book, pp. 397-8.
116 William E. Soothill and Lewis Hondous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms: With Sanskrit
and English Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index (Londin: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & co.,







In the rite of the sanctuary, the practitioner is asked to expose his faults and make
1 9ft
confessions, hiding nothing. In the final part of the rite, one should realize that:
mind is insubstantial, like a dream or an illusion of magic. Being quiescent, it is
like empty space. It is without name, without distinguishing characteristics, and
it defies discrimination. At this point the practitioner does not even see the mind
of birth and death; how could he yet [expect to] find a mind of nirvana
(nieh-p'an liberation)? As he does not [apprehend] any object of
discernment or retain any notion of [a subjective] discerner, he does not grasp
hold of anything, does not abandon anything, does not depend on anything, and
does not adhere to anything. No mental activity whatsoever arises. His mind is
ever quiescent, yet he does not dwell in stillness. Beyond the reach of words and
speech, it is indescribable.121
One similarity between Liu's confession ritual and this Buddhist confession rite is
firstly that sitting in meditation plays an important role in both cases. In Liu's ritual,
the whole process of the moral cultivation appears to be realized during sitting in
meditation, while in the Buddhist rite, sitting in meditation was the necessary
requirement for the preparation for cultivation. Secondly, they both tried to formalize
moral cultivation. In other words, through the rigorously formal ritual, they intended
to persuade people to cultivate their moral life.122 Lastly, they both need a supervisor
119 Chih-i "Fa-hua san-mei ch'an-i" ^sijSzEIffc'IflSt'dl [The confession rite in accordance to Lotus
Scripture], in Taisho shinshu daizokyo TFffj-fttEA'lSfffi [Taisho edition of the Buddhist canon]
(Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng ch'u-pan ku-fen yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1983), vol. 46, pp. 950a-b. The English




Ibid., p. 954a. For the English translation see Daniel B. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 70.
122 Ku Ch'ing-mei suggests that Liu's ritual seems to have a regular process similar to the one held in
the sanctuary of the Buddhist rite. See Ku, op. cit., p. 195. Cynthia J. Brokow's study of Liu's "Sung
kuo fa" (A method for the prosecution of bad deeds), which is the record of Liu's ritual, points out that
this essay "explains how, through a form of quiet-sitting [sitting in meditation], one can make oneself
aware of one's tendencies to transgress", and "Liu believed that a rigorous practice of confession and
self-criticism was a prerequisite for the correction of faults and ultimately the attainment of moral
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for the whole process of cultivation. In Liu's case, the supervisor was another self,
which appears to be an imaginary self,123 while, in the Buddhist case, the supervisor
was the Lotus Scripture, which is a real object.
However, scholars also point out that there are some basic differences between
these two cases of confession rites. First, in Liu's case, the aim of the ritual is to help
people to realize their moral autonomy into moral realities in actual life, while in the
Buddhist case the aim of the rite is to help people to understand the empty nature of
this worldly life.124 Secondly, in Liu's case, the mind of the main actor of the ritual
is, in accordance with Confucian doctrine, ultimately good in nature, while in the
Buddhist case, the mind is empty, neither good nor evil.125
Despite the differences, the similarities between the two cases are obvious. It is
also noteworthy that the author of the Fa-hua san-mei ch'an-i, Chih-i, frequently
used the terms "sudden or gradual" (tun chien which are part of the basic
terminology later adopted by the Ch'an Buddhists,126 in both his doctrinal and his
practical works. Chi-i, therefore, had a pronounced influence on Ch'an Buddhism.127
In this sense, although there is no evidence to prove that Liu Tsung-chou intended to
imitate the Fa-hua san-mei ch'an-i, it is no wonder that Liu was criticised as being
perfection." See Brokow, op. cit., p. 135; p. 136.
123
Pei-yi Wu suggests that Liu's ritual "corresponds point for point with the Western theme of the
soul on trial," allowing for the difference that, with Liu, "the self is not divided into conscience and
soul but plays the twin roles alternately." See Wu, op. cit., p. 224.
124 See Mou, Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, p. 533.
125 See Ku Ch'ing-mei, op. cit., pp. 197-8.
126 The Ch'an school was divided into two schools, the Northern school and the Southern school. The
two schools are usually distinguished by the fact that while the Northern school advocates gradual
enlightenment (chien-wu jfrfn), the Southern school advocates sudden enlightenment (tun-wu itjlffa-).
See Source Book, p. 427.
127 Neal Donner, "Sudden and gradual intimately conjoined: Chih-i's T'ien-t'ai view," in Peter N.
Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1978), p. 201.
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close to Ch'an Buddhism.128
It was the pressure of this type of criticism that made Liu very concerned to
distinguish between the Confucian sitting in meditation and Ch'an Buddhist intent
meditation. Liu explained:
Isn't sitting in meditation the learning [of sages]? Ch'eng I praised people as
well-accomplished in study whenever he saw them sitting in meditation.
Someone after Ch'eng I explained: "[what Confucians said of sitting in
meditation] was not meant to teach people to sit in meditation for the sake of
attaining samadhi of Ch'an Buddhism. They simply wished to recommend such
a remedy to our lack of learning by an effort of chasing the strayed mind." This
explanation is absolutely right.129
Liu's quotation of the explanation for Ch'eng I is from Wang Yang-ming.130
Like Wang Yang-ming, Liu was careful to distinguish between the Confucian sitting
in meditation and Ch'an Buddhist intent meditation. Following the above passage,
Liu also cited Kao P'an-lung's distinction between two kinds of sitting in meditation
in order to explain the difference between Confucian sitting in meditation and Ch'an
Buddhist meditation. He said:
Recently master Kao P'an-lung has divided sitting in meditation into two kinds.
One is a method [to teach people how] to forsake everything ultimately. The
other one is a method [to teach people how] to settle down carefully in their real
life. The master considered the latter one is the right practice of sitting in
meditation.131
From the context, we can reasonably assume the former kind of sitting in meditation
1-8 See Ch'ien Ma, Sung Ming li-hsiieh kai-shu, p. 434.
129
"Jen-p'u", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 19.
130
Wang Yang-ming, "Yii Ch'en-chung chu sheng", in WYMCC, chiian 4, p. 144.
131
"Jen-p'u", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 19.
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refers to Ch'an Buddhist practice, the latter to Confucian practice.
Liu made a similar distinction in another essay. He said: "Ch'an Buddhism
considers emptiness the substance [of the mind], while Confucianism considers
goodness the substance [of the mind]". Liu maintained that, unlike the Confucian
practice, Ch'an Buddhist intent meditation is aimless and meaningless.132
It is clear that Liu tried to make a distinction between Confucian sitting in
meditation and Ch'an Buddhist meditation in order to avoid criticism that his
teaching was too close to Ch'an Buddhism. In an essay on sitting in meditation, Liu
gave a further explanation. He said:
The method during this time [of sitting in meditation] is neither closing the eyes,
nor covering the ears, nor sitting cross-legged, nor shu hsi (breathing
exercises), nor ts'an hua-tou (analyzing the saying of a kung-an
). We may rise to our feet when we feel tired and respond to stimulus in our
ordinary daily routines. Whether walking, standing, sitting or lying [in bed], we
treat all as sitting in meditation.134
Here, Liu seems to dismiss a regulated form for sitting in meditation. He particularly
mentions that the effort of his method of sitting in meditation is not "breathing
i oc
exercises", characteristic of Taoist cultivation, or "analyzing the saying of a
kung-an", characteristic of Ch'an Buddhist meditation.136 With this explanation, Liu
draws a definite line distinguishing his teaching of sitting in meditation from those of
132 "Ken-chih shuo", in ibid., pp. 377-8.
133
Kung-an is known as koan in Japanese. Literally it means an official document on the desk,
connoting a sense of important decision and the final determination of truth and falsehood. To this end
Ch'an masters made use of any story, problem, or situation as a kung-an for their pupils to explore the
truth behind it. See Source Book, p. 429.
134 "Chin-tso shuo", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 357.
135
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1956), vol. 2, pp. 143-4.
136 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (second series) (Boston: The Beacon Press,
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Taoism and Buddhism.
Thirdly, on the doubt about the "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity"
dualism behind the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting
in meditation, Liu, though an adherent of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity",
expressed his opposition to this dualism. He said:
To acquire tranquillity in activity is the true substance of tranquillity; to acquire
activity in tranquillity is the true function of activity. Substance and function
1 "37
come from the same source.
In saying "substance and function come from the same source", Liu was
emphasizing that "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" can be truly realized
in each other. Liu appears to take a position close to Wang Yang-ming, and even to
those who, like Ou-yang Te and Wang Chi, opposed the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity".
Liu's idea of the relation between "substance/tranquillity" and
"function/activity" seems to damage the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and
the practice of sitting in meditation. However, it does not influence Liu's belief in
these things. In place of the "substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism,
Liu had his own theory on the relation of tranquillity and activity to support his belief.
This theory can be explicated from the two passages below. The first is Liu's
explanation of Chou Tun-i's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity":
[A student asked:] "Master Chou [Tun-i] held that it is the activity and
1952), p. 15.
137
"Hsueh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 440.
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tranquillity of the Great Ultimate that bear yin (the passive cosmic force) and
yang |if§ (the active cosmic force). But when he referred to the sage establishing
the Ultimate, [he] emphasized 'tranquillity'. Why?" [Liu] answered: "To be in
accordance with principle is tranquillity. It is not the tranquillity in the relativity
of activity and tranquillity."138
The second passage is a further explanation. Liu said:
The "tranquillity" of Chou Tun-i's "emphasizing tranquillity" is totally different
from the tranquillity in the relativity of activity and tranquillity. For yin and
yang were born from activity and tranquillity. Both activity and tranquillity arc
necessary for the birth of yin and yang. If only one of them is emphasized, how
can they be taken as the foundation of all existence? ... We know that activity
and tranquillity are simply the same principle, and that yin, yang and the
Ultimate are simply the same thing."139
In the last lines of the first of these passages, Liu used the word "tranquillity" in two
different meanings. One has an experiential meaning, i.e. tranquillity in the duality of
activity and tranquillity, which are the two major elements that give birth to yin and
yang. The other has a metaphysical meaning, i.e. the tranquillity that is in accordance
with principle. Liu also held that "The principle of Heaven is a subtle unity because
in it there exist tranquillity in activity and activity in tranquillity."140 In this sense,
Liu believed that the metaphysical tranquillity is transcendental to the experiential
tranquillity and activity.
In the second passage, Liu also found no contradiction between tranquillity and
activity in metaphysical tranquillity. It is clearly the metaphysical tranquillity that is
the tranquillity that both Chou Tun-i's and Liu's doctrines of "emphasizing
tranquillity" refer to.
138 Ibid., p. 471.
139 Ibid., p. 444.
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Lastly, in regard to Liu's ideas on the duality between "substance/tranquillity"
and "function/activity", we now turn to his concern that the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation might mislead some people into
preferring tranquillity to activity.
Huang Tsung-hsi summarised of one of Liu's doctrines as "there is no
examining in action outside of abiding in tranquillity".141 This doctrine is so
pronounced in Liu's moral philosophy that it invites questioning. One of his disciples
asked Liu: "If 'being vigilant in solitude' resides exclusively in tranquillity, then is
the effort during activity totally useless?"142 Liu answered:
It is just like a tree having its roots first and then its branches and leaves. The
efforts of cultivation and irrigation all should apply to the roots. Why bother
with efforts on the branches and leaves? If one cannot concentrate his effort in
tranquillity, once he is in pleasure or anger, he will be indulging in emotion.
How can he make any effort at that moment?143
It is noteworthy that in Liu's answer, he used the metaphor of root-branch polarity to
describe the relation between effort in tranquillity and that made in the feelings of
pleasure or anger. This metaphor can be traced to the Great Learning. In describing
the relation between cultivation of personal life and the management of social and
political world, the Great Learning maintains:




Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tzu Liu-tzu hsing-chuang" T'MT'fTtK [A narrative of the life of master Liu
Tsung-chuo], in Huang Tsung-hsi, Huang Tsung-hsi ch'uan-chi [The complete works of
Huang Tsung-hsi] (Hangchou: Chekiang ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1993), vol. 1, p. 250.
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end. To know what is first and what is last will lead one near the Way. ... There
is never a case when the root is in disorder and yet the branches are in order.144
For centuries, the Great Learning was an important classic for Neo-Confucians.
Although they debated certain issues in it, they all agreed on the root-branch
polarity.145 The use of this metaphor, aligning tranquillity with roots, confirms the
essential role of "emphasizing tranquillity" in Liu's moral philosophy. Naturally, the
metaphor of root-branch polarity does not mean that either is contradictory to the
other.146 It is here that Liu's idea of the metaphysical tranquillity and the experiential
tranquillity and activity plays an important role. In brief, the reason that the doctrine
of "emphasizing tranquillity" is essential is because the "tranquillity" to be
emphasized is metaphysical tranquillity. In metaphysical tranquillity, there is no
contradiction between experiential tranquillity and activity. In other words, in
metaphysical tranquillity, tranquillity can be acquired in activity and activity can be
achieved in tranquillity.
Therefore the realization of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" cannot be
limited to the tranquil state. This is why Liu maintained that "The effort in
tranquillity should be realized during managing daily affairs: it can be perfectly
144 The Great Learning, in Source Book, pp. 86-7.
145
Wing-tsit Chan, "Moral and social programs: the Great Learning", in ibid., p. 85.
146 In his studies of Confucian thought, Benjamin Schwartz has used three metaphors of polarities to
deal with certain themes: self-cultivation and the ordering of society, the inner and outer realms, and
knowledge and action, which seem to have an enduring importance within the tradition as a whole. He
considered that we cannot use words such as antithesis, contradiction, and dichotomy because the
alternatives in question were regarded by most orthodox Confucians not as antithetical but as
inseparably complementary. See Benjamin Schwartz, "Some polarities in Confucian thought", in
David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1959), pp. 50-62. The root and branch polarity in the Great Learning and the Neo-Confucian
terminology has similar characteristics to the three polarities discussed in Schwartz's study.
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effective."147 This shows that the tranquillity in the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" is transcendental to experiential tranquillity and activity, and therefore it
can be realized in daily affairs.
However, it is difficult to discern the difference between metaphysical
tranquillity and experiential tranquillity in the real life of experiences. This is why
Liu's students raised the questions: "Master Chou [Tun-i] held that it is activity and
tranquillity of the Great Ultimate that bear yin and yang. But when mentioning about
the sage's establishing the Ultimate, [he] emphasized simply the word "tranquillity."
Why?"; "If 'being vigilant in solitude' resides exclusively in tranquillity, then will
the effort during activity totally useless?" as mentioned above. Liu himself struggled
with this problem, too, as Liu Chuo recorded:
The master (Liu Tsung-chou) concentrated on the effort of "being vigilant in
solitude." [He regarded] tu-t'i $§fft (the substance of solitariness) as no more
than wei '${ (subtlety). The effort of "being vigilant in solitude" resides in
subtlety. Therefore, he concentrated on searching for the substance of
solitariness in tranquillity. After searching for a long time in vain, he began to
realize that the solitariness cannot be described by the word ching jf§?
(tranquillity).148
Ching in this context can be seen as experiential tranquillity. The substance of
solitariness is regarded as an important element in Liu's moral philosophy. Liu said:
"Solitariness is t'ai-chi (the Great Ultimate). The feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow, and joy are yang activity and yin tranquillity."149 To Liu, solitariness can be
related to metaphysical tranquillity, which transcends experiential activity and
147
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148
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tranquillity and gives birth to them, just like t'ai-chi in relation to yin and yang.150
Liu Chuo's record shows that Liu Tsung-chou had been indulging in experiential
tranquillity in order to pursue or search for metaphysical tranquillity.
It is not only Liu Chuo who shows this. Liu Tsung-chou himself admitted to his
students that he was wrong in saying "In learning one should pursue [the Way] in the
state of tranquillity".151 Correcting himself, he maintained that: "The Way cannot be
divided into an activity part and a tranquillity part; the mind cannot be divided into
an activity part and a tranquillity part. Therefore, we know that learning also cannot
be divided into an activity part and a tranquillity part."152
In this connection there is another similar account in which Liu criticizes a
student for indulging in cultivating experiential tranquillity:
The mind cannot be divided into an activity part and a tranquilliy part. Therefore,
learning cannot be divided into an activity part and a tranquillity part either. If
[we] particularly pursue [the Way] in tranquillity, we will have the defect of
preferring tranquillity to activity.153
It appears that Liu was aware of the danger that the pursuit of experiential tranquillity
would lapse into preferring tranquillity to activity. Liu went on:
In the crystal-clear tranquillity there exist volitions that need to be considered
and things that need to be attended to. No matter whether these are about
"I-pien hsiieh-yen", in ibid., vol. 2, p. 567.
150 Liu's parallel between the relation of t'ai-chi to yin and yang and the relation of solitariness to
experiential activity and tranquillity is probably inspired by Chou Tun-i's T'ai-chi tu-shuo: "T'ai-chi
through movement generates yang. ... Through tranquillity generates yin." See Chou, Chou-tzu
ch'iian-shu, chiian 2, p. 23; Source Book, p. 463.
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financial management or military strategy, all of them can be done in tranquillity.
This is the true cultivation of tranquillity. ... Learning without seizing the skill
but emptily talking about "emphasizing tranquillity" is worthless.154
The crystal-clear tranquillity can be seen as metaphysical tranquillity. Liu was
reemphasizing here that there is no contradiction between tranquillity and activity in
metaphysical tranquility, since any kind of activity can be done in metaphysical
tranquillity. Also, Liu was reemphasizing that, to use his own words, "to acquire
activity in tranquillity is the true function of activity". Liu appears to regard "to
acquire activity in tranquillity" as the necessity for learning the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity". In this sense Liu appeared to combine metaphysical
tranquillity with experiential activities.155 It is clear that, according to Liu, his
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" would never prefer tranquillity to activity.
To sum up the doctrines on "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practices of
sitting in meditation from Ch'en Hsien-chang's day to Liu Tsung-chou's day, since
Ch'en created the new paradigm of sitting in meditation, the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation became popular
among Ming Neo-Confucians. Ch'en's paradigm is characterized as a variety of
mysticism because of his promoting the mystical experience of the state of
tranquillity attained by sitting in meditation. This sort of mystical experience
reemerged in the later Neo-Confucian generation, which included Wang Yang-ming,
Nien Pao, Lo Hung-hsien, and Kao P'an-lung.156 This mysticism is generally seen as
154
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560.
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a heresy in Neo-Confucian circles. It especially was a target of the criticism of the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation by
1 co
scholars in the early Ch'ing, such as Ch'en Ch'tieh and Yen Yuan, who are also
known as the anti-Neo-Confucian scholars.159 To some extent, in the arguments
between the defenders and the critics of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity"
and the practice of sitting in meditation, they were endeavouring to prevent the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation from
being accused of heresy, and trying to restore Confucian orthodoxy. Evidence of this
may be seen in Ch'en Hsien-chang's, Chan Jo-shui's and Kao P'an-lung's cases in
reconfirming the compatibility between the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity"
and the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" of the Ch'eng-Chu School; in Chan
Jo-shui's and Wang Yang-ming's cases in distinguishing the difference between
Neo-Confucian sitting in meditation and Ch'an Buddhist intent meditation; in Wang
Chi's and Ou-yang Te's cases in challenging the "substance/tranquillity" and
"function/activity" dualism; and, finally, in Chan Jo-shui's and Wang Yang-ming's
cases in warning of the lapsing into a preference of tranquillity over activity. Liu
Tsung-chou's views on the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of
sitting in meditation reflect his ideas of dealing with the four doubts on the doctrine
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of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation. With the
solution of the above four doubts, like his Neo-Confucian forerunners as mentioned
above, Liu endeavoured to prevent the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the
practice of sitting in meditation from being accused of heresy and sought to restore
them to Confucian orthodoxy. In this sense his ideas display his reconsideration of
the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation;
and they anticipate the criticism of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the
practice of sitting in meditation by the anti-Neo-Confucian scholars in the early
Ch'ing.
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4.2 Liu Tsung-chou's revision of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine
(A) Liu Tsung-chou's changing attitudes toward Wang Yang-ming's doctrine
The second issue which concerned Liu Tsung-chou greatly in his intellectual
career was that of how to deal with Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. Living in a period
in which Wang's influence was widespread, Liu changed his attitude towards it
several times. According to his son, Liu Chuo:
There have been three changes in the master's [Liu Tsung-chou's] attitude
towards Yang-ming's doctrine: [he] doubted it at the beginning, then believed it,
and then did everything he could to check its defects at the end.1
The "three changes" in Liu Tsung-chou's attitude towards Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine can be compared with Wang's "three changes" in his intellectual career.2
Wang's "three changes" are concerned with his attitude towards Chu Hsi, as he
transformed himself from a faithful student of the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism to
bearing a strong philosophical affinity to its opposite, the Lu Hsiang-shan School.3 A
demarcation in the tradition of Neo-Confucianism between Chu's school and Wang's
school is thus recognized by modern scholars.4 While the changes in Wang's beliefs
throughout his career were dramatic, in Liu's case they were less so, and his final
stance was not very different from Wang. Furthermore, while confirming Liu's "three
1
YNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 488.
2 Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom, p. 43.
3 Ibid, p. 55.
4
Wing-tsit Chan, "The Hsing-li ching-i and the Cheng-Chu School of the seventeenth century", p.
543.
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changes", his faithful disciple Huang Tsung-hsi even claimed that because of these
changes "Wang Yang-ming's doctrine became more conspicuous than ever."5 It is
probably for this reason that after describing his father's "three changes", Liu Chuo
immediately makes a comment excusing the changes, saying:
Alas, it was only because he had some doubts [about the teaching of Wang
Yang-ming], that he believed [it] then; alas, it was only because he believed it
so sincerely, that he argued against it so eagerly. Who knows whether people
who compete to be more abstruse than each other in their explications of
Yang-ming's doctrine are wise enough to understand Yang-ming?6
Liu Chuo also considered Liu Tsung-chou to be a true inheritor of Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine.
Wang's "three changes" represented a significant shift away from Chu Hsi's
Neo-Confucianism, and Liu's "three changes" brought him close to Wang
Yang-ming's position. If Wang's doctrine represents a paradigm-shift in the
mid-Ming Neo-Confucian academic community, Liu's closeness to Wang represents
the maturity of the Wang Yang-ming paradigm in late Ming Neo-Confucianism.
Nevertheless, although Liu ultimately took up a position which brought him close to
Wang, to some modem scholars it is more accurate to regard him as a revisionist of
Wang's doctrine.7 It is therefore useful to investigate Liu's "three changes" to
5
Huang Tsung-hsi, 'Tzu Liu-tzu hsing-chuang", p. 254.
6
YNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 488.
7 Carsun Chang, The Development ofNeo-Confncian Thought (New York: Bookman Associates,
1962), vol. 2, p. 173; Mou Tsung-san, Ts'ung Lu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, pp. 453-457; Lao
Ssu-kuang, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih, vol. 3b, p. 604; Tu Wei-ming, "Subjectivity in Liu
Tsung-chou's philosophical anthropology", p. 106; Okada Takehiko, O Ydmei to Minmatsu no Jugaku,
p. 459; Thome H. Fang, Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development (Taipei: Linking
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981), p. 475; Wm. Theodore de Bary, Learning for One's Self: Essays on the
Individual in Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 165; Hou
Wai-lu Ch'iu Han-sheng and Chang Ch'i-chih eds., Sung-Ming li-hsiieh shih
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establish where exactly he agreed and disagreed with Wang.
Liu's attitude towards Wang's doctrine is first seen in 1613. In a letter to one of
his friends that year, Liu expressed his dissatisfaction with Wang's doctrine as
follows:
[Lu] Hsiang-shan and [Wang] Yang-ming's doctrines both straightforwardly
believed [that] pen-hsin 2^/L> (the mind of its original state) is the guarantee for
[man becoming a] sage. They did not like to talk about the task of k'o chi
(overcoming the self).8
The idea of k'o chi (overcoming the self) is from the Analects and referred to
overcoming selfish human desires.9 In this sense, Liu was concerned that Lu and
Wang underestimated the task of overcoming selfish human desires for moral
cultivation.
Liu's emphasis on overcoming the self had been revealed in two earlier letters to
a friend in the same year. In the first letter Liu said: "The acquisition of the essence
of the learning of the sages starts from overcoming the self."10 This shows that for
Liu, overcoming the self is fundamental for moral cultivation. In the second letter he
had more to say about the effort of overcoming the self. He said:
[A history of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism] (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1987), vol.
2, p. 634.
8 "Yu Lu I-chien erh" [Letters to Lu I-chien: the second one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 354.
However, the above passage, with a slight difference, was recorded in Liu Chuo's edition of the
biography of Liu Tsung-chou under the year 1601. See LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 106. Liu Chuo's
edition did not present the origin of the passage in Liu Tsung-chou's works. According to Yao Ming-ta,
a modern editor of Liu Tsung-chou's biography, the passage was found in detail in the letter to Lu
I-chien in 1613. See YNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 112. Liu Chuo's edition nevertheless indicates that Liu
began to have doubts about Wang Yang-ming and Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrines after his first meeting
with his teacher Hsu Fu-yiian in 1603, since it is known that Hsu also had such doubts.
9 The Analects, Book XII: l,p. 112.
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The gentleman searches for [returning to] the heavenly gifted nature in his
words and deeds, and exerts himself to be chieh chii J^\|| (cautious and
apprehensive). The effort [of being chieh chii] in the Yii shu J|fU (The book of
Yu) is called ching i fjf—- (mastering oneness); in the school of Confucius it is
called k'o chi (overcoming of the self); in the Book of Changes it is called hsi
hsin $:>[> (cleaning the mind); in the Great Learning and the Doctrine ofMean
it is called shen tu (being vigilant in solitude). All of these efforts amount
to the same thing.11
In tracing this tradition back to the classics, Liu stressed the importance of the effort
of overcoming the self, whether it goes under the name of mastering oneness,
cleaning the mind, or being vigilant in solitude. It is in this regard that he criticised
the corruption and lack of moral cultivation of his contemporaries. He said in the
same letter:
The corruption of normal people nowadays is that they talk about returning the
mind to its original state but not about overcoming the self...; they talk about
the extension of knowledge but not about the investigation of things. Therefore,
it is inevitable that they will pursue enlightenment in the mind with ignorance of
objects, take emptiness as the Way, take erasing everything as learning; and take
wordless immediate response as the true nature. How popular these weird
doctrines are!12
All the faults of his contemporaries, in Liu's mind, reside in their neglect of
overcoming the self. These defects are relevant to Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of
"the extension of innate knowledge".
Another of Liu's criticisms was that because Lu and Wang overestimated the
reliability of the mind in its original state, "[they] furthermore did not make any
effort to practise the tasks of studying (hsiieh |p), inquiring (wen (□]), thinking (ssu j§)
10 "Yii Lu I-chien i" J/SHLLliSl—• [Letters to Lu I-chien: the first one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 351.
11 "Yii I-chien erh" [Letters to I-chien: the second one], in ibid., p. 352.
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and sifting (pien fjf)."13 To Liu, Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming's doctrines
not only underestimated moral effort, but also were devoid of motivation for
extensive learning for moral cultivation. In light of these defects, Liu remarked,
the teachings of Hsiang-shan and Yang-ming contain [instruction] for people at
a high level but nothing for people at a low level. The main concepts [of their
teaching] are extremely dangerous, similar to Wang Chi's "Four Negatives". If
we follow their teachings and transmit them again and again, we will inevitably
be corrupted. We can see the result in Yang Chien H§Htl [T'zu-hu
1141-1226] and Wang Chi, not to mention people in later generations.14
This passage brings us back to the disagreement about Wang Yang-ming's famous
"Four Sentences of Teaching" between Wang's two disciples, Ch'ien Te-hung and
Wang Chi, as mentioned in section 3 of chapter 2. Wang Yang-ming tried to combine
the opinions of both sides by singling out two ways of moral cultivation for the man
of acute intelligence and the man of average and low intelligence. However, Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine of moral cultivation became controversial after his death.
From Liu Tsung-chou's point of view, because Wang Yang-ming and Lu
Hsiang-shan despised "the task of studying, inquiring, thinking and sifting", it has
made their doctrines of moral cultivation as nihilistic as Wang Chi's "Four
Negatives", which maintains that there is no distinction between good and evil in the
mind, the will, the knowledge and things.
At the end of this letter, Liu's reference to Yang Chien, by comparing him with
Wang Chi, is also significant. Yang Chien was the most famous follower of Lu
Hsiang-shan in the Sung dynasty. Although Yang followed Lu closely, he differed
12 Ibid.
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from Lu in many important respects. For example, whereas Lu considered the
development of the mind as the most important, Yang focused on the mind itself. On
this count, he has been sometimes regarded as a Buddhist.15 It seems to Liu that the
similarity between Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming's doctrines and that of
Yang Chien and Wang Chi also implies that they are in danger of straying into
Buddhism. To sum up, Liu suspected that Lu and Wang indulged in moral nihilism
and Buddhism.
Liu's doubts seem to diminish slightly four years later. In 1617, in a letter to
another friend, he tried to excuse Wang Yang-ming's involvement in Buddhism and
Taoism. He said:
The ways [to pursue the truth] between Confucians and Buddhists are different.
Although master Yang-ming was once involved in the two religions (i.e.
Buddhism and Taoism), he ultimately openly rejected them, and considered Lu
Hsiang-shan not to be a Ch'an Buddhist. It is obvious that he had sensed the
faults of Ch'an Buddhism. However, people after him often intend to synthesize
the three religions (Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism) to talk about the
doctrine about innate knowledge. I am afraid that this is not the master's
intention.16
The relation between Buddhism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism is very complicated.
In its embryonic form, Neo-Confucianism has intimate connections with Buddhism
and Taoism. There are many Sung forerunners of Neo-Confucianism who were
involved with Buddhism and Taoism before they created their own doctrines of
13 "Yii Lu I-chien erh", in ibid., p. 354.
14 Ibid.
15 Herbert Frank, ed.. Sung Biographies (Wiesbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1976), p. 1221.
16 "Yii Wang Hung-tai nien-yu" %[A letter to Wang Hung-t'ai], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p.
357.
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Neo-Confucianism.17 Wang Yang-ming had also been involved in Buddhism and
18Taoism in his spiritual quest. It seems that Buddhism and Taoism provided the
impulse to inspire scholars to rethink the intellectual problems of their time.
However, the orthodox Neo-Confucians had always considered their metaphysics and
worldviews to be different from those of the Buddhists and Taoists,19 so that many
broke away from Buddhism and Taoism. This is probably the reason why Wang
rejected Buddhism and Taoism and attempted to excuse his forerunner Lu
Hsiang-shan. By confirming Wang's rejection of Buddhism and Taoism, Liu
maintained that Wang had realized their faults. However, in Liu's time the
syncretism of the three religions was very popular, especially in the circle of Wang
Yang-ming's disciples.20 This seemed to bother Liu so much that he felt obliged to
rescue Wang's doctrine from this connection. In this regard, Liu did not believe that
connecting the doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" to Buddhism and
Taoism was Wang's original intention, and so attributed this defect to Wang's
disciples.
Although Liu showed some sympathy in his evaluation of Wang's intention, he
showed no such mercy in dealing with Wang's doctrine itself. In the same letter he
said:
17
Chiang I-pin Sung Ju yii Fo-chiao [Sung Confucians and Buddhism] (Taipei:
Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1997), pp. 24-8.
18 Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confucian Thought in Action, p. 43.
19 Kenneth K. Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1964), pp, 394-8; Edward T. Ch'ien, Chiao Hung and the Restructuring ofNeo-Confucianism in the
Late Ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 92-3. Mou Tsung-san Hsin-t'i
yii hsing-t'i [Mind and human nature] (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chu, 1987), vol. 2, pp.
129-31.
20 Edward T. Ch'ien, op. cit., p. 5.
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Master Yang-ming raised [the doctrine concerning] innate knowledge as the
main issue, considering the investigation of things a secondary issue. This seems
to be different from the main theme of the Great Learning. The difference
between Confucianism and Buddhism actually resides in this point. The master
did not discriminate between them with precision or talk about the difference
with clarity. How can we blame people after him for starting [to synthesize the
three religions]?21
Liu basically took Chu Hsi's paradigm, which regards "the investigation of things" as
essential in the Great Learning, as the criterion for criticism. In this regard he could
not agree with Wang in taking "the extension of innate knowledge" as essential for
moral cultivation. Liu appears to conclude that it is Wang's doctrine of "the
extension of innate knowledge" itself that led to the syncretism of the three religions.
In this sense, Liu still had doubts about Wang's doctrine.
Liu's attitude towards Wang's doctrine seemed to change from doubt to belief
after he finished editing Huang-Ming tao-t'ung lu in 1627. In this book, as mentioned
in section 3 of chapter 3, Liu imitated Chu Hsi's Ming-ch'en yen-hsing lu to record
the words and deeds of Ming scholars, with his own conclusion as an appendix.
According to Liu Chuo, Liu Tsung-chou takes Confucius and Mencius' doctrine as
the only criterion to decide whose words and deeds deserved recording. Liu clearly
differed from popular opinion, even criticising those whom he himself had
designated as 'worthies' in his selection. Only eight of these scholars, including
22
Wang Yang-ming, escaped criticism.
As recorded by Liu Chuo, it was probably during the editing of this book that
Liu Tsung-chou undertook further reading of Wang Yang-ming's works, and began
21 "Yu Wang Hung-tai nien-yu", in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 357.
22
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, pp. 225-6.
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to believe Wang's doctrine.23 In this book, Liu Tsung-chou expressed approval of
Wang's doctrine on three points. First, Liu praised Wang's doctrine of "the extension
of innate knowledge" for "rescuing scholars from the defects of a teaching that was
fragmented, distracting, and superficial."24 Secondly, Liu confirmed: "Actually he
(Wang) had been for a time associated with Ch'an Buddhist circles, but later,
25
discovering the mistakes of Ch'an Buddhism, he abandoned it." Thirdly, Liu
claimed that Wang in "seeking the original mind in liang-chih (innate knowledge),
makes the instruction more personally relevant and in joining the extension of
knowledge to the investigation of things, makes the exertion more balanced and
reliable."26 Here he appears to differ from his earlier criticism of Wang's doctrine of
"the extension of innate knowledge".
With this new attitude towards Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge", Liu also tried to relate it to his own doctrine of "being vigilant in
solitude", which he formally expounded in 1625.27 In 1631, in his comment on the
"Cheng-jen hui yiieh" IffAII'ltJ [Constitution for members of the association for
realizing humanity], Liu maintained:
The main theme of the Confucian school can be summed up as "being vigilant
in solitude". Master Yang-ming said: "Innate knowledge is the knowledge of
self in solitude." Both are saying the same thing. "Being vigilant in solitude" is




Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 7; Records, p. 58. Huang-Ming tao-t'ung lu is no
longer extant. According to Yao Ming-ta and Julia Ching's studies, Huang Tsung-hsi's "Shih shuo" in
MJHA is taken out of Liu's Huang-Ming tao-t'ung lu. See YNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 228; Julia Ching,
"Introduction", in Records, p. 16.
25
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 7; Records, p. 59.
26 Ibid.
27
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 206.
28
"Cheng-jen hui-yiieh shu hou" [A comment on the contract for the member of the
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A similar opinion also is expressed in a letter to one of Liu's students in 1632.29
Liu's positive attitude towards Wang's doctrine appears to reach its zenith when
he edited Sheng-hsiieh tsung-yao in 1634. In this book, as mentioned in section 3 of
chapter 3, only five Neo-Confucians, including Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, Ch'eng Hao,
Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming, are chosen as examples for introducing the essence
of Confucian doctrine. Liu even compared Wang to Mencius.30 He praised Wang's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" by saying: "the three words chili
liang chih (the extension of innate knowledge) straightforwardly run through all
doctrines from ancient times till now."31
However, while Liu came to accept Wang's doctrine, it seems that he still was
not totally convinced of Wang's teaching. Together with his praise for Wang's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge", Liu criticized Wang as follows:
He (Wang) was impatient in desiring to make manifest the Way, often
instructing others lightly in the subtle doctrines that concern the higher level of
the truth. This has opened the floodgates for later scholars to attempt [to attain
the goal by] missing intervening steps.32
It seems that Liu still blamed Wang for ignoring the fundamental task of studying,
inquiring, thinking and sifting, while concentrating on the task of seeking the original
mind in liang-chih (innate knowledge) for moral cultivation.
Association for realizing humanity], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 589.
29 "Ta Lii-ssu liu" A [Letters to Lij-ssu: the six one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 370.
30
"Sheng-hsiieh tsung-yao" [The essential themes of the learning of the sages], in LTCCC,




Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 7; Records, p. 59.
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It probably is because Liu still harboured some doubts about Wang's doctrine
that his third change of attitude came about. A letter from Liu to one of his students
written in 1640 first shows this attitude. It says:
The saying of innate knowledge basically does not need to be hidden. ... But his
interpretation of the Great Learning not only erred in being unnatural, but also
had never examined the idea of "knowing what to abide in" (chih chih ^Tlth).
merely teaching people to make efforts to do good and erase evil while nien tst
(thoughts) arise. This indeed is not a fundamental way [of teaching].33
Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" can be traced to
the Great Learning.34 Although Liu expressed a positive attitude towards Wang's
expression of innate knowledge, he showed his basic opposition to Wang's
interpretation of the Great Learning in the light of his doctrine of "the extension of
innate knowledge". "Knowing what to abide in" (chih chih) refers to the idea of
"abiding in the highest good" (chih yii chih shan )• "Abiding in the highest
good" is one of the three constituents of the Way of learning to be great depicted in
the Great Learning.3,5 In this regard, Liu suggested that Wang did not realize the
basic truth of the Great Learning. The defect concerning Wang's "merely teaching
people to make efforts to do good and erase evil while thoughts arise" refers to the
different interpretations of i jl; (the will) and nien tat (thought) in the Great
Learning between Wang and Liu. This issue is complicated and will be discussed
later.
33 "Ta Han Tsan-fu" [Reply to Han Tsan-fu], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 422.
34
Wing-tsit Chan, "Dynamic idealism in Wang Yang-ming," in Source Book, p. 656.
35 The other two are "manifesting the clear character of man" and "loving the people". See the Great
Learning, in Source Book, p. 86.
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In 1643, in his "Cheng-hstieh tsa-chieh", Liu not only pointed out again this
defect in Wang's doctrine, he also took the doctrine of "making the will sincere" as
its remedy. He wrote:
Yang-ming's [propounding the doctrine of the extension of] innate knowledge
was for rescuing recent scholars from being fragmented [in studies]. He thus
used the Great Learning to attain to this purpose, though not perfectly in
accordance with the essence of the Great Learning. ... Those who are
responsible for education would like to expound the doctrine of "making the
will sincere" to recover the truth of the Great Learning,36
Despite this praise for Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge", Liu
still considered it not in accordance with the essence of the Great Learning. In place
of "the extension of innate knowledge", Liu regarded "making the will sincere" as
essential to the Great Learning. Furthermore, Liu tried to relate Wang's doctrine of
"the extension of innate knowledge" and the doctrine of "making the will sincere".
He said:
Those who oppose [me] would argue: "the will is a weed." I would answer: "It
is good corn." They would argue again: " the will is a branch." I would answer:
"It is the root." [In my opinion,] to know the root is to know what is to be
attained. To know what is to be attained is to know what to abide in. To know
what to abide in is the so-called extension of innate knowledge. This is the main
theme of Yang-ming's doctrine.37
It appears that Liu was trying to interpret Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge" in the light of the doctrine of "making the will sincere".
Although Liu tried to excuse Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate
36
"Cheng-hsiieh tsa-chieh", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 325.
Ibid.
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knowledge" and even interpret it in the light of his doctrine of "making the will
sincere", he never ceased to worry about its shortcomings. At the very end of his life,
just a few days before he died, Liu said:
The essence of learning is nothing but sincerity (ch'eng !$). Remaining reverent
is the main effort [for cultivation]. To remain reverent is to be sincere. To be
sincere is to be close to the heavenly truth. Innate knowledge can barely escape
from becoming Ch'an Buddhism. I would like to keep away from it from now
38
on.
While he still did not specify whether it was Wang Yang-ming's doctrine or the
people who transmit it that incur the danger of straying towards Buddhism, he was
obviously doubtful about it. The only doctrine he could accept was "making the will
sincere."
To sum up, Liu regarded Wang's doctrine as the true transmission of the
learning of the sages but was still less than satisfied with it. Three issues concerned
him. The first was the task of overcoming selfish human desires for moral cultivation.
The second was Wang's attitude towards extensive learning for moral cultivation.
The third was the interpretations of the Great Learning.
(B) Differences in attitude towards overcoming selfish human desires between
Wang Yang-ming and Liu Tsung-chou
For Confucians, to overcome selfish human desires of the self is a vital
procedure in the pursuit of sagehood. The idea can be traced to Confucius' teaching.
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When answering his disciple Yen Hui's question about benevolence (jen {_),
Confucius said:
To return to the observance of the rites (li i]ift) through overcoming the self
constitutes benevolence. If for a single day a man could return to the observance
of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider
benevolence to be his. However, the practice of benevolence depends on oneself
alone, and not on others.39
Here, both overcoming the self and returning to the observance of the rites are crucial.
In Confucius' opinion, in the process of moral cultivation for the realization of
benevolence, overcoming the self is the main task, while the rite is the objective
norm for realization.40
To Neo-Confucians, as they take selfish human desires as the source of all kinds
of evil, to overcome selfish human desire is crucial to their moral cultivation.41
38 "Hui-lu", in ibid., p. 645.
39 The Analects, Book XII: 1, p. 112.
40 The rite plays a sacred role in Confucian tradition. It connects an individual to society. To return to
the observance of the rites is a crucial procedure in moral cultivation. A modern interpreter of
Confucius' doctrine, Herbert Fingarette, states: "Rite brings out forcefully not only the harmony and
beauty of social forms, the inherent and ultimate dignity of human intercourse; it brings out also the
moral perfection implicit in achieving one's ends by dealing with others as beings of equal dignity, as
free coparticipants in li ijH (rite)." See Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 16. Another modern interpreter, Benjamin I. Schwartz, despite
criticizing Fingarette's interpretation of Confucius' idea of li in many respects, also maintains that "If
the word tao jtj (the Way) seems to refer to an all-encompassing state of affairs embracing the 'outer'
sociopolitical order and the 'inner' moral life of the individual, the word li on the most concrete level
refers to all those 'objective' prescriptions of behavior, whether involving rite, ceremony, manners, or
general deportment, that bind human being and the spirits together in networks of interacting roles
within the family, within human society, and within the numinous realm beyond." See Benjamin I.
Schwartz, The World ofThought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1985), p. 67. For criticism of Fingarette's interpretation, see Schwartz, ibid., pp. 67-75.
41 Chai Chih-ch'eng "Sung-Ming li-hsiieh te kung ssu chih pien chi ch'i hsien-tai i-han"
[The discourses about "public" and "private" in Sung-Ming
Neo-Confucianism and their modern meaning], in Huang K'o-wujlfjSlKl and Chang Che-chia
eds., Kung yii ssu: chin-tai Chung-kuo ko-t'i yii cli'iin-t'i chih ch'ung-chien ^[$1{@111I®
§¥fjl[Public and private: reconstructing individual and collective bodies in modern China]
(Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2000), pp. 14-39.
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Wang Yang-ming also talks positively about overcoming selfish human desires.
Once in discussion with a disciple on the task of learning for moral cultivation, Wang
warns him about the effect of selfish human desires. He considers the "thoughts and
deliberations" of a young scholar "mostly tend to the side of selfish human desires".42
He suggests that others should "teach him to sit in meditation and to stop those
thoughts and deliberations".43 "Wait a long time till his mind becomes somewhat
settled", he suggests, to teach him "self-examination and self-mastery".44 He
maintains that there is no letup in the work of self-examination and self-mastery, and
says:
It is like getting rid of robbers and thieves. There must be the determination to
wipe them out thoroughly and completely. Before things happen, each and every
selfish desire for sex, wealth, and fame must be discovered. The root of the
trouble must be pulled up and thrown away so that it will never sprout again.
Only then can we feel fine. At all times be like a cat trying to catch a rat, with
eyes single-mindedly watching and ears single-mindedly listening. As soon as
an evil thought begins to arise, overcome it and cast it away. Be as decisive as in
cutting a nail or slicing a piece of iron. Do not tolerate it or give it any
consideration. Do not harbour it and do not allow it any way out. Only efforts
such as these can be considered serious and concrete. Only then can selfish
desires be thoroughly and completely wiped out.45
Liu Tsung-chou displays a similar attitude. He once told in a letter to a friend his
dream of promotion, criticizing himself for being tempted by the thought. He
concluded that, in general, "Our minds are fully occupied by [the temptations] of
beautiful sounds, beautiful colours, money and benefits. For example, we pursue
gourmet food, elegant residences and beautiful clothes. In all of our activities in daily




life we are constantly occupied by selfish human desires."46 Like Wang Yang-ming,
Liu urges dealing with selfish human desires. He said:
The places the self hides in are extremely difficult to find. They flee away in all
directions. It seems that there is no way to overcome them. [To overcome them]
is like chasing robbers and thieves. [We should] chase them away in all
directions without leaving them any place to hide. It is only by this way all the
major and subsidiary parts can be put under arrest.47
Like Wang, Liu also uses the metaphor of chasing robbers and thieves to describe
overcoming selfish human desires. Both of them consider selfish human desires a
serious problem and are anxious to overcome them. However, they take different
standpoints on how to overcome them.
Wang takes a less active position. Asked about how to overcome the self, Wang
replies firstly how desires harm human beings in general:
Beautiful colours make man's eyes blind. Beautiful sounds make his ears deaf.
Good tastes injure his palate, and riding and hunting make him go wild with
excitement. All these are harmful to your ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and four
limbs.49
In this passage, Wang implicitly affirms that there is a physical self, which consists
of human desires for such things as beautiful colours, beautiful sounds, delicious
food, and racing and hunting. He then states:
45 Ibid.
46 "Yii I-chien wu" [Letters to I-chien: the fifth one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 356.
47
"Lun-yti hsueh-an san" [The study of The Analects: part three], in LTTCC, vol. I, p.
501.
48
Paraphrasing Lao-tzu's Tao te ching, ch. 12. See D. C Lau, trans., Lao-tzu, Tao te ching
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Book Ltd, 1963), Chapter XII, p. 16
49
CHL, p. 146; Instructions, Part I: 122, p. 80.
157
When you want to do something for your ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and four
limbs, and will not look, listen, speak, move out of accord with the rules of
propriety, are your ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and four limbs themselves capable
of not doing so? The ability must come from your mind. These activities of
seeing, listening, speaking, and moving are all of your mind. The sight of your
mind emanates through the channel of the eyes, the hearing of your mind
through the channel of the ears, the speech of your mind through the channel of
the mouth, and the movement of your mind through the channel of your four
limbs. If there were no mind, there would be no ears, eyes, mouth, or nose....
What is called your mind is that which makes seeing, listening, and moving
possible. It is the nature of man and things; it is the principle of Heaven.... This
is your true self. This true self is the master of the body.50
This passage shows that, in Wang's opinion, there is another self: the self that is
mastered by the mind. Only when the self is mastered by the mind can one fully
realize the function of eyes, ears, mouth, nose and the four limbs. This self is what
Wang defines as the true self.
Wang seems to keep a balance paying attention to both these aspects of the self,
i.e., preserving the true self and getting rid of the desires of the physical self.
However, in his conclusion to this discussion, Wang appears to put more emphasis
on preserving the true self. Wang urges his disciple to
make use of this true self, always preserve its original substance, and be
cautious over things not yet seen and apprehensive over things not yet heard of,
for fear that the true self be injured even slightly. Then whenever the least desire
to act out of accord with the rules of propriety germinates and becomes active,
you will feel as though cut with a knife and stuck with a needle; the feeling will
be unbearable, and will not stop until the knife and the needle are removed.
Only then may you said to have the determination to do something for yourself.
Only then can you overcome the self.51
30
Ibid.; Instructions, Part I: 122, pp. 80-1.
51
Ibid., Instructions, Part I: 122, p. 81.
158
Wang was always concerned about selfish human desires, but his method for
eliminating or overcoming them is dependent on the realization of the true self. He is
less interested in how to overcome the physical self in detail.
When talking about rites, the objective norm for moral cultivation in Confucian
ethics as mentioned above, Wang interpreted the rites in terms of principle as
follows:
The word li /iff (meaning rites) means the same as li fjj (meaning principle).
When principles become manifested and can be seen, we call them patterns
(wen >C also meaning literature) and when patterns are hidden and abstruse and
cannot be seen, we call them li (principle). They are the same thing. Restraining
oneself with rules of rites means that this mind must become completely
identified with the principle of Heaven. In order to become completely
identified with the principle of Heaven, one must direct one's effort to where
principle is manifested. For example, if principle is manifested in the serving of
one's parents, one should learn to preserve it in the very act of serving one's
parents. If principle is manifested in the serving of one's ruler, one should learn
to preserve it in the very act of serving one's ruler. If principle is manifested in
one living in riches or poverty or in noble or humble station, one should learn to
preserve it in these situations. And if principle is manifested in one's being in
difficulty and danger or being in the midst of barbarous tribes, one should learn
to preserve it in these situations. And one should do the same whether working
or resting, speaking or silent. No matter where principle may be manifested, one
52should learn right then and there to preserve it.
In Confucian ethics, rites not only stand as outward standards for regulating people's
behaviour, they also stand as inward inspirations for cultivating people's minds. In
his consistent endeavour to reestablish the feudal rites of the previous Chou dynasty,
Confucius emphasizes not only the preservation of the rites on every occasion, but
also urges people to realize them with sincerity. Therefore he insists: "Surely when
one says 'The rites, the rites,' it is not enough merely to mean presents of jade and
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silk."53 This shows that he remained consistently in pursuit of the meaning behind
the rites, rather than simply being eager to replicate the rites in a formalistic way. He
also insists that "Unless I take part in a sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice".54 Both
these quotes show that Confucius has implicitly depicted the role of the mind in the
observance of the rites. Although Confucius never went any further in discussing the
role of the mind in moral cultivation, his emphasis on the sincerity of the self in
realizing the rites appeared to anticipate Mencius' emphasis on the primacy of the
mind in moral cultivation.55 Mencius' idea of the mind especially influenced Lu
Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming.56 However, Confucius also emphasizes outward
standards for the observance of the rites. He asks questions about everything when he
goes inside the Grand Temple, expressing his eagerness to learn the rules of the
rites. He rebukes a noble family for performing rites which were the prerogative of
the Emperor, saying "If this can be tolerated, what cannot be tolerated."58 In contrast,
Wang Yang-ming appears to emphasize preserving principle, which is more abstract,
rather than the details of the rites, which are more objective as rules for regulating
people's behaviours in different situations.59 The following examples show Wang's
attitude more clearly in this respect.
One of Wang's disciples queried the idea that "the mind is principle". He asked:
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"If the highest good is to be sought only in the mind, I am afraid not at all principles
of things in the world will be covered."60 "In filial piety in serving one's parents, in
loyalty in serving one's ruler, in faithfulness in intercourse with friends, or in
humanity in governing people, there are many principles which I believe should not
be left unexamined."61 Furthermore he asked about the actual details of proper
behaviours in different situations by saying: "Take, for example, the matter of
serving one's parents. The filial son is to care for their comfort both in winter and
summer, and to inquire after their health every morning and evening. These things
involve many actual details. Should we not endeavour to investigate them?"62 Wang
answered that there is nothing in the world outside the mind, and there are no
principles outside of the mind.63 He said:
For instance, in the matter of serving one's parents, one cannot seek for the
principle of filial piety in the parent. In serving one's ruler, one cannot seek for
the principle of loyalty in the ruler. In the intercourse with friends and in
governing the people, one cannot seek principle of faithfulness and humanity in
friends and people. They are all in the mind, that is all, for the mind and
principle are identical. When the mind is free from the obscuration of selfish
desires, it is the embodiment of the principle of Heaven, which requires not an
iota added from the outside. When this mind, which has become completely
identical with the principle of Heaven, is applied and arises to serve parents,
there is filial piety; when it arises to serve the ruler, there is loyalty; when it
arises to deal with friends or to govern the people, there are faithfulness and
humanity.64
Wang's answer is characterized by his idealist position, which regards the mind and
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everything in the universe as a single body.65 In this view, material things and affairs
or events are not external either, for they are likewise inside the mind. By the mind
Wang essentially means the will. Therefore there would be no principle or things
unless the mind were determined to realize it.66 Therefore, to Wang, the principle of
everything is nothing but the exercise of the mind, all concerning the mind's
determination to realize it.
Wang's idea of the mind's determination to realize principle is very optimistic.
He maintained: "Knowledge is the original substance of the mind. The mind is
naturally able to know. When it perceives the parents, it naturally knows that one
should be filial. When it perceives the elder brother, it naturally knows that one
should be respectful. And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it naturally knows
that one should be commiserative. This is innate knowledge of good (liang-chih) and
need not be sought outside."67
Although Wang did not oppose endeavouring to investigate the actual details
of proper behaviour in different situations, he emphasized in general ridding the mind
of selfish human desires and preserving the principle of Heaven. He said:
Why not endeavour to investigate them? The main thing is to have a basis. The
65 See Hou Wai-lu et al., Cliung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih, vol. 4b, pp. 882-904; Wing-tsit Chan,
"Dynamic idealism in Wang Yang-ming," in Chan, Source Book, pp. 654-9; Liu Shu-hsien HlJidtTfe.
"Wang hsiieh yii Chu hsiieh: Yang-ming hsin-hsiieh chih tsai ch'an-shih," 3i^|S|7k'5i :
SMS [The learning of Wang Yang-ming and the learning of Chu Hsi: a reinterpretation of Wang
Yang-ming's doctrine of the mind], in Liu Shu-hsien, Chu-tzu che-hsiieh ssu-hsiang te fa-ch'an yti
wan-ch'eng [The development and accomplishment of Chu Hsi's
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main thing is to endeavour to investigate them by ridding the mind of selfish
human desires and preserving the principle of Heaven. ... If the mind is free
from selfish human desires and has become completely identical with the
principle of Heaven, and if it is the mind that is sincere in it filial piety to
parents, then in the winter it will naturally think of the cold of the parents and
seek a way to provide warmth for them, and in the summer it will naturally think
of the heat of the parents and seek a way to provide coolness for them. These are
all offshoots of the mind that is sincere in its filial piety. Nevertheless, there
/-Q
must first be such a mind before there can be these offshoots.
In Wang's idea, once the mind is free from any selfish human desires, the actual
details of proper behaviours in different situations will naturally be known and
realized in each situation. In brief, although Wang is very concerned about selfish
human desires, given his strong belief in the idea "the mind is principle", he
suggested only a general rule, "ridding the mind of selfish human desires and
preserving the principle of Heaven", to answer his disciple's question.
On how to rid the mind of selfish human desires and preserve the principle of
Heaven, Wang even sometimes expressed a negative attitude toward objective norms.
He said:
Innate knowledge is to minute details and varying circumstances as compasses
and measures are to areas and lengths. Details and circumstances cannot be
predetermined, just as areas and lengths are infinite in number and cannot be
entirely covered. If compasses and squares are truly set, there cannot be any
deception regarding areas, and the possibility of correct areas in the world
cannot be exhausted. If measures are well exhibited, there cannot be any
deception regarding lengths, and the possibility of correct lengths in the world
cannot be exhausted. If innate knowledge is truly extended, there cannot be any
deception regarding minute details and varying circumstances, and the
possibility of minute details and varying circumstances in the world cannot be
exhausted.69
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Wang appears to take innate knowledge as the only standard that can judge all moral
behaviour. He took the stories of the ancient sages, Shun ^ and King Wu of
Chou, as examples of the extension of innate knowledge. He said:
As for Shun's marrying without first telling his parents, was there someone
before him who did the same thing and served as an example for him, which he
could find out by looking into certain records and asking certain people, after
which he did as he did? Or did he search into the innate knowledge in an instant
of thought in his own mind and weigh all factors as to what was proper, after
which he could not help doing what he did? Similarly, in the case of King Wu's
launching a military expedition before burying his father, was there someone
before him who did the same thing and served as an example for him, which he
could find out by looking into certain records or asking certain people, after
which he did as he did? Or did he search into the innate knowledge in an instant
of thought in his own mind and weigh all factors as to what was proper, after
which he could not help doing what he did?70
In general, Wang maintained that when there is no one before us who did the same
thing and served as an example for us, which we can find out by looking into records
or asking people, we can only search into the innate knowledge in an instant of
thought in our own mind and weigh all factors as to what is proper, after which we
will do what we should do. In short, in Wang's idea, innate knowledge is supposed to
be priori to any objective norm. He expressed his negative attitude towards studying
rites by saying: "It is clear that such things as the names and varieties of rites and
music have nothing to do with the effort to become a sage."71
Compared with Wang Yang-ming, Liu Tsung-chou appears to be more positive
about objective norms for overcoming selfish human desires. First of all, Liu's idea
of the mind is different in some way from Wang's. Although Liu agreed that "there is
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no principle in the world outside the mind and, therefore, there is no knowledge
79
outside of the mind," he did not reach Wang's optimistic conclusion that
"knowledge is the original substance of the mind". Liu expressed his idea of the mind
in a conversation with a student as follows:
The teacher (Liu Tsung-chou) says: "The mind is able to know. However, it
consists of a bright side and a dark side. When [you feel that] the mind is
completely full of knowledge, it actually is only bright in its appearance and
absolutely dark in its inner depths." ... [The student] asked: "If the mind has
knowledge, why is it that it consists of a bright side and a dark side, and is
bright in appearance and dark inside?" The teacher said: "It is just like an eye
which has a little dirt in it. The eyesight is blurred." [The student] asked: "Is that
little dirt produced by external things?" The teacher said: "The mind consists of
nothing in its original state. Only because of being obstructed by a little selfish
desire it may be in a mess. ..." [The student]: "Even if it (the mind) is disturbed,
is it still the mind-in-itself?" The teacher said: "You may, as you wish, see it as
the mind-in-itself."73
It appears that Liu considered that the mind is half good and half evil. Although he
considered that the evil half is just like dirt in the eye, he did not consider it as
produced by outward things but by selfish desire, which he considered a part of the
mind-in-itself.
In one of Liu's criticisms of Lu Hsiang-shan, Liu commented that Lu "simply
mentioning the mind-in-itself' showed that he "only knows about the mind-in-itself
but does not know about the habitual mind [hsi hsin f^>C^]."74 In brief, Liu believed
that besides the mind-in-itself, which is half good and half evil, there is also a mind
which is always influenced by habits, being more changeable without definite
72 "Yii Wang Yu-chung wen-ta" S|EELi{cf3fni;n: [A conversation with Wang Yu-chung], in LTCCC,
vol. 2, p. 394.
73 "Ch'in Lii-ssu wen chih-chih chih shuo" [Ch'in Lli-ssu's inquiries on the
doctrine of the extension of knowledge], in ibid., pp. 387-8.
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character. In other words, the habitual mind can be good or evil.
It appears that Liu, in comparison to Wang Yang-ming, is more concerned about
the evil side of the mind. This leads him to urge the correction of faulty behaviour in
moral cultivation. He said:
In the operation of the heavenly mandate, all things in it [behave] without
recklessness. What man is gifted from the Heavenly mandate is the mind. It is
the so-called mind-in-itself. How can there be fault [in the mind-in-itself]? It is
simply [because] in the circumstances of the changing of the emotions and
situations it is inevitable for man to commit the faults of doing too much or
doing not enough.75
It seems to Liu that, although the mind is good in its original state, it is constantly in
danger of doing too much or not doing enough in the circumstance when one's
emotion is changing at the time when the situation is changing.
Furthermore, Liu divided faults into six categories. The first kind is "the subtle
fault" (wei kuo which exists in solitary knowing (tu chih $§£□), including
desire for profit and fame and attachment to life and death. Its crude expression is
indulgence in liquor, sexual desire, greed, and anger. The second kind is "the
concealed fault" (yin kuo ISjiM), which lies in the realm of seven emotions, including
excessive joy, hidden anger or resentment, sadness, excessive fearfulness, excessive
love for one's wife and children, cruelty to those not related to one or to those of low
status, and indulgence in physical desires. The third kind is "obvious faults" (hsien
kuo IIIj©, which are manifest in the nine appearances, including outrageous postures
or expressions in appearances of foot, hand, eye, mouth, voice, head, manner,
74 "Yii Wang Yu-chung wen-ta", in ibid., p. 394.
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standing and face. The fourth kind is "great faults" (ta kuo which lie in the
realm of the five relationships, including twenty-one examples of fathers and sons,
sixteen of rulers and ministers, seven of husbands and wives, nineteen of elder and
younger brothers, and sixteen of friends. The fifth kind is "miscellaneous faults"
(ts'ung kuo IxJlsl), which occur in the day-to-day practices, including ninety-three
examples in ordinary life, such as fantasizing, loitering alone, excesses in eating,
sexual intercourse, and spending on luxuries and entertainment; faults of character;
errors in study in private field of life, and litigation, vengeance, theft, usury, greed,
toadying for advancement, false business practices, oppression of the poor, cruelty to
animals, and straying close to heterodox teachings, such as Taoism and Buddhism in
public field of life. The last kind is "completed faults" (ch'eng kuo fjJciis!), which are
the above five faults in their completed states, which become the "doors that lead to
evils". The completion of the subtle fault is the "subtle evil" (wei o this is the
"door of the demon" (sui men The completion of the concealed faults are the
"concealed evil" (yin o PHH); these are the "doors of monsters" (yao men The
completion of the obvious faults are the "obvious evils" (hsien o these are the
"doors of criminals" (li men MP1!)- the completion of the great faults are the "great
evils" (ta these are the "doors of beasts" (shou men The completion of
the miscellaneous faults are the "miscellaneous evils" (ts'ung o JxHO; these are the
"doors of bandits" (tsei men MP!)-76
In contrast to the above categories, Liu presented six steps for the correction of
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77faults. He concluded with the sixth step for the correction of faults: "A student who
has not yet passed the above five steps of correction has his body full of sins. Even if
no
he has passed the above five steps, his body is still full of sins." This shows that
Liu is constantly concerned about sins committed by the mind. In this respect, Liu's
sense of sin is regarded as the clearest in the history of Neo-Confucianism.79 His
devotion to categorizing the various faults and to presenting the ways to correct them
shows the difference between him and Wang Yang-ming in their attitudes towards
endeavouring to investigate the actual details of proper behaviours in different
situations.
Not only does Liu hold a different idea of the mind from Wang Yang-ming.
Liu's idea of the relation of the rites and the self is also somehow different from
Wang's. In his interpretation of what k'o chi (overcoming the self) means in The
Analects, Liu explains the words jen (benevolence), li (rite), and chi (the self) as
follows:
Benevolence characterizes human nature. The rites are the distinctive rules of
benevolence. The rites are distinctive because they distinguish human nature far
apart from [selfish human desires of] the self. That which is in accordance with
order is the rites. That which is imbued with impurity is the self. They are the
different names of the principle of Heaven and human desires respectively.80
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In Liu's idea, it is only by the observance of the rites that man can keep away from
selfish human desires and the benevolence of human nature can be realized. Liu
considers the observance of the rites crucial to moral cultivation. He also said:
Benevolence is only an undifferentiated spirit. There are no signs of the division
of good and evil in it. Ritual is another name for benevolence. Therefore, to talk
81
about benevolence without also talking about the rites is not accurate.
In Liu's idea, benevolence is a general concept of morality. It supplies no objective
rules for distinguishing good from evil in reality. Ritual, as another name for
benevolence, with its special characteristic of distinguishing human nature apart from
selfish human desires, is rather practical in distinguishing good from evil. Liu
therefore considers the observance of the rites as necessary for the realization of
benevolence. The following dialogue between Liu and his disciple shows this
argument in more detail.
[The disciple asks:] "Why did not Confucius tell Yen Hui: 'to be cautious over
what he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not hear. Be
respectable without action. Be trustworthy without word." [Liu answers:] "What
is manifested and what is subtle are undifferentiated [in saying that]. However,
when mentioning looking, listening, speaking and moving, there must be a
8? ^
distinctive rule for each of them.
It appears that Liu emphasizes the detailed rules for behaviour rather than the general






of "returning to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self' as follows:
Ritual is the starting point for and the embodiment of benevolence. Benevolence
is invisible, while ritual has substance [that can be seen]. With substance in it
ritual can distinguish human nature from the self. The self therefore cannot ruin
benevolence. To return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the
self is to thoroughly erase all the obstacles of impurity and recover innate
goodness. By returning to the observance of the rites through overcoming the
self one can therefore fulfill his nature and realize benevolence.83
This shows that Liu considered the observance of the rites essential in moral
cultivation.
There were similarities between Liu and Wang on ritual and self. Both of them
consider that there is a physical self, which consists of selfish human desires, and
both are concerned about these selfish human desires and eager to get rid of them.
However, there were also differences. Wang considered that there is a true self,
whose master was the mind, which is principle. He then interpreted the rites in terms
of principle. Taking the preservation of principle in the mind as essential, he
considered that returning to the observance of the rites was less important in moral
cultivation. By contrast, Liu considered that the mind is half good and half evil. He
therefore paid more attention to correcting the faults produced by the mind. With
respect to returning to the observance of the rites, Liu considered that, as a general
concept of morality, benevolence is too ambiguous to be verified in reality. It is only
by returning to the observance of the rites, which is the embodiment of benevolence,





Liu's emphasis on the observance of the rites was not merely a theoretical
discussion. In his daily life, he tried to observe and realize the rites sincerely. Liu not
only practised the rite of mourning his mother sincerely but also tried to practise it in
accordance with ancient tradition.84 In his retreat from his official life, he also spent
or
time editing the rites for his family and his hometown. Late in his life, since the
ancient version of the Book ofRites was no longer extant and there was still no
consensus as to its authenticity, following the steps of Chu Hsi and Wu Ch'eng
[Ts'ao-lu IpLHL 1249-1333], Liu devoted himself to evidential study on the Book of
Rites?6
Liu's attitude to selfish human desire and his remarkable awareness of sin made
him a significant thinker in the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing. Studies of the
intellectual history of this period show that, with the growth of the economy, scholars
of this period started to regard human desire as positive in human nature and
therefore encouraged the emancipation of human desires.87 Contrary to this way of
thought, a variety of moral Puritanism also emerged in this period. Liu, with his acute
awareness of human desires, is considered a representative of this moral
OQ
Puritanism. Liu's emphasis on returning to the observance of the rites to realize
benevolence is also noteworthy in that it represents a starting point of another
intellectual transformation in the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing. Scholars of
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this period found it more important to emphasize the rites, which were considered
more concrete by them, rather than principle, which was less concrete, for moral
cultivation. Study of the rites gradually began to increase,89 and even became a
mainstream of mid-Ch'ing intellectual history.90
(C) Differences in attitude towards extensive learning between Wang
Yang-ming and Liu Tsung-chou
The next issue relates to Liu Tsung-chou's attitude towards Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine on extensive learning for moral cultivation. As mentioned earlier, Liu
criticized Wang for neglecting the tasks of studying, inquiring, thinking and sifting.
Such tasks can be referred to the issue of tu shu IftUr (learning from books or
book-learning), or extensive learning in general, in Neo-Confucianism. As Chu Hsi
points out:
It is of course true that in high antiquity, before the writing system had been
invented, learners had no books to read. Moreover, it is also true that people with
above-average intelligence sometimes can attain to the Way through
self-realization and without book-leaming. However, ever since the sages and
worthies began their creative work, a good deal of the Way has been preserved in
the Classics. Therefore, even a sage like Confucius could not have possibly
pursued learning apart from them.91
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In this sense, extensive learning became increasingly relevant to moral cultivation in
Neo-Confucianism.
Wang's attitude towards extensive learning for cultivation is connected to his
idea of knowledge. Therefore, first of all, we should understand what Wang means
by knowledge. Wang said:
Knowledge is principle made intelligent. In terms of its position as master [of
the body], it is called the mind. In terms of its position as endowment, it is
called our nature. All infants know how to love their parents and respect their
elder brothers.92
What Wang Yang-ming means by knowledge is the natural disposition or knowing
the way of doing good. He therefore claimed definitively: "Innate knowledge of our
Q-5
nature does not come from hearing and seeing." If the knowledge is naturally
endowed, what, then, needs to be learnt? Wang said:
The simple truth is that when the intelligent faculty is not obstructed by selfish
desires, but is developed and extended to the limit, it is then completely the
original substance of the mind and can identify its character with that of Heaven
and Earth. From the sage downward, none can be without obstruction. Therefore
all need to investigate things so as to extend their knowledge.94
Although knowledge is naturally endowed, it can be obstructed by selfish desires,
which are inevitable in all men, including sages. He therefore maintained: "To learn
and knowledge in Chu Hsi's philosophical system", in Wing-tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and
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is to get rid of selfish human desires and to preserve the principle of Heaven."95
Specifically on the extensive study of literature, he said:
No matter where principle may be manifested, one should learn right then and
there to preserve it. This is what is mean by the extensive study of literature.96
Wang is not totally dismissive of the extensive study of literature, but he emphasized
that "to learn is to get rid of selfish human desires and to preserve the principle of
Heaven".
Based on this idea of learning, Wang's comments on the history of
Confucianism show his basic attitude towards extensive learning for moral
cultivation. He said:
The great disorder of the world is due to the popularity of conventional,
meaningless literature and the decline of actual practice of moral values. If the
doctrine [of the Way] had been illuminated throughout the world, there would
have been no need to transmit the Six Classics. Confucius abridged and
transmitted them only because he had to. From the time of Fu-hsi who
devised the Eight Trigrams to the time of King Wen [1171-1122 B.C.] and
Duke Chou [d. 1094 B.C.], a countless number of books ... was written on the
doctrine of Changes, and consequently the doctrine of Changes became highly
confused. Believing that the atmosphere of superficial writing was becoming
thicker and realizing there would be no end to theorizing, Confucius took hold
of the doctrine of King Wen and Duke Chou and clarified it as the only way of
getting at its foundation. As a result, the various theories were all overthrown
and an unanimity of interpretation was reached among the expositors of the
Book of Changes. It was the same with the cases of the books of History, Odes,
Rites, and Music, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. ... When Confucius
transmitted the Six Classics, he feared that superfluous writing was creating a
chaos in the world, and he lost no time in making the Classics simple so that
people might avoid the superfluous words and find out the real meaning; he did
not intend to teach through mere words.97
95 Ibid., p. 132; Instructions, Part I: 111, p. 70.
96 Ibid., p. 41; Instructions, Part I: 9, p. 16.
97
Ibid., pp. 44-5; Instructions, Part I: 11, pp. 18-9.
174
Wang believed that there are essential moral values that need not be over-interpreted
by superfluous words but need to be discovered through their real meanings with
words which are as simple as possible. In accordance with this, Wang maintains: "If
the doctrine [of the Way] had been illuminated throughout the world, there would
have been no need to transmit the Six Classics," and praises Confucius for abridging
QO
the Six Classics. Wang also commented on the burning of the books in the reign of
the First Emperor of Ch'in ffl [r.246-210 B.C.]. He said:
After the Ch'un-ch'iu period [722-481 B.C.] superfluous writing became
more abundant and the world became more chaotic. The First Emperor of Ch'in
burned the books and has been condemned because he did so from a selfish
motive, and he should not have burned the Six Classics. Had his intention been
to illuminate the doctrine [of the Way], and to burn all those books opposed to
the Classics and violating principle, it would have conformed, by implication, to
Confucius' intention of editing and transmitting the Classics."
The burning of the books is generally condemned as a calamity in Chinese cultural
history. Risking public opinion, Wang maintained that burning those books opposed
to the Classics and violating principle was acceptable and conformed to Confucius'
intention in editing and transmitting the Classics. He concluded: "The reason the
world is not in order is because superficial writing is growing and concrete practice is
declining."100
Some modern scholars have claimed that Wang's comments and conclusion can
98 Ibid.
99
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100 Ibid.
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be considered anti-intellectual.101 Although it is not easy to determine how
anti-intellectual Wang is, there is no doubt that he held a less positive attitude
towards writing in the investigation of moral principle. He also held a less positive
attitude towards extensive learning for moral cultivation.
Taking this stance, Wang criticizes many of his Confucian forerunners for
wasting too much time on writing and extensive learning. Believing that Chu Hsi
failed to understand the real meaning of "the investigation of things" in the Great
Learning, Wang maintained that it was because, from Chu's youth, "all along he
directed his efforts only to intellectual investigation and writing. Naturally he would
have had no time for these if he had given priority to self-cultivation with a sense of
102
genuine and personal concern." Wang furthermore considered that Chu repented
in his old age and realized that "book learning did not help his task and that his task
had nothing to do with holding on to books or adhering rigidly to words."103 In his
comments on the two famous disciples of Confucius, Yen Hui and Tzu-kung ^pjf
[520 B.C.-?], Wang praised the former for "devoting his effort to the mind" and
condemned the latter for "devoting his effort to what was to be seen and heard."104
Another disciple of Confucius, Tzu-chang [503 B.C.-?], was also criticized by
Wang for "defect of hearing and seeing much".105
Wang's negative attitude towards extensive learning was most extreme in his
famous essay entitled "Pa pen sai yuan" [Pulling up the root and stopping
101 See David S. Nivison, "The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming", in Bryan W. Van Norden ed., The
Ways ofConfucianism: investigations in Chinese philosophy, p. 217; Yii Ying-shih, 'Ts'ung Sung
Ming ju-hsiieh te fa-chan lun Ch'ing-tai ssu-hsiang shih", pp. 93-6.
102
CHL, p. 121; Instructions, Part I: 100, p. 62.
103
Ibid.; Instructions, Part I: 100, p. 63.
104 Ibid., p. 135; Instructions, Part I: 113, p. 72.
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up the source]. In this essay, Wang vigorously attacks four tendencies that dominated
the social and political scene for many years: namely, the stress on "hearing and
seeing," the habit of "memorization and recitation," "indulgence in flowery
compositions," and the philosophy of "success and profit."106 The first three
tendencies refer to extensive learning. Wang said:
Since Confucian doctrines were discarded,... as a result, the door of
Confucianism was blocked, and it was no longer to be seen. Therefore the
learning of textual criticism developed and those perpetuating it were regarded
as famous. The practice of memorization and recitation developed and those
advocating it were regarded as extensively learned. The writing of flowery
107
compositions developed and those indulging in it were regarded as elegant."
He therefore condemned them as follows:
Extensive memorization and recitation merely served to increase people's pride,
substantial and abundant knowledge merely served to help them do evil,
enormous information merely served to help them indulge in argumentation, and
108wealth in flowery compositions merely served to cover up their artificiality.
This shows Wang's dismay at the development of tendencies concerning extensive
learning, and thus his negative attitude towards extensive learning for moral
cultivation.
Compared to Wang Yang-ming, Liu Tsung-chou adopts a more positive stance
towards extensive learning. In general, influenced by Wang Yang-ming's doctrine
that "the mind is principle", Liu also considered "there is no principle in the world
105
Ibid., p. 187; Instructions, Part II: 140, p. 111.
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Ibid., pp. 194-8; Instructions, Part II: 142-3, pp. 117-24.
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outside the mind and, therefore, there is no knowledge outside of the mind."109 Liu
believed it was wrong to separate the pursuit of the Way through the sayings of the
ancient sages and the pursuit of the Way in one's own mind. He said:
The ancient sages are sages simply because they manifest the same mind that we
have. Therefore, all the thousands of words they spoke were simply to ask
people to pursue the mind which had gone astray. With repeated practising of
the task of pursuing the mind, the mind may return to its body. What we called
the Way of learning is simply this.110
Obviously Liu believed that pursuing the Way in the mind is essential for learning. In
this sense, Liu is in accordance with Wang Yang-ming's doctrine that "the mind is
principle". However, Liu reached a conclusion that is different from Wang's. Liu
continued:
Therefore, if you do not intend to pursue the Way in the mind, I have no further
comment for you. Once you pursue the Way in your own mind, the sayings of
the ancient sages may be useful no matter what form they take.111
In Liu's opinion, extensive learning of the words of ancient sages is necessary
because they supply the experiences of manifesting the mind for people to learn from
them.
Liu also wrote essays on learning and specifically on learning from books to
emphasize their importance in moral cultivation.112 In his essay entitled "Yuan
109 "Yii Wang Yu-chung wen ta", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 394.
no "Xa Chao Chiln-fa" [Reply to Chao Chun-fa], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 383.
111 Ibid.
112 Liu wrote one essay in three parts on learning and three essays on learning from books. See "Yuan
hsileh shang chung hsia " IMIfSJlT'TTOn the principle of learning: parts one, two, and three], in
LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 332-8, "Tu-shu shuo shih erh" ISiUftTTSjnl [An essay on learning from books as
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hsueh" [On the principle of learning], Liu said:
The mind is ultimately good. ... The principle of goodness is one. However, its
manifestations are many. The investigation of things and the extension of
knowledge are to realize them (the manifestations).113
"Principle is one but its manifestations are many" (li ifen shu SI—is basically
a Neo-Confucian doctrine developed by Chu Hsi.114 Wang Yang-ming considered it
wrong. According to Wang, "in insisting that every blade of grass and every tree
possesses principle and therefore should be investigated, the theory diverted people
from the basic principles of things and the fundamentals of life. Moreover, by saying
that the mind should go to things to investigate the principles inherent in them, the
theory considered things as external and separated the mind and principle."115 Liu,
who differs from Wang in this respect, furthermore said: "Goodness manifests itself
in the myriad things of the world. Therefore, in learning, one cannot but study
extensively."116
Liu's attitude towards extensive learning is so positive that he opposed the
thought of taking a single guideline as essential. In criticizing a friend who
"considers taking a single guideline as essential in learning and dislikes to talk about
the effort of cultivation, and dismisses everything referring to overcoming the
an instruction to his son], in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 347-50, "Tu-shu shuo" gftlliS [An essay on
learning from booksl, in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 358-9, and "Tu-shu yao-i shuo" Itilrlliiift [An essay
on the essence of learning from books], in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 366-8.
113 "Yuan hsueh shang" [On the principle of learning: part one], in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp.
332-3.
114 Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin hsiieh-an, vol. 3, pp. 34-5.
115
Wing-tsit Chan, "Dynamic idealism in Wang Yang-ming", in Source Book, p. 655.
116 "Yiian hsueh shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 333.
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self,"117 Liu advises him that the tasks of studying, asking, thinking, and sifting
cannot cease to be followed throughout one's whole life. Even Confucius and Yen
Hui had to devote themselves to the tasks of studying, asking, thinking and sifting.
Liu believed that taking a single guideline as essential is an attempt to attain
goodness without taking the necessary intervening steps.118
When one of Liu's friends criticized Chu Hsi for his extensive learning,
considering it had nothing to do with moral cultivation, and praised Confucius for his
concept of "a single thread that run through all" (i-kuan —-Jf),119 considering it has
nothing to do with extensive learning, Liu answered:
We should get knowledge from learning as much as possible. The reason why
we should get much knowledge from learning is right for "honouring the moral
nature". All Confucius' words concerning "following the path of inquiry and
study" are concerned with "honouring the moral nature". If someone says that
'the single thread that runs through everything' is the proof of the moral nature,
he shows that he has no idea about "the thread that runs through everything".120
This again shows Liu's difference with Wang Yang-ming. In contrast to Liu, when
mentioning Confucius' "single thread", Wang took it as evidence to prove that
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Confucius regarded knowledge from extensive learning as secondary.
Liu wrote an essay entitled "Tu-shu shuo" UHrlS [An essay on learning from
books] to instruct his son to devote his efforts towards learning from books. In the
appendix of the essay Liu noted:
117 "Yii Lu I-chien i", in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 351.
118 See "Yii I-chien erh", in ibid, pp. 352-3.
119 The term i-k'uan is from The Analects, Book XV: 3, p. 132. In his conversation with his disciple
Tzu-kung, who was known for his erudite learning, Confucius denied that he himself was erudite and
said that he had a single thread that ran through everything.
120 "Yu Wang Yu-chung wen ta", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 396.
180
I have been following master Yang-ming in study. However, when I find that in
his essay "Pa pen sai yuan" he considered that substantial and abundant
knowledge about the changing events of past and present merely serves to help
people ruin the world, I doubt the truth of this. If this point of view is extended
to its utmost, it will inevitably lead people to forsake learning from books. The
reason that people dare not do evil is simply because the classical learning
provides the basic blockade to stop the flood of evil. Once people forsake
122
learning from books, the flood of evil will flow everywhere.
Liu considered that the knowledge obtained from learning from books provides
objective norms for regulating people's behaviours and preventing them from doing
evil. To prove his point, he gave an example of an incident in Ming politics that was
inspired by Wang's doctrine. He said:
I have read a book that mentions Chang Chu-cheng's determinination not to
observe traditional mourning rites [for the death of his father], Chang attacked
those who criticized him. He blamed them for not being able to present any
better reason but simply relying on old cliches. He maintained that only Wang
Yang-ming could understand what he had done. Alas! The case that Chang
Chii-cheng intended to not to observe traditional mourning rites, in fact, has
nothing to do with Wang Yang-ming. How can it be possible that people as
intelligent as Wang Yang-ming would make an excuse for such a rebellious
subject as Chang Chii-cheng? It is the doctrine concerning innate knowledge
that gave him the inspiration to do that. Therefore gentlemen who propagate
doctrines cannot but be vigilant. This is the reason why I am writing this essay
on learning from books.123
Chang Chu-cheng's determinination not to observe traditional mourning rites caused
a great debate in mid-Ming politics. Chang's father died in 1577, when Chang was at
the height of his power as the Grand Secretary and his program of reforms was
beginning to take hold. In accordance with the conventions, Chang should have
121 See CHL, p. 187; Instructions, Part II: 140, p. 112.
122 shuo shih erh", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 350.
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returned home to mourn for twenty-seven months. Wanting to continue the program
of reforms without interruption, numerous people at court, including the emperor,
begged Chang to remain, while a similar number considered this impermissible in the
light of time-worn precedent. Many of the latter who criticized Chang were flogged
severely and either demoted or exiled. The emperor decreed that all criticism should
cease on pain of condign punishment.124
Since Liu did not show the source of his information, we cannot be sure that
Chang actually drew on Wang Yang-ming to strengthen his determination. What we
can be sure of is that Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" might
have given Chang an excuse to revolt against time-worn conventions. As mentioned
above, Wang took innate knowledge as the only standard that can judge all moral
behaviour. To Wang, innate knowledge is a priori to any objective norm: "The
thoughts of the sages are all passing shadows; it is innate knowledge alone that is my
teacher,"125 and "The important thing in learning is to acquire learning through the
exercise of the mind. If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong,
although they have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as
correct."126
When Chang Chii-cheng faced criticism in the light of precedent, it is possible
that he considered his deciding not to observe traditional mourning rites in favour of
continuing his program of reforms as a behaviour which was in accordance with
123 Ibid.
124 See Chu Tung-jun Chang Cliii-cheng ta chuan 'IMfEfTFT'fiJl [A grand biography of Chang
Chii-chengl, (Shanghai: Shanghai shu-chii, 1947), pp. 260-79; Carrington L. Goodrich and Fang
Chao-ying, eds., Dictionary ofMing Biography, 1368-1644 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1976), p. 85.
125
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Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge". In this sense, Liu appears to
accuse Wang's doctrine of potential moral nihilism. It is noteworthy that Wang's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" had invited this sort of accusation in
the intervening period prior to Liu's time.
As his doctrine challenging Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy became widespread, Wang
1 97
Yang-ming and his disciples came under serious criticism, especially for their
supposed moral nihilism. A memorial by an official of the Ministry of Rites, Chang
Ch'iao mm [?-?], in 1522 started this criticism by saying:
Ever since the Three Dynasties till now, there has been no other doctrine that
can compare to the teaching of Chu Hsi. However, recently a man (referring to
Wang Yang-ming) who is so intelligent that he can inspire the whole world has
propounded a divergent doctrine. Those who aimed high for fame without doing
the fundamental work worshipped him in huge numbers. They mostly adopted
the easier way propounded by Lu Hsiang-shan and resented Chu Hsi, for what
they deemed his triviality.128
Chang Ch'iao appeared to accuse Wang and his followers of being inclined to taking
Lu Hsiang-shan's easier way and forsaking Chu Hsi's harder way for moral
cultivation.
The Minister of Personnel Kuei O [Tsu-shih -flUt, 7-1531], after Wang's
death, presented a memorial in 1529 criticizing Wang as follows:
CHL, p. 248; Instructions, Part II: 173, p. 159.
127 Chu Hung-lam, 'The debate over recognition of Wang Yang-ming," Harvard Journal ofAsiatic
Studies, 48-1 (1988), pp. 47-70.
128
Ming Shih-tsung shih-lu [Veritable records of the Ming: the part of the reign of
emperor Chia-ching] (Taipei: The Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1966), chtian
19, pp. 5b-6a (568-569); Wu Chen Ming-tai chih-shih-chieh chiang-hsiieh huo-tung hsi-nien
(1522-1602) [Lecturing activities in Ming intellectual circles
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Wang Yang-ming did not behave in accordance with the instructions of the
ancients and he spoke with no respect to Confucius. In order to acquire fame, he
dissented from Chu Hsi's doctrine of the investigation of things. He knew that
others did not agree with him. Therefore, he wrote the book Chu-tzu wan-nien
ting-lun to [defame Chu] and summoned his disciples to make them his
accomplices. Those who are intelligent are happy in behaving without being
restricted by morality. Some of them indulge in empty talk. Those who are
1 ?Q
mediocre, counting on his fame, dare to behave wildly.
This accusation, which appears to blame Wang for encourging moral nihilism in
academia, was one of many.130 Even in Liu's time some scholars of the Wang
1 "31
Yang-ming School were still accused of moral nihilism. Some of these charges
against Wang and his followers were politically motivated. In this sense,
condemning Chang Chti-cheng and blaming Wang for Chang's misdeeds show both
Liu's concern that Wang's doctrine was infected by moral nihilism and also his own
response to this political reality.
In the beginning of "Tu-shu shuo", Liu claims: "The purpose of learning from
1 41"3
books is to pursue the Way in our mind." He explains:
Since the birth of the universe, there have been the birth of myriad things. Then,
the principles of human relation appear. The results of myriad affairs and myriad
changes are refined within the mind without exception. The sages therefore had
investigations into them and used them to teach people. Scholars of later
generations collected and preserved the teachings of the sages. The scholarship
of Confucianism emerged under such circumstances. Therefore learning from
(1522-1602)] (Shanghai: Hsiieh-lin ch'u-pan she, 2003), p. 6.
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130 Chu Hung-lin [Chu Hung-lam] "Yang-ming ts'ung-ssu tien-li te cheng-i ho ts'o-che"
[The final decision for the official recognition of Wang Yang-ming],
Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu-suo hsiieh-pao 4^ ISfklifffffE [Journal of Chinese studies], n.s.
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131
Wang Fan-sen, "Ch'ing ch'u te chiang-ching hui", pp. 515-24.
132 Chu Hung-lin, "Yang-ming ts'ung-ssu tien-li te cheng-i ho ts'o-che", p. 180; Wang Fan-sen,
"Ch'ing ch'u te chiang-ching hui", pp. 522-4.
133 "Tu-shu shuo shih erh", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 347.
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books is the duty of a Confucian.134
In this passage, Liu adopts the same position as Wang Yang-ming in regarding the
mind to be identical to principle. However, unlike Wang, Liu emphasized the
importance of learning from books in order to preserve the sages' experiences of
searching for the principle in the mind.
Also, Liu pointed out that even though everyone has a mind, it is possible that
one may fail to realize what it is. In this circumstance, one needs others' help in
pointing out what the mind is. Books are the most useful aid for teaching people what
1
the mind is. He then describes in detail which books are beneficial for moral
cultivation. He said:
First of all, one should read the Hsiao-hsiieh /Jvlp [Elementary studies] to
establish the basics. Then, read the Great Learning to grasp the outlines. Then,
read the Doctrine of the Mean to investigate the implied meaning. Then, read
the Analects to learn to practise. Then, read the Mencius to refine the main
theme. It is from then on that one realizes what the mind is. Then, one should
read the Book of Changes to acquire [the truth of] the changes of yin and yang in
the mind. Then read the Book of Odes to acquire [the truth of] the nature and
emotions of the mind. Then read the Book ofDocuments to acquire [the truth of]
the ability of the mind in [dealing with] politics. Then read the Book ofRites to
acquire [the truth of] the ability of the mind in [dealing with] the rules of
propriety. Then read the Ch'un-ch'iu fffX [The history of the Ch'un-ch'iu
period] to acquire [the truth of] of the ability of the mind in [dealing with]
affairs concerning social status.136
After listing these books, Liu states that extensive studying, accurate inquiring,
careful thinking, clear sifting and earnest practising are supposed to be used in





sifting and practising in learning that one can control things ranging from the subtlest
aspect of human nature and emotions, through the affairs of the family, the country,
and all-under-heaven, to the myriad things in the universe. Liu concluded that this is
the function of learning from books.137
In contrast to Liu's detailed elaboration, Wang referred to these efforts in a very
general way. For example, Wang simply said that they are used "in order for the mind
to be completely identified with the principle of Heaven,"138 and they "are all efforts
of refinement for the sake of singleness of mind."139 It is based on this difference
that Liu's following criticism probably took Wang's opinion as his main target.
Like Wang, Liu also criticized those who are not good in learning from books.
He condemned:
They regard merely the memorization, recitation, and flowery compositions as
learning. They therefore are lacking in that they only know about knowledge
concerning speaking and memorizing. Furthermore, there are some of them who
even use this kind of knowledge to do evil."140
Thus he seemed to praise people who intended to save scholars from these defects.
He said:
Therefore there are some knowledgeable people who have started to oppose this
climate. They creatively depict that the mind is the only thing that can prove the
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They [, therefore,] consider the knowledge from hearing and seeing as secondary
knowledge. Following their steps, the Buddhists and Taoists therefore extend
their theory. To their utmost, some of them even become frenzied and arrogant
and are bad enough to ruin the world.142
Although Liu had shown his respect to these "knowledgeable people" for their
determination to save scholars from learning by rote memorization, recitation and
flowery compositions, he blamed them for inspiring the frenzy and arrogance of the
Buddhists and Taoists. "Knowledgeable people" may be directed at Wang
Yang-ming, because Wang claimed that the knowledge from hearing and seeing is
secondary knowledge.143
Basically Liu is dissatisfied with Wang Yang-ming's negative attitude towards
learning from books. However, in another essay, also entitled "Tu-shu shuo", Liu
excuses Wang's negative attitude:
Master Yang-ming did not like students to emphasize learning from books but
asked them to verify things directly with their mind in its original state. He said
that simply because [he considered that] those who do not know how to learn
from books would forsake [the pursuit of the Way in] their own mind to pursue
[the Way in] the mind of the sages, which would make them like beggars taking
their bowls in front of others' doors to beg for food [without knowing what they
really want]. He does not mean that we may totally forsake learning from
books.144
Liu considered that Wang's negative attitude towards learning from books was meant
to admonish scholars who simply pursue the Way in the mind of the sages without
142 Ibid.
143 See CHL, p. 187; Instructions, Part II: 140, p. 111.
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verifying things in their own mind. However, Liu, again, presented argument to show
that learning from books is necessary. Liu states:
Master Yang-ming also said: "To study extensively is to study nothing but
principle. To inquire accurately is to inquire about nothing but principle. To
think carefully is to think of nothing but principle. To sift clearly is to sift
nothing but principle. To practise earnestly is to practise nothing but principle."
[He also said:]"The mind is principle." It is difficult to understand the mind and
principle. As he said, it needs studying, inquiring, thinking, sifting and
practising to understand the mind and principle. What, then, can we do in
studying, inquiring, thinking, sifting and practising? I said: "The ancients are
like a light for me. Isn't learning from books a good way to lead me? Even
though [as Wang Yang-ming said] there are those who do not know how to
learn from books who would forsake their own mind to pursue the mind of the
sages, which would make them like beggars taking their bowls in front of
others' doors to beg for food [without knowing what they really want], if they
can actually get some food in their bowls, what harm is there in being a
beggar?"145
It appears that although Liu agrees with Wang's doctrine that "the mind is principle",
he preferred to stress studying, inquiring, thinking, sifting, and practising. In this
respect, Liu expressed a more practical position. Even though forsaking the pursuit of
the Way in one's mind to pursue the Way in the mind of the sages in learning from
books was in his estimation essentially wrong, he saw it as acceptable if one can at
least really learn something from books.
Liu Tsung-chou played an important part in the switch from the pursuit of the
learning of "honouring the moral nature" to the pursuit of the learning of "following
the path of inquiry and study", which characterizes the rise of Confucian
intellectualism in the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing.146 Many scholars of this
144 "Tu-shu shuo", in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 358-9.
145 Ibid., p. 359.
145 Yii Ying-shih "Ju-chia chih-shih chu-i te hsing-ch'i: ts'un Ch'ing ch'u tao Tai
188
period considered pursuing the Way in the mind to be too subjective. They preferred
to take learning from books as the basic standard for moral cultivation. They
therefore founded the Classics Discussion Societies [Chiang-ching hui to
gather scholars together for discussions of the classics instead of abstract moral
principles.147 To some extent, Liu's emphasis on extensive learning for moral
cultivation was influential on the founding of the Classics Discussion Societies in
this period.148 Liu also devoted a great effort to recording the words and deeds of
ancient Confucians and his Neo-Confucian forerunners. His Lun-yti hsiieh-an BraSn^
0j| [The study of The Analects] and Sheng-hsiieh chung-yao play an important part in
the historiography of intellectual history.149 Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-ju hsiieh-an
was particularly influenced by Liu.150
Tung-yiian," [The rise of Confucian intellectualism: from
the period of early Ch'ing to the time of Tai Chen], in Yu Ying-shih, Lun Tai Chen yii Chang
Hsiieh-ch'eng: Ch'ing-tai hsiieh-shu ssu-hsiang-shih yen-chiu ®
[Essays on Tai Chen and Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng: studies of the intellectual history of the
middle Ch'ing] (Taipei: Tung-tai t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1997), pp. 21-2.
147
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historgraphy] (Taipei: Wen-chin ch'u-pan she, 1989), p. 29; Chiang Nien-fang 'Ts'ung
Chu-tzu tao Liu Chi-shan te hsin hsing lun fen-hsi ch'i shih-hsiieh ching-shen"
W [An analysis of the ideas of history in theories on the mind and human nature:
from Chu Hsi to Liu Tsung-chou], in Chung Ts'ai-chiin ed., Kuo-chi Chu-tzu hsiieh hui-i
lun-wen chi H['®BL?sMb![Collective essays from international conference on the studies
of Chu Hsi's scholarship] (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica,
1993), pp. 1136-7; Tungfang Shuo, Liu Tsung-chou p'ing-chuan, pp. 392-5. Some modern scholars
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Ming-ju hsiieh-an], Yu-shih yiieh-k'an ij]&LTil [Yu-shih monthly], no. 48 (July 1978), pp. 6-9;
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(D) Differences in the interpretation of the Great Learning between Wang
Yang-ming and Liu Tsung-chou
The last issue concerning Liu Tsung-chou's attitude towards Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine is Liu's criticism of Wang's interpretation of the Great Learning. The
discussion of this issue can focus on Wang's interpretation of the meaning of "the
rectification of the mind", "making the will sincere", "the extension of innate
knowledge" and "the investigation of things", four of the eight steps of moral
cultivation depicted in the Great Learning.
In his essay entitled "Ta-hsiieh wen" [An inquiry on the Great
Learning] Wang interpreted the meaning of "the rectification of the mind", "making
the will sincere", "the extension of innate knowledge" and "the investigation of
things", as follows:
The original substance of the mind is man's nature. Human nature being
universally good, the original substance of the mind is correct. How is it that any
effort is required to rectify the mind? The reason is that, while the original
substance of the mind is originally correct, incorrectness enters when one's will
and thoughts (i nien Malf) are in operation. Therefore he who wishes to rectify
his mind must rectify it in connection with the operation of his will and
thoughts.151
Huang Chin-hsing Jlfjllil, "Hsueh-an t'i-ts'ai te ssu-hsiang pei-ching: ts'ung Li Fu te Lu-tzu
hsiieh-p'u t'an ch'i" [The emergence of an
historical genre: the background to the "philosophical records" (hsiieh-an): starting from a discussion
of Li Fu's Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u], Han-hsiieh yen-chiu [Chinese Studies], vol. 2, no. 1 (June
1984), p. 215. Nonetheless, Huang Tsung-hsi himself admitted that in writing Ming-ju hsiieh-an he
was inspired by and wrote in accordance with Liu's teaching. See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Huang Li-chou
hsien-sheng yuan hsti" If [The original preface by Huang Tsung-hsi] in MJHA, pp.
9-10.
151
Wang Yang-ming, "Ta-hsiieh wen" [A inquiry on the Great Learning], in WYMCC, chii
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With his belief that human nature is universally good, Wang maintained that the
original substance of the mind, by which human nature is characterized, is good. The
evil is from i nien or i (these are used almost interchangeably in Wang's
interpretation of the Great Leaning), which, as will be shown below, consists of good
and evil in operation. Wang explains the method by which to distinguish good from
evil:
However, what arises from the will (i M) rnay be good or evil, and unless there
is a way to make clear the distinction between good and evil, there will be a
confusion of truth and untruth. In that case, even if one wants to make his will
sincere, he cannot do so. Therefore he who wishes to make his will sincere must
extend his knowledge (chih £[]).152
To Wang, knowledge (chih) is an ability to distinguish good from evil. It appears that,
in Wang's interpretation, the extension of knowledge is the most crucial of the four
steps of moral cultivation. Wang therefore provides a more detailed explanation of
"the extension of knowledge" as follows:
The extension of knowledge is not what later scholars understand as enriching
and widening knowledge. It is simply extending one's innate knowledge of the
good to the utmost. This innate knowledge of good is what Mencius meant
when he said, "The sense of right and wrong is common to all men." The sense
of right and wrong requires no deliberation to know, nor does it depend on
learning to function. This is why it is called innate knowledge. It is my nature
endowed by Heaven, the original substance of my mind, naturally intelligent,
shining, clear, and understanding.153
an 5, p. 971; Source Book, p. 664.
152 Ibid.
153
Ibid.; Source Book, pp. 664-5.
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Wang appears to challenge Chu Hsi's doctrine on "the extension of knowledge". To
Chu Hsi, "the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge" are two
different descriptions of the same operation seeking to discover the principle of
things.154 Therefore Chu Hsi maintained: "If we wish to extend our knowledge to the
utmost, we must investigate the principle of all things we come into contact with."155
He therefore shows a great interest in enriching knowledge of various sorts of things,
ranging from social and ethical problems to natural phenomena.156 By contrast,
Wang, in the light of his Mencian belief that man is born with the innate knowledge
of good, regards enriching knowledge of various sorts of things irrelevant to the
157extension of innate knowledge. Wang explains the function of innate knowledge
as follows:
Whenever a thought or a wish arises, my mind's faculty of innate knowledge
itself is always conscious of it. Whether it is good or evil, my mind's innate
knowing faculty itself also knows it. It has nothing to do with others.158
In Wang's opinion, the guarantee of human goodness is the mind's innate knowing
faculty. With his confidence in the mind's innate knowing faculty, Wang
optimistically remarks:
Therefore, although an inferior man may have done all manners of evil, when he
sees a superior man he will surely try to disguise this fact, concealing what is
1,4
Ying-shih Yii, "Morality and knowledge in Chu Hsi's philosophical system," p. 231.
155 Chu Hsi, Ssu-shu chi-chu, p. 8; Source Book, p. 89.
156 Kim Yung-sik, The World-view of Chu Hsi (1130-1200): Knowledge about the Natural World in
"Chu-Tzu Ch'iian-shu" (Princeton: PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1980), pp. 28-40.
157
Tang Chiin-i JffTjisi, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yiian-lun: tao-lun p'ien *T'l£IS:^lMnra: [A
fundamental exposition of Chinese philosophy: introduction] (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chil, 1984), pp.
344-6.
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Wang Yang-ming, "Ta-hsiieh wen", in WYMCC, chtian 5, p. 971; Source Book, p. 665.
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evil and displaying what is good in himself. This shows that innate knowledge
of the good does not permit any self-deception.159
Because he believes that man cannot possibly deceive himself, he maintains:
The only way to distinguish good and evil in order to make the will sincere is to
extend to the utmost the knowledge of the innate faculty. ...If what the innate
faculty knows to be good or evil is sincerely loved or hated, one's innate
knowing faculty is not deceived and the will can be made sincere.160
In Wang's belief, the goodness or evil of the will will be exposed by extending innate
knowledge. Lastly, Wang explains the function of innate knowledge in reality:
Now when one sets out to extend his innate knowledge to the utmost, does this
mean something illusory, hazy, in a vacuum, and unreal? No, it means
something real. Therefore, the extension of knowledge must consist in the
investigation of things. A thing is an event. For every emanation of the will
there must be an event corresponding to it. The event to which the will is
directed is a thing. To investigate is to rectify. It is to rectify that which is
incorrect so it can return to its original correctness. To rectify that which is not
correct is to get rid of evil, and to return to correctness is to do good. This is
what is meant by investigation.161
In Wang's idea, the event is the entity in which the will manifests and innate
knowledge functions. With innate knowledge functioning, man can rectify the
incorrectness emanated by the will, i.e., get rid of evil, and recover the goodness of
the mind. To sum up, to Wang, "the extension of innate knowledge" is the most
crucial one among the four steps.
In light of the above interpretation Wang sums up the relations between the
159
Ibid., pp. 971-2; Source Book, p. 665.
160
Ibid., p. 972; Source Book, p. 665.
161
Ibid., p. 972; Source Book, pp. 665-6.
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mind, the will, knowledge and things as follows:
The master of the body is the mind. What emanates from the mind is the will.
The original substance of the will is knowledge, and wherever the will is
directed is a thing. For example, when the will is directed toward serving one's
parents, then serving one's parents is a "thing". When the will is directed toward
serving one's ruler, then serving one's ruler is a "thing". When the will is
directed toward being humane to all people and feeling love toward things, then
being humane to all people and feeling love toward things are "things", and
when the will is directed toward seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then each
of these is a "thing".162
In contrast to Wang's emphasis on "the extension of innate knowledge", Liu
considered "making the will sincere" more crucial. He states:
[In the chapters of commentary of the eight steps,] the ancient version of the
Great Learning starts by explaining "making the will sincere". Previous to it
there is no chapter of commentary to explain "the extension of knowledge" [and
"the investigation of things"]. Next to it there is no chapter of commentary to
explain only "the rectification of the mind". [The author] elicits it alone and in a
straightforward manner, taking it to include the other three steps. As to the end
of the chapter, [He] also said: "Therefore the superior man always makes his
will sincere." How seriously [he sees] it is!163
Of the chapters of commentary on the eight steps in the Great Learning, only five
chapters were extant by Chu Hsi's time. The chapters of commentary that explained
"the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge" had been lost and "the
rectification of the mind" was combined with "cultivation of the personal life" as a
single chapter. Chu Hsi adopted Ch'eng I's suggestion to make a supplementary
chapter to explain "the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge".164
162
CHL, p. 37; Instructions, part I: 6, p. 14.
163
"Hsiieh-yen hsia", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 524.
164 See The Great Learning, in Source Book, pp. 89-90.
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Liu chose to believe that there was no chapter of commentary on "the investigation of
things" and "the extension of knowledge" in the original version of the Great
Learning,165 He therefore concluded that the author of the Great Learning might
only have elicited "making the will sincere" in order to take it as the major step in
which the other three steps were included and, thus, had no intention at all to explain
them in the text.
Therefore Liu gave the word "z" (the will) a different interpretation from Wang.
In contrast to Wang's maintaining that the will, which may be good or evil, emanates
from the mind, Liu maintained: "/ (the will) is what is preserved in the mind, not
what emanates from the mind."166 Liu furthermore borrowed the expression from the
chapter of commentary on "making the will sincere" in the old version of the Great
Learning comparing the will to "when we abhor a bad smell or admire a beautiful
colour" to describe the absolute goodness of the will.167 He said:
What [this expression] means here is that the will's liking good and disliking
evil is [like we abhor a bad smell or admire a beautiful colour] so is absolutely
without any compromise. From this point of view, we know that the presence of
good and the absence of evil characterize the will, as what is preserved in the
165 It is in this belief Liu Tsung-chou even adopted a forged version of the Great Learning, Ta-hsiieh
shih-ching [Stone-inscribed Great Learning], which also did not include a chapter of
commentary on the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, into his "Ta-hsiieh ts'an-i"
[Doubts on the Great Learning], which was finished only three months before his suicide.
See Wang Fan-sen "Ming-tai ho-ch'i te tsao-wei yii ssu-hsiang cheng-lun: Feng Fang yii
Ta-hsiieh shih-ching" [The'Darling Fool'Feng
Fang (1500-1570) and his ink rubbing of the Stone-inscribed Great Learning", Hsin shih-hsiieh
[New history], vol. VI, no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 17-8.
166
"Hsiieh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 459. It is noteworthy that the idea "the will emanates
from the mind" originates in Chu Hsi. Wang Yang-ming accepted Chu Hsi's opinion. Liu also
challenged Chu Hsi's opinion. Liu's challenge caused wide disagreements among his disciples in the
early Ch'ing. They tried to make some amendments to Liu's works intending to prevent Liu from
being accused of revolting against the Ch'eng-Chu paradigm, which was the official orthodoxy in the
early Ch'ing. See Wang Fan-sen, "Ch'ing ch'u ssu-hsiang ch'ii-hsiang yii Liu-tzu chieh-yao: chien lun
Ch'ing ch'u Ching-shan hsiieh-pai te fun-lieh", pp. 417-25.
167 The Great Learning, in Source Book, p. 89.
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mind.168
Like Wang Yang-ming, Liu believed that human nature is definitely good. The
difference is that, while Wang, as mentioned earlier, took the mind's innate knowing
faculty as the guarantee of the goodness of human nature, Liu took the goodness of
the will as the guarantee. Liu said: "The will is the master of the mind."169 He also
used the metaphor of a compass to describe the relation between the will and the
mind, taking the will to be the needle which guides the mind.170 Talking about the
goodness of the will, Liu said: "The will is good in its original state, it does not
merely become good after being made sincere. To recover the original state of the
will is what is known as making [the will] sincere."171 To sum up, to Liu, it is the
will, which is definitely good, that characterizes human nature.172
In addition to his elaboration of the word i (the will), Liu also had a special
definition of the word nien ^ (thought). Liu said:
The chin hsin ^7/L> (present mind) is known as nien ^ (thought). It is the
mind's residual material force (yii ch'i f£|S,)- The residual material force is the
material force in action. In its action it is remote from the accordance of the
principle of Heaven. Therefore, the arising of the thought is a disease of the
168
"Hsiieh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 459.
169
"Hsiieh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 522. The same idea also is expressed as "the master of the mind is
called the will." See "Hsiieh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 528.
170 "Ta Tung sheng hsin i shih wen" [Reply to student Tung's ten inquiries on the
ideas of the mind and the will], in ibid., p. 397, p. 399.
171
"Hsiieh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 521.
172
Tang Chun-i observes that in Liu's critique of Wang Yang-ming's thought, he tried to elicit that the
will is priori to the knowing function in an ontological order. See Tang Chun-i, "Liu Tsung-chou's
doctrine of moral mind", p. 313. See also Tang Chun-i Hfitlx, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh yuan-lun:
yiian-hsing-p'ien M14H§ [A fundamental exposition of Chinese philosophy: on
human nature] (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chu, 1989), p. 494. Mou Tsung-san also maintains that Liu
Tsung-chou tried to emphasize the absolute goodness of the will. See Mou Tsung-san, Ts'ung Lu
Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, pp. 465-6.
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mind.173
Liu was using the etymological tactic of splitting the character nien into two graphic
components to define thought ()§;) as the present mind (^O)-174 In this sense, Liu
seemed to suggest that thought is the expression of the mind in reality. In saying "the
arising of the thought is a disease of the mind," Liu appeared to mean that the
thought itself approximates to evil. With this special definition of nien, Liu took the
effort to eliminate it as crucial for moral cultivation. He even wrote an essay entitled
"Chih nien shuo" [On the elimination of nien (thought)] at the age of
sixty-five.175 In it he concluded that the purpose of learning is simply to eliminate
176
thought, and doing good and erasing evil resides in eliminating thought.
Liu was dissatisfied with Wang's interpretation of the word i. He said: "Master
Wang always takes the words nien (thought) and i (the will) together [to mean the
same thing], I am afraid that they are different in reality."177 His dissatisfaction is so
strong that whenever he thought of Wang's confusion on the will as thought, he
"always wanted to wake the master [Wang Yang-ming] up from death to ask him
about it".178
Liu also criticizes Wang's idea of chih ^P (knowledge). Liu says: "It is because
Yang-ming misunderstood the word i (the will) that he could not but pursue goodness
173
"Hsiieh-yen chung" JpIgEju [Words of learning: part two], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 491.
174 Tu Wei-ming, "Subjectivity in Liu Tsung-chou's philosophy anthropology," p. 112.
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LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 438.
176 "Chih nien shuo" [On the elimination of nien (thought)], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 372.
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"Yang-ming ch'uan-hsin lu san" [The authentic record of master Yang-ming: part




in chih (knowledge). However, he also misunderstood the word chih,"179 As
mentioned above, Wang regarded knowledge (chih) as an ability to distinguish good
from evil. Liu criticises this idea as follows:
What [Wang Yang-ming] said about innate knowledge is not right. Knowing
good and knowing evil are similar to but different from knowing love and
knowing reverence. In knowing love and knowing reverence, knowledge
manifests itself in loving and reverencing. In knowing good and knowing evil,
knowledge is external to good and evil. The knowledge that is manifest in
loving and reverencing allows no extra space for motions of non-loving and
non-reverencing. It is the so-called innate knowledge of good. The knowledge
that is external to good and evil is nothing but the knowledge of recognizing the
distinction between good and evil.180
Liu seems not to dismiss the knowledge of distinguishing good from evil. However,
by saying, "In knowing good and knowing evil, the knowledge is external to good
and evil," he appeared to regard this sort of knowledge to be amoral. In this sense,
Liu seems to criticize Wang for advocating a sort of amoral knowledge.
Liu's criticism of Wang in this regard may not be well grounded. In his doctrine
of "the unity of knowledge and action" (chih hsing ho i £nfj1=r—*)> Wang said, for
example:
The Great Learning points to true knowledge and action for people to see,
saying, they are "like loving beautiful colours and hating bad odours." Seeing
beautiful colours appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colours
appertains to action. However, as soon as one sees that beautiful colour, he has
already loved it. It is not that he sees it first and then makes up his mind to love
it. Smelling a bad odour appertains to knowledge, while hating a bad odour
appertains to action. However, as soon as one smells a bad odour, he has already
hated it. It is not that he smells it first and then makes up his mind to hate it. ...
179
"Liang-chih shuo" [An essay on innate knowledge], in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 373.
180 Ibid., p. 372.
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Suppose we say that so-and-so knows filial piety and so-and-so knows brotherly
respect. They must have actually practised filial piety and brotherly respect
before they can be said to know them."181
It appears that besides the aspect of the knowledge that knows good and evil, Wang
also emphasized the aspect of the knowledge that is manifest in loving and
reverencing.
Liu is not unaware of Wang's emphasis on the latter aspect of knowledge. In his
commentary on the above passage, Liu affirms: "This saying is a crystallization of
the depiction [of the substance of the mind]. In this regard, master Wang truly
perceives the substance of the mind."182 However, it is because Liu was more
concerned about Wang's expression of the former aspect of knowledge that he
sometimes ignored Wang's emphasis on the latter. In this sense, Liu's criticism only
shows his preference of the latter aspect over the former in interpreting the idea of
knowledge.
Based on his different idea of i (the will) and this preference in interpreting the
idea of chih (knowledge), Liu took "making the will sincere" as the main purpose
(tsung-chih ^ g )183 of his doctrine and criticized Wang's taking "the extension of
innate knowledge" as the main purpose. Liu said:
181 CHL, p. 33; Instructions, part I: 5, p. 10.
182
"Yang-ming ch'uan-hsin lu san", in LTCCC, vol. 4, pp. 63-4.
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Selecting a dictum, either created by themselves or extracted from classics, as the tsung-chih (main
purpose) of their doctrines to help scholars grasp the essence of their doctrines, was very popular
among the Ming academic community. Ch'en Hsien-chang's "fostering a starting point from the
cultivation of tranquillity", Chan Jo-shui's "experiencing heavenly principle everywhere", Wang
Yang-ming's "the extension of innate knowledge" and Liu Tsung-chou's "making the will sincere" are
famous examples. See Wang Fan-sen EEi/US, "Ming mo Ch'ing ch'u ssu-hsiang chung chih
tsung-chih" r th m j [Changing perspectives on the notion of "tsung-chih" in the
late Ming and early Ch'ing], Ta-lu tsa-chih [The continent magazine], vol. 94, no. 4 (April
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[Wang Yang-ming] says something like "when your i is on serving your
parents," by that he regards nien (thought) as i (the will). ... Consequently
[Wang Yang-ming's] interpretation of the Doctrine of the Mean stated: "There
is no effort needed for attaining the state of chung (equilibrium). All efforts
needed are simply for attaining the state of ho (harmony)." Wang Yang-ming
takes the extension of innate knowledge as the main purpose of his doctrine
without mentioning attaining the state of chung. He concentrates only on
pursuing the knowledge of knowing which is good and which is evil at the
moment when thoughts arise. I am afraid that he was wrong in seeing innate
knowledge in this way.184
According to the Doctrine of the Mean: "Before the feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called 'chung'' (equilibrium). When these feelings
are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called lho'
(harmony)".185 In Liu's opinion, Wang's doctrine did not seize the moment before
the feelings are aroused and only counted on using knowledge, which is amoral, to
ward off evil when these feelings or thoughts are aroused. To Liu, this is wrong. The
proper moment to get rid of evil should be the moment before the feelings of pleasure,
anger, sorrow, or joy are aroused. In his answer to the question "Does the will refer to
the moment when the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy are aroused and the
mind refer to the moment before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy are
aroused?", Liu states: "the moment before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or
joy are aroused refers to what is preserved [in the mind],"186 thus confirming that the
moment before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy are aroused refers to the
will. Consequently Liu also appears to maintain that it is "making the will sincere"
that can seize the moment before feelings are aroused and can be sure to get rid of
1997), pp. 1-4.
184
"Hsiieh-yen chung", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 498.
185 The Doctrine of the Mean, in Source Book, p. 98.
186
jung sheng hsin i shih wen", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 398.
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evil.
It is also noteworthy that, in Liu's moral philosophy, the moment before the
feelings are aroused is most crucial for moral cultivation. In his Jen-p'u, talking
about the correction of faults, Liu considers the wei kuo (the subtle fault) the
first category for every sort of faults. He said: "Wei kuo exists in solitary
knowing."187 Under the category of the subtle fault there is only one item named
wang ^ (recklessness). He said:
The fault of wang actually is present in every sort of fault that is described
below. Wang is hidden in the moment before nien (thought) arises. Wang is
formless. This is the reason why it is considered to be a slight fault. The fault of
1 oo
wang is supposed to be recognized from the moment when no fault happens.
Liu appears to take wang as the birthplace of evil. He furthermore describes wang as
follows:
The word wang is extremely difficult to explain. There is no sign of pain from
which it can be recognized. Just as in the case when once one loses his essential
ch'i H, (pneuma) all kinds of diseases will easily invade his body, once one
suffers from this disease he will live in sickness for his whole life and be
incurable. This sort of fault is the most frightening.189
To Neo-Confucians, ch'i is considered to be the material sources of all things in the
world. It functions as the most crucial element in influencing the life and death of
things.190 By taking the metaphor of ch 'i Liu is emphasizing that wang is the most
187
"Jen-p'u", in ibid., p. 11
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Yamanoi Yu U-|:j4:"§b "Li ki tetsugaku ni okeru ki no gainen: hoku So kara Shindai mate: soron"
MM^ TL [The concepts of ch'i in the philosophy
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crucial determinate to influence the success or failure of moral cultivation. He states:
Ch'eng I said: "To act without recklessness is called 'sincerity'." Sincerity even
comes after non-recklessness. Sincerity exists in opposition to hypocrisy.
Hypocrisy is borne by wang.m
From this description, we know that Liu takes the formless recklessness so seriously
that he even considers non-recklessness more essential than sincerity.
Moreover, in the second category of the faults, Liu defines it as follows:
Yin kuo ISjM (the concealed fault) lies in the realm of the seven emotions.192
In this category, Liu lists joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, cruelty, and desire as the
seven emotions. He describes them as follows:
The faults listed above are all stored in the mind. They are hidden and invisible.
This is why they are called concealed faults. They all come from the subtle fault.
One sort of fault therefore turns out to become two sorts of faults. The subtle
fault is invisible. However, once it is activated by joy, it becomes [a fault] of
excessive joy. Once it is activated by anger, it becomes [a fault] of outrageous
anger. All the other kinds of the seven kinds of feelings activate with faults
likewise. The true face of the subtle fault can be seen from them.193
It is next to the second category of fault that Liu first mentions visible faults,
concerning principle and material in the period from northern Sung to Ch'ing: an introduction], in
Onozawa Seiichi —, Fukunaga Mitsuji iSzKTif S'J, and Yamanoi Yu eds., Ki no shiso:
Chugoku ni okeru shizenkan to ningenkan no tenkai EbSSlCHtt -5 §t. AFaliM'T)
Ifij [The thought of ch'i: the unfolding of the views on nature and human beings in China] (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1978), p. 356.
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"Jen-p'u", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 11.
192 Ibid., p. 12.
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including all kinds of evil behaviours, ranging from private habits to social crimes.194
To sum up Liu's idea of faults, he basically considers the first two categories as
the most crucial. The subtle fault exists before thoughts arise. The concealed fault
emerges at the moment when the seven kinds of feelings arise. Liu is anxious to erase
the subtle fault, which is the birthplace of evil, at the moment before thoughts arise.
To him it is not fast or good enough to deal with the concealed fault, which is the
beginning of visible faults, by the time feelings arise. This is why he is dissatisfied
with Wang Yang-ming, as Liu said above, "Wang Yang-ming takes the extension of
innate knowledge as the main purpose of his doctrine without mentioning attaining
the state of chung (equilibrium)" and "concentrates only on pursuing the knowledge
of knowing which is good and which is evil on the moment when thoughts arise". To
Liu it is only "making the will sincere" that can get rid of evil that emerges at the
moment before thoughts arise and attain the state of equilibrium.
By taking "making the will sincere" as the main purpose of his doctrine, Liu
considered everything in the world to be the expression of the will. Liu transformed
the Confucian idealism of "sageliness inside and kingliness outside" into a
concentration on the learning of "sageliness inside" only.195 Like many of his late
Ming contemporaries, Liu believed that a rigorous practice of confession and
self-criticism was a prerequisite for the correction of faults and ultimately the
attainment of moral perfection.196 With his systematic work on the practice of
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period from late Ming to early Ch'ing.197 Liu's idea of the correction of faults
presented an extremely high standard for moral cultivation. It has even been
described as the most rigorous standard ever seen in the Confucian doctrine of moral
108
cultivation. This emphasis on the correction of faults became popular throughout
the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing, and its residual influence can even be
found in the era of the May Fourth movement in the early twentieth century.199
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4.3 Liu Tsung-chou's criticism of Wang Yang-ming's followers
(A) Liu Tsung-chou's sense of the degeneration of Wang Yang-ming's followers
Although Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind stood firm as a new intellectual
paradigm in Neo-Confucianism, different interpretations of his doctrine emerged as it
became popular, and thus the factionalization of this School of Mind also occurred.
To Liu Tsung-chou, accompanied with this factionalization there came the
degeneration of Wang Yang-ming's followers. Liu believed that there were two
defects in Wang's followers' interpretations of Wang's doctrine:
Nowadays everyone competes in discussing innate knowledge. This incurs some
dangers. Arrogant men confuse it with emotions and consciousness. Therefore,
they consider any behaviour equally moral. Prudish men mistake it for
mysticism. Therefore, they make morality more complicated than it should be.1
In brief, the two defects in Wang's followers' interpretations are moral nihilism and
mysticism. Quoting Mencius, Liu regarded these tendencies as "heresy," "extreme
■y
action," and "excessive views." To Liu, they are signs of the moral decay of his
time. This opinion is exposed in his "Ch'eng-hsueh tsa-chieh", written in 1643, only
•3
two years before his death. It can be seen as the final summary of his opinions on
the degeneration of Wang's followers.
Liu's criticism may be inspired by Wang Yeh-hstin [Shih-mei dt
1
"Cheng-hsiieh tsa-chieh", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 325.
2 Ibid.
3
LNP, in LTCCC, vol. 5, p. 480.
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H, ?-?], Wang Yang-ming's grandson. Four years before Liu expressed the above
criticism, he was invited by Wang Yeh-hsiin to write a preface to a reprint of Wang
Yang-ming's Ch'uan-hsi luA In this preface, Liu said that Wang Yeh-hsiin had told
him his concerns about the degeneration of Wang Yang-ming's followers. Wang
Yeh-hsiin said:
The doctrine of [the extension of] innate knowledge is propounded to save
scholars from the defects of Sung scholars' over emphasizing textual exegesis.
It is a prescription for curing disease. [However,] since it was distorted, people
often either consider innate knowledge ready-made or use innate knowledge too
flexibly. It made men of high level become mystical and men of low level
arrogant. The defects are worse than that of [Sung scholars' over-emphasizing]
textual exegesis.5
The two defects of moral mysticism and nihilism were exposed in Wang Yeh-hsiin's
above quotation, too. In this sense, Wang Yeh-hsiin was expressing the same concern
about moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's followers.
Another contemporary of Liu who might also have inspired him to detect moral
nihilism and mysticism is Kao P'an-lung. In his preface to a publication of Liu's
teacher Hsu Fu-yiian's works, Kao criticized Wang Yang-ming's followers for
pursuing a special method of making the mind concentrate on recognizing a thing
that is neither good nor evil and forsaking all things concerning moral principles.6
Kao's criticism of Wang's followers seemed also to be directed at moral mysticism
and nihilism. Although Liu did not mention this preface in his works, given his close
4
"Ch'ung k'o Wang Yang-ming hsien-sheng Ch'uan-hsi lu hsii" JC^'JcEI
[Preface to the reprint of Wang Yang-ming's Ch'uan-hsi lu] was written in 1639. See "Ch'ung k'o
Wang Yang-ming hsien-sheng Ch'uan-hsi lu hsti", in LTCCC, vol. 3b, p. 726.
5
Quoted by Liu Tsung-chou, ibid., p. 728.
6 See Kao P'an-lung, "Hsu Ching-an hsien-sheng yii-yao hsii" [Preface to
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relation to Kao and Hsu, we may assume that Liu might have noticed it.
This sense of moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's followers can also
be seen earlier in another member of the Tung-lin party. In his criticism of
philosophical conferences where scholars of the Wang Yang-ming School like Wang
Chi and Chou Ju-teng participated, Ku Hsien-ch'eng, the leader of the party,
criticized them for failing to express approval or disapproval in regard to political
questions of the day.7 He remarked:
If the thoughts of the official at the capital are not of the ruler, and the thoughts
of the official in the provinces are not of the people, and if [private citizens]
group together in retirement to discuss questions of nature and destiny, to help
one another cultivate virtue without thought of the needs of the world, then even
o
though they have other qualities, they are not to be approved of by gentlemen.
Although Ku did not use similar words to criticize scholars of the Wang Yang-ming
School, he deplored their habit of indulging in empty discussion of moral issues
without caring about the world. Another member of the Tung-lin party, Shih
Meng-lin [Yu-ch'ih 3sYtk, ?-?], also said:
Nowadays professors of philosophy point out only 'the momentary' to students
If one asks: 'What do you mean by the momentary?' the answer is 'Something
you do at the moment that is required, such as eating when you feel hungry, or
sleeping when you feel tired.' This kind of behaviour goes on so naturally that
no discipline is required. According to this popular teaching, emphasis on
discipline is superfluous because it runs counter to reality. Such naturalism can
only lead to spiritual flabbiness, and it is a pit for people to fall into.9
master Hsu Ching-an's selected words], in Kao P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, chiian 9a, p. 14b.
7 See Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 164.
8
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsueh-an i" — [The Tung-lin School: part one], in MJHA,
chiian 58, p. 1377; Records, p. 228.
9
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsiieh-an san" [The Tung-lin School: part three], in
MJHA, chiian 60, p. 1473. The English translation is from Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 170.
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Shih's critique of moral decay is also aimed at Wang Yang-ming's followers such as
Li Chih,10 Wang Chi and the members of the T'ai-chou School.11
Lastly, Hsii Fu-yiian, Liu Tsung-chou's teacher, also had the same impression of
the members of the T'ai-chou School. According to Huang Tsung-hsi: "Hsu Fu-yiian
believed in liang-chih and disliked those who used it to preach Buddhism. He once
cautioned Lo Ju-fang [Chin-hsi jfjrH, 1515-88] (a member of the T'ai-chou
School) about the danger of setting a bad example to younger scholars, saying that a
few flippant persons speaking recklessly of ridiculous things and confusing the
listeners could lead to the disapproval and disgust of correct and earnest scholars,
who would then refuse to believe in the teaching [of liang-chih]. [He thought that]
12this might bring about serious consequences." In conclusion, the view of the
degeneration of Wang Yang-ming's followers was a common belief shared by most
critics of Wang's followers in the late Ming period.
One of Huang Tsung-hsi's disciples, Ch'en I-ch'ang [?-?], attributed the
reason for the emergence of moral nihilism and mysticism to Wang's teaching itself.
He said:
After Wang Yang-ming died, some of his disciples expressed their opinions
without any limitation. They could not reach an agreement upon his teaching of
the "Four Sentences". Therefore, they were defective either in regarding
emotions and consciousness as innate knowing or regarding imagination as the
10 See ibid.
11 See Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 169.
12
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Kan-ch'iian hsiieh-an wu", in MJHA, chiian 41, p. 976; Records, pp. 205-6.
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pen-t'i (original substance) [of innate knowing].lj
Ch'en's observantion shows a basic truth about the influence of Wang Yang-ming's
"Four Sentences of Teaching" on the emergence of moral nihilism and mysticism
among his followers. Most of the above-mentioned critics of Wang Yang-ming's
followers referred their criticism to the influence of Wang's "Four Sentences of
Teaching".14 Ch'en also claimed that moral nihilism and mysticism are the defects
Liu Tsung-chou meant to correct in his introduction to Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine.15 In this sense, the degeneration of Wang Yang-ming's followers can be
traced to Wang's "Four Sentences of Teaching".
(B) The debate on Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching"
Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching" is considered one of the most
controversial issues in his doctrine. There were even doubts if it was really by Wang
Yang-ming himself.16 Liu Tsung-chou was one of the people who had such doubts.
He said: "According to my research, the teaching of the Four Sentences is not found
in Yang-ming's writings. Its articulation really came from Wang Chi. The Four
Sentences may have represented Yang-ming's inconclusive opinions, something he
13
"Yang-ming ch'uan-hsin lu san", in LTCCC, vol. 4, p. 108.
14 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsueh-an i", in MJHA, chiian 58, p. 1379; "Tung-lin hsueh-an san",
in ibid., chiian 60, p. 1473; "Kan-ch'iian hsueh-an wu", in ibid., chiian 41, p. 976.
15
"Yang-ming ch'uan-hsin lu san", in LTCCC, vol. 4, p. 108.
16 Ch'en Lai Yu wu chih ching: Wang Yang-ming che-hsiieh te ching-shen : -FPUffil
[Positive and negative; the essentials of the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming] (Peking:
Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1991), p. 194; Chung-ying Ch'eng, "The consistency and meaning of the
Four-Sentence teaching in Ming-ju hsueh-an", in Chung-ying Ch'eng, New Dimensions of Confucian
and Neo-Confucian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 1991), p. 484; Simon
Man-ho Wong, "A critique of Huang Tsung-hsi's interpretation of the 'Four Maxims'", Tsing Hua
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discussed at some time but did not dare to put in writing for fear of confusing
scholars."17 It is noteworthy that Liu is not the only one who attributed Wang
Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching" to Wang Chi. A member of the
T'ai-chou school, Fang Hstieh-chien [Pen-an 1540-1615], had
expressed the same opinion.18 Huang Tsung-hsi had another explanation. He said:
"My teacher Liu Tsung-chou used to suspect that what Wang Yang-ming said at
T'ien-ch'iian [i.e. the Four Sentences] differed from his ordinary teachings. Wang
usually referred to mind-in-itself as being characterized by the good, and this good
means fulfilling to the utmost the principle of Heaven, without a speck of human
passion. He also said liang-chih is the principle of Heaven. And the Ch'uan-hsi lu
refers many times to the principle of Heaven. Even if there is a reference to li
(principle) in tranquillity being neither good nor evil, Wang Yang-ming never said
there that the mind-in-itself was neither good nor evil."19
However, Liu and others' doubts are not grounded because there is enough
evidence that can verify that the "Four Sentences of Teaching" was indeed by Wang
Yang-ming.20 Nonetheless the "Four Sentences of Teaching" is "ambiguous enough
to allow a wide diversity of interpretation and left behind a legacy of controversy that
Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s., vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1998), p. 489.
17
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 8; Records, p. 61.
18 See Kao P'an-lung, "Fang Pen-an hsien-sheng Hsing shan i hsii" [Preface
to master Fang Hstieh-ch'ien's "Interpretation of the theory of the goodness of human nature"], in Kao
P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, chiian 9a, p. 15b.
19
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men hsueh-an i", in MJHA, chiian 16, pp. 334-5; Records, p.
120.
20 See Ch'en Lai, op. cit., pp. 193-203. Tang Chiin-i also considers the "Four Sentences" as "rightly a
very concise summary of Wang Yang-ming's teaching." See Tang Chiin-i, "The development of the
concept of moral mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Chi," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., Selfand
Society in Ming Thought, p. 112. Chung-ying Ch'eng also maintains it "gives an organized unity to
Wang's philosophy." See Chung-ying Ch'eng, "The consistency and meaning of the Four-Sentence
teaching in Ming-ju hsiieh-an", p. 484.
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continued long after his death."21 At least three debates had happened since Wang's
"Four Sentences of Teaching" was propounded: the debate between Wang Chi and
Ch'ien Te-hung in 1527, the debate on the "Nine Inquiries and Nine Explanations"
between Hsu Fu-yiian and Chou Ju-teng in 1592, and the debate between Ku
Hsien-ch'eng and Kuan Chih-tao [Tung-ming 1537-1608] in 1598.22
Liu was so impressed by the first and the second ones that he commented on them.23
As is mentioned in section 3 of chapter 2, in the debate between Wang Chi and
Ch'ien Te-hung, Wang Chi was so overwhelmingly impressed by Wang
Yang-ming's description of the nature of "the absence of good and evil" in the mind
that he denied the other three sentences of his "Four Sentences of Teaching", which
emphasize the existence of good and evil and the tasks of discriminating good from
evil and doing good and removing evil. He therefore concentrated on realizing the
fact that there is no distinction between good and evil in the mind, the will,
knowledge and things. Ch'ien Te-hung argued that although the human mind was
originally neither good nor evil, it is dominated by habits, which might put good and
evil thoughts into it. He therefore emphasized the effort to recover that original
nature and substance of the mind through discriminating good from evil. Wang
Yang-ming in response to this debate proposed two ways of teaching: one for men of
acute intelligence, and one for men of average and low intelligence. He saw Wang
21 Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom, pp. 149-50.
22 See Ch'en Li-sheng "Wang Yang-ming ssu-chti-chiao te san ts'u pien-nan chi ch'i
ch'uan-shih-hsiieh i-yiin" [Three debates on Wang
Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching" and their hermeneutic significances], in T'ai-ta li-shih
hsiieh-pao <JJ [Bulletin of the Department of History of National Taiwan University], no.
29 (June 2002), pp. 1-27.
23 Liu Tsung-chou's comment on the debate between Wang Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung is in his "Ch'ien
Hsu-shan hsien-sheng yao-yii hsii" [Preface to master Ch'ien Te-hung's essential
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Chi's view as appropriate for dealing with men of acute intelligence, Ch'ien
Te-hung's view as appropriate for men of average and low intelligence, and
suggested that a combination of their views would lead all people to the truth.
Based on Wang Yang-ming's response, Wang Chi, with his confidence in his
"Four Negatives", concluded the debate: "The 'Four Negatives' is for teaching men
of acute intelligence, while the 'Four Positives' (ssu yu IZ9W) is for teaching men of
average and low intelligence."24 What Wang Chi referred to as the "Four Negatives"
is his own doctrine and the "Four Positives" is Ch'ien Te-hung's interpretation of
Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teachings".25 However, it seems that Ch'ien
never provided a theory to confirm that the mind, the will, knowledge, and things are
all characterized by the presence of good or evil: a "Four Positives" which can be
contrasted to Wang Chi's "Four Negatives".26 Only an indirect record of the debate
between Wang Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung by Wang Yang-ming's other disciple Tsou
Shou-i, which presents a different version from Wang Yang-ming's Ch'uan-hsi lu,
notes that in contrast to Wang Chi's "Four Negatives", Ch'ien Te-hung said: "The
presence of the highest good and the absence of evil characterized the mind. The
presence of good and evil characterized the will. The knowledge of good and evil is
liang-chih (innate knowledge). The doing of good and ridding of evil is the
97
investigation of things." This is considered the only evidence to verify that Ch'ien
words], in LTCCC, vol. 3b, p. 698. His commend of the debate on the "Nine Inquiries and Nine
Explanations" between Hsu Fu-yuan and Chou Ju-teng is in his "Hui-lu", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 643.
24
Wang Chi, "T'ien-ch'iian cheng tao chi", in Wang Chi, Wang Lung-hsi ch'iian-chi, chtian 1, p. 2a.
25 Ch'en Lai, op. cit., p. 300; Ch'en Li-sheng, op. cit., p. 5.
26 Ch'en Li-sheng, op. cit., p. 5.
27
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Chiang-yu Wang-men hstieh-an i" * [The Chiang-yu section of
the Wang Yang-ming School: part one], in MJHA, chiian 16, p. 341.
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Te-hung advocates "Four Positives".28 To some extent, the debate between Wang
Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung can be characterized by the difference between the "Four
Negatives" and the "Four Positives". In brief, Ch'ien emphasized the relativity of
good and evil, while Wang Chi emphasized the non-relativity of good and evil.
The debate on "Nine Inquiries and Nine Explanations" between Hsu Fu-yiian
29and Chou Ju-teng may be summarized as follows:
Hsii's first inquiry: The classics all maintained that human nature is good and
the notion that human nature is neither good nor evil was only prompted by Kao-tzu
cnp, which was effectively refuted by Mencius. The theory of "the absence of good
and evil" is contrary to what is written in the classics.
Chou's first explanation: The "highest good" the sages sought to learn refers to
the "original substance" that defies dichotomization. Although in the classics, the
word "good" often appears in the context of the good-evil polarity, "the good which
is ultimately manifested in the mind and human nature is the good which is not pitted
against evil."
Hsu's second inquiry: There are objective good and evil that cannot be altered
by subjective opinion. Just as in the universe what is upright is good and that which
is partial is evil, the distinction between good and evil is as clear-cut as that between
28 Ch'en Lai, op. cit., p. 301.
29 Hsu Fu-yiian's "Nine Inquiries" and Chou Ju-teng's "Nine Explanations" are recorded in Huang
Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an wu", in MJHA, chiian 36, pp. 862-8. The English summary of the
"Nine Inquires" and "Nine Explanations" below are based on Carsun Chang, op. cit., pp. 129-41;
On-cho Ng, Cheng-zhu Confucianism in the Early Qing: Li Guangdi (1642-1718) and Qing Learning
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 15-21. For a detailed philosophical
discussion of the debate, see Ts'ai Jen-hou HHUIP, "Wang men T'ien-ch'iian ssu-wu tsung-chih chih
lun-p'ien: Chou Hai-men Chiu-ti Chiu-chieh te shu-chieh" : jH$8F"3 rA
j KSitfj? [A debate on Wang Chi's doctrine of "Four Negatives": a discussion on the
debate on "Nine Inquiries" and "Nine Explanations" recorded by Chou Ju-teng], in Ts'ai Jen-hou,
Hsin-ju-chia te ching-shen fang-hsiang lYKlfiW Tf ["] [The philosophy of Neo-Confucianism]
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ice and coal, or black and white. People who accumulate good actions will be
rewarded, while those who do evil things will suffer from misfortune. If people
believe in the theory of "the absence of good and evil", they will not know what to do
and what not to do.
Chou's second explanation: "Uprightness" and "partiality" are descriptions and
views created by individuals. They have nothing to do with the existence of objective
good and evil. The theory of reward to the virtuous and punishment to the wicked is
applicable only to fools who need to be instructed.
Hsu's third inquiry: "The human mind is like a great vacuum, which is spotless.
Yet there exists in essence what can be established as the standard. The standard is
also called the uprightness, the ultimate, the goodness and so on." With the theory of
"the absence of good and evil", what can the cosmic standard be?
Chou's third explanation: Since the human mind is like a great vacuum,
therefore it cannot be "rendered into a thing", may it be the "highest goodness" or its
opposite.
Hsu's fourth inquiry: "The original state of human nature is good." All the sages
tried in many ways to instruct people simply to bring them back to their original state.
If hsin (the mind), i (the will), chih (knowledge) and wu (things) mentioned in the
Great Learning, are all neither good nor evil, there will be no secure point of
departure for moral cultivation.
Chou's fourth explanation: The innate goodness of human nature is the highest
good. But as long as there is misapprehension of this highest good, evil is generated.
To return to the original state of human nature is not to lose one's innocence. In the
(Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chii, 1982), pp. 239-762J4
innocence of the infant there is neither good nor evil. The same principle of
innocence may be applied to adults.
Hsu's fifth inquiry: The ancient sages, who had charge of moulding the moral
climate and of awakening human hearts, depended upon the innate goodness of
human nature. Because of the indestructible goodness of human nature those who are
foolish and ignorant can be educated, those who are violent can be moderated, the
whole moral atmosphere can be changed from bad to good. This is the key to reform.
Chou's fifth explanation: A mind which is not attached to the doing of either
good or evil is the perfect paradigm for human nature's innate goodness. To educate
the ignorant, to make gentle the violent, or to transform the moral climate is to lead
the community on the basis of what one knows to be good. Knowledge of the good,
in turn, is founded on the idea of the highest good in the non-relative sense.
Hsu's sixth inquiry: According to Confucius, moral cultivation requires endless
study and rigorous discipline. But, with the influence of the theory of "the absence of
good and evil", scholars nowadays instead of hard and steady work wish to realize
the principle of instantaneous enlightenment in non-goodness.
Chou's sixth explanation: The theory of "the absence of good and evil" also
maintains that moral cultivation requires a lifetime of self-discipline. Disciplinary
work itself, consisting in the performance of virtuous acts and the avoidance of
wickedness, without a trace of anything else, is the only real chastisement.
Hsu's seventh inquiry: Indeed, as revealed in many classics, authentic virtuous
deeds require not doing good for the sake of appearances. However, one cannot jump
to the conclusion that because contrivance to do good is undesirable, there is no
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goodness as such at all.
Chou's seventh explanation: The evidence from the classics that authentic
virtuous deeds require not doing good for the sake of appearances are reasonable
enough to verify the theory of non-existence of good. The virtuous deeds which
genuine gentlemen perform are good in the non-relative sense, and are good without
purpose behind them.
Hsu's eighth inquiry: Wang Yang-ming himself explicitly states that "there is no
nature that is not good, and so there is no knowing that is not good." His saying that
"the absence of good and evil characterized the mind-in-itself' simply refers to the
state of tranquillity of the mind before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy
are aroused.
Chou's eighth explanation: If the saying of Wang Yang-ming, "the absence of
good and evil characterized the mind-in-itself', alludes to the state of tranquillity of
the mind before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused, why
should the mind become something different after the feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow and joy are aroused. If it is tranquil before these feelings are aroused, it
should be the same after they are aroused.
Hsu's ninth inquiry: Wang Chi wrongly divided his doctrine of "Four
Negatives" and his opponent Ch'ien Te-hung's doctrine of "Four Positives" into two
separate ways for men endowed with acute intelligence and with dull intelligence
respectively.
Chou's ninth explanation: The method of dividing men into two kinds, one
above average, the other below, and teaching them differently was started by
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Confucius. The so-called two different methods with two different languages are
really one. The self-same linguistic expression may be understood by one who has
confidence in the source of the words, and misunderstood by one who is suspicious.
To sum up this debate, although Hsu and Chou did not reach agreement in
TO
appearance, there are many ideas that were common to both. First of all, they both
agree that the original state of the mind and human nature is good. Secondly, they
both require authentic virtuous deeds not to do good for the sake of appearances.
Thirdly, they both accept that the expression "the absence of good and evil" can be
seen as a description of the "highest goodness" of the mind and human nature.
Fourthly, they both maintain that moral cultivation requires rigorous self-discipline.
Despite these common ideas, the significant disagreement between them can be
summarized as follows: Hsu insisted that there are objective good and evil. In
confirming this, he maintained that the sages therefore advise people to do good and
remove evil in order to return to the original state of goodness of human nature. He
considered the teaching of the sages convincing because, in accordance with the
principle of Heaven, people who accumulate good actions will be rewarded, while
those who do evil things will suffer from misfortune. This appears to involve the
theory of causation and retribution (karma, yin kuo 0IH), which will be discussed
later. He doubted that the doctrine of "the absence of good and evil" will make
people think that there is no definite good or evil and render them incapable of
distinguishing good from evil, and ignorant of what to do and what not to do.
In contrast to Hsu, Chou insisted that as long as there is misapprehension of the
30
According to Huang Tsung-hsi, after this debate "the disciples of the two masters (Hsu and Chou)
also had their own disputes." See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Kan-ch'uan hsueh-an wu", in MJHA, chtian 41, p.
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highest good, evil is generated. The "highest good" defies dichotomization. In this
sense, doing good and removing evil can only be genuine when there is the
realization that there is neither good nor evil. Therefore, to educate the ignorant, to
make gentle the violent, or to transform the moral climate is to lead the community
on the basis of what one knows to be good in the non-relative sense. He therefore
maintained that, in order to fully understand human nature, it is necessary to grasp
the ultimate truth and for that one must believe the theory of "the absence of good
and evil".
(C) Liu Tsung-chou's criticism of Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of
Teaching" and the debates on it
It appears that the most controversial point of the debates on Wang Yang-ming's
"Four Sentences of Teaching" resides in the first sentence. Wang's contemporaries,
such as Chan Jo-shui, Lo Ch'in-shun and Huang Tso jlf{4 T'ai-ch'iian,
1490-1566], also criticized it for contradicting the Mencian doctrine of the highest
good of human nature and its closeness to Buddhist theory.31 This kind of criticism
continued after Wang's death. The members of the Tung-lin party were especially
critical of this idea. As Huang Tsung-hsi observed: "Ku [Hsien-ch'eng] is especially
diligent in pointing out the difficulties inherent in Wang Yang-ming's statement
regarding 'the absence of good and evil,' considering this to be the occasion of ruin
976; Records, p. 206.
31 See Tang Chun i, "The criticisms of Wang Yang-ming's teachings as raised by his contemporaries",
Philosophy East and West, nos. 1 and 2 (January and April, 1973), p. 174; p. 176; Chung Hung-lam,
"Huang Zuo [Ts'uoJ's meeting with Wang Yang-ming and the debate over the unity of knowledge and
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for the world." Shih Meng-lin put forward a theory of the goodness of human
nature to resist the spread of this idea.33 Lastly, Ka'o P'an-lung also believed that the
theory of "the absence of good and evil" can corrupt the teaching of the theory of
"the presence of goodness".34 Even a member of the T'ai-chou School, Fang
Hstieh-chien, considered it better to promote the theory of the goodness of human
nature rather than the theory of "the absence of good and evil" in persuading people
to do good.35
In this sense, Liu is no exception. Liu criticized the first sentence of Wang
Yang-ming's "Four Sentences" as follows:
If the mind-in-itself is really characterized by the absence of good and evil, then
where does the thought that is characterized by the presence of good and evil
come from? Where does the knowing that has the knowledge of good and evil
come from? Where does the effort of doing good and removing evil come
from? ... How straightforward was [Wang Chi's] theory of "Four Negatives"!
How can Master [Wang Yang-ming] answer him?36
The main point of Liu's criticism is that Wang misunderstood the mind-in-itself as
amoral. If it is true that the mind-in-itself is neither good nor evil, there is no reason
to argue against Wang Chi's "Four Negatives". In that case, everything is amoral and
there will be no guarantee for the goodness of the mind and human nature. At the end
of the passage, Liu appeared to blame Wang Yang-ming for being incapable of
stopping Wang Chi's over-extending the first sentence of his "Four Sentences of
action", Ming Studies, 35 (1995), pp. 53-73.
32
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsiieh-an i", in MJHA, chiian 58, p. 1379; Records, p. 230.
33
Huang Tsung-hsi, "Tung-lin hsileh-an san", in MJHA,-chiian 60, p. 1473.
34 Kao P'an-lung, "Fang Pen-an hsien-sheng Hsing shan i hsii", in Kao P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu,
chiian 9a, p. 16a.
35 See ibid., p. 16b.
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Teaching."
Therefore Liu re-worded Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences" as follows: "The
presence of good and evil characterizes the movement of the mind. The liking of
good and disliking of evil characterize the tranquillity of the will. The knowledge of
good and evil is innate knowledge. The doing of good and removing of evil
characterizes the principles of things."37
The main differences between these two "Four Sentences" reside in their first
two sentences. Liu does not directly challenge Wang's description of the nature of
the mind as good or evil. He rather asserts that the movement of the mind is
characterized by the presence of good and evil. Liu himself uses a similar expression
to describe the mind. In his Jen-p'u, Liu said: "That which has no goodness yet is
highest goodness is the substance of the mind."38 In his "Hsiieh yen" [Words
on learning], he said: "The mind is neither good nor evil. Only through the movement
as liking and disliking, i.e., liking good and disliking evil just like the heat of fire and
the coldness of water, can we see the goodness [of the mind]."39 Liu believed that
"the absence of good and evil" meant the "highest goodness" of the mind.
Although in Liu's opinion the mind is the highest good, it does not mean that all
of the movement of the mind is definitely good. Only in movement such as liking
good and disliking evil can the goodness of the mind be seen. In that case, Liu
continues in the second sentence of his "Four Sentences", "The liking of good and
disliking of evil characterize the tranquillity of the will." It is the original substance
36
"Yang-ming ch'uan-hsin lu san", in LTCCC, vol. 4, p. 107.
37
"Hsueh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 459.
38
"Jen-p'u", in ibid., p. 3.
39
"Hstieh-yen hsia," in ibid., p. 519.
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of the will that can be seen as the guarantee for keeping the "highest goodness"
without being ruined. This is the reason that elsewhere Liu remarked: "The will is the
place where the highest goodness abides.... There is no goodness outside the will."40
Although Liu agreed that the highest good of the mind could be described as
"the absence of good and evil," he tried to persuade scholars not to use this
description. He said:
Scholars of the Wang Yang-ming School advocate the theory of "the absence of
good and evil." It after all is incompatible with [the theory of] "highest good."
Some explain it as follows: "It is the absence of good and evil that is the highest
good." I am afraid that all this achieves is to add a burdensome statement [for
explaining the mind]. There is only one shan |lf (goodness). But [according to
them] there is a shan that is having goodness and there is a shan that is having
no goodness. The ancient sages never thought like that.41
Liu considered "the absence of good and evil" was an obstacle to his theory of "the
highest good." He therefore asserted: "The highest goodness is the substance of
human nature. There is no extra bit of goodness that can be added in it."42
It is with his main concern on presenting the guarantee of the goodness of the
mind and human nature that Liu comments on the debates on Wang Yang-ming's
"Four Sentences of Teaching". He not only considered that the articulation of the
"Four Sentences of Teaching" was by Wang Chi but also maintained that Wang
Yang-ming emphasized the "goodness" of human nature. He says:
What master [Wang Yang-ming] would like to emphasize is simply innate
knowledge. He also says: "Innate knowledge is the principle of Heaven,"
40 "TuTa-hsiieh" [Reading the Great Learning], in LTCCC, vol. 3b, p. 1182.
41




because it (innate knowledge) is characterized by the presence of good and the
absence of evil. [Therefore,] there is no doubt that the knowledge is the
knowledge that is characterized by the presence of good and the absence of evil,
the things is the things that are characterized the presence of good and the
absence of evil, the will is the will that is characterized by the presence of good
and the absence of evil, and the mind is the mind that is characterized by the
presence of good and the absence of evil 43
Liu considered that Wang Yang-ming only intended to elucidate the goodness of
human nature. To Liu, the mind, the will, knowledge and things and are all
characterized by the presence of good and the absence of evil. Compared with Ch'ien
Te-hung's "Four Positives", Liu presents a much more positive description of the
goodness of the mind, the will, knowledge and things.
Liu believed that Wang Chi's "Four Negatives" is based on the Buddhist
doctrine: "To recognize one's original state at the time of thinking of neither good
nor evil."44. Wang Chi's closeness to Ch'an Buddhism is verified by modern scholars
of Ming Neo-Confucianism 45 Wang Chi's interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's
"Four Sentences of Teaching" and thus his "Four Negatives" also appear to be
influenced by Ch'an Buddhism.46
The expression "To recognize one's original state at the time of thinking of
neither good nor evil" is founded in a Ch'an Buddhist canon Liu-tsu t'an-ching /\ijii.
ifilM [The platform scripture].47 Despite its Buddhist origins, it is considered the
43 "Ch'ien Hsu-shan hsien-sheng yao-yii hsii", in LTCCC, vol. 3b, p. 698.
44 Ibid.
45 See P'eng Kuo-hsiang, op. cit., pp. 239-328.
46 Tu Wei-ming fifdBfj, "Wang Yang-ming ssu-chii-chiao t'an-chiu" [A survey
on Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching"], in Tu Wei-ming, Jen-hsing yii tzu-wo
hsiu-yang AITAFl TcflTft [Human nature and self-cultivation] (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan
shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1992), pp. 215-33.
47 See Hui-neng Ufa, Liu-tsu t'an-ching AiMtlM [The platform scripture], in Taisho shinshu
daizokyo, vol. 48, p. 349b.
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highest level of moral cultivation by some Neo-Confucians, including Wang
Yang-ming. He said: "[What the Ch'an Buddhist calls] the original state is what our
AO
Confucian school calls innate knowledge." To Liu, it is only through the basic
steps of cultivation that one can achieve this highest level 49 Without passing
through these steps of moral cultivation but only thinking about achieving this
highest level by sudden enlightenment is to miss the intervening steps.50 Liu
therefore concluded his criticism of Wang Chi's "Four Negatives" as follows:
According to Wang Chi's "Four Negatives", the mind is the mind that is neither
good nor evil. This sort of mind is a mind of nothing. The will is the will that is
neither good nor evil. This sort of will is a will of nothing. The knowing is the
knowing that is neither good nor evil. This sort of knowing is a knowing of
nothing. The thing is the thing that is neither good nor evil. This sort of thing is
a thing of nothing. Therefore, there is no [need for] such tasks as "investigating
things", "extending knowledge", "making the will sincere", "rectifying the
mind", "cultivating the personal life", "regulating the family", "ordering the
state" and "pacifying the world". There is no consideration of [what is depicted
in the Great Learning:] "Things have their roots and branches. Affairs have
their beginnings and their ends. To know what is first and what is last will lead
one near the Way." [Has he thought about] what is the essence of Great
Learning? He said: "To recognize one's original state at the time of thinking of
neither good nor evil." Is he not intending to expose the secret of Heaven
(,t'ien-chi ^i!)?51
In Liu's opinion, Wang Chi's "Four Negatives" not only becomes epistemologically
agonistic, but also leaves no room for the eight steps of moral cultivation in the Great
Learning. To Liu, these eight steps are not only basic but also should be fulfilled step
by step in the order given in the Great Learning. It is in this sense that Liu concludes
48
CHL, p. 228; Instructions, Part II: 162, p. 142.
49 See "Ch'ien Hsu-shan hsien-sheng yao-yii hsti", in LTCCC, vol. 3b, p. 699.
50 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "Shih shuo", in MJHA, p. 7.
51
"Hsiieh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 427.
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that Wang Chi's "Four Negatives" will inevitably become heresy.52
In commenting on the debate on the "Nine Inquiries and Nine Explanations"
between Hsu Fu-yuan and Chou Ju-teng, Liu also emphasizes the goodness of the
mind and human nature. Taking the side of the former, he criticized the latter as
follows:
Even if [we admit that] Chou Ju-teng had profound explanations, they can
simple be taken as footnotes [to the explanations of] "the highest goodness" and
o ^
cannot be separated from the word shan.
To Liu, Chou Ju-teng's explanations of the "Four Negatives" verify the existence of
the "highest goodness" of the mind and human nature. Besides this general comment,
on many other occasions Liu also expresses opinions on the mind and human nature
that concern the ideas exposed in the debate on the "Nine Inquiries" and the "Nine
Explanations".
In brief, Liu expresses his close position to Hsu Fu-yuan and opposition to Chou
Ju-teng's position in three ways. First of all, Liu criticized the expression "The
absence of good and evil characterizes the highest goodness." He said:
Kao-tzu regarded human nature as neither good nor evil. Mencius effectively
rebutted him with the theory of "goodness". It is a definite conclusion [about
human nature] that has been well accepted for thousands of years. But nowadays
[how odd it is] that those people advocating the theory of "the absence of good
and evil" take Mencius' theory as their footnote.54
Obviously Liu took Hsu Fu-yiian's first inquiry as his assistance. He accused the
52 See ibid.
53
"Hui-lu", in ibid., p. 643.
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advocates of the theory of "the absence of good and evil" of contradicting Mencius'
theory of "the goodness of human nature".
Secondly, Liu emphasizes that there are objective good and evil. Liu said:
The moral principles in the world are all characterized by the presence of good
and the absence of evil. What we Confucians learn is simply to learn to do good
and get rid of evil. What we call the presence of good is the same as the absence
of evil, and vice versa.55
In Liu's opinion, not only are there objective good and evil, good and evil are
basically incompatible.
Thirdly, Liu considered that the doctrine of "the absence of good and evil" will
make the effort of doing good and getting rid of evil meaningless. Liu said:
Since [, as it is said,] there is no good, there is nothing deserving of doing good.
Since [, as it is said,] there is no evil, there is nothing deserving of getting rid of
evil. ... This will lead people in the world to lapse into frenzy and arrogance.
Even those who are determined to study are upset because they do not know
where to start [the process of moral cultivation]. They might lapse into
Buddhism or Taoism.56
In Liu's opinion, the theory of "the absence of good and evil" makes people wrongly
believe that there are no definite good and evil and renders them incapable of
distinguishing good from evil. They therefore will not know what to do and what not
to do. They are in danger of lapsing into Buddhism and Taoism for their nihilistic
attitude towards moral matters.
Although Liu took Hsii's side in the debate, he intended to make a
54
"Hsiieh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 519.
55 "Yii Lii-ssu shih" [Letters to Lii-ssu: the tenth one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 376.
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compromise between Hsu and Chou.37 This shows that there are some of Chou's
points Liu could agree with. First, as mentioned earlier, Liu agreed that the highest
goodness of the mind and human nature can be described as "the absence of good
and evil," though he considered the theory of "the absence of good and evil" as an
obstacle to his theory of "the highest good". Secondly, Liu agreed that doing good for
the sake of appearances is not right. He said:
It is always easy for us to raise a good nien ^ (thought) in the mind. Once we
CO
consider it seriously, we will find that it is burdensome.
Not only did he consider the arising of a good nien (thought) burdensome, he also
considered it evil. Using the metaphor of sand in the eye, Liu commented:
Not the tiniest speck of gold or silver should be allowed to enter the eye.
Anything that enters the eye is evil. What difference does it make if it be gold or
silver? Is this the reason that people advocate the theory of "the absence of
good"?59
Liu left the last question without an answer. Wang Yang-ming used the same
metaphor to describe doing good for the sake of appearances and his opposition to
it.60 Liu might have been inspired by Wang. Although Liu did not go so far as to use
the metaphor to sustain the doctrine of "the absence of good and evil", he agreed with
Wang in regarding doing good for the sake of appearances as evil. Therefore he had a
general comment on doing good for the sake of appearances as follows:
56 "Ta Lii-ssu erh" H [Reply to Lii-ssu: the second one], in ibid., p. 364.
57 See "Yii Lii-ssu shih", in ibid., pp. 376-7.
58
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"Hsueh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 532.
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The Way originally consists of nothing. If it contains anything, it is merely an
obstruction. In learning there is originally nothing that needs to be seized. If
[you think that] there is one thing that needs to be seized, it must be something
that will hurt your mind. For example, if one is learning simply in order to be
benevolent, he is not benevolent at all. If one is learning simply in order to be
righteous, he is not righteous at all. If one is learning simply in order to be in a
state of equilibrium, he is not in a state of equilibrium at all. If one is learning
simply in order to be tranquil, he is not tranquil at all.6'
It is in this sense that he once asserted: "The sage has no nien (thought). Once he has
nien, he is reckless." A student asked him immediately: "Is thinking of doing good a
nien, too?" Liu answers: "[Yes, for example,] thinking of becoming a sage is [a nien,
too]."62 In Liu's opinion, even the thought of becoming a sage is better to be
prevented.
To sum up Liu's comment on the debate on the "Nine Inquiries and Nine
Explanations" between Hsu Fu-yiian and Chou Ju-teng, Liu emphasizes the highest
goodness of the mind and human nature and shows concern about the confusion of
the distinction between good and evil which might be caused by the theory of "the
absence of good and evil." However, Liu also disapproved of mistaking the highest
goodness as doing good for the sake of appearances.
(D) Liu Tsung-chou's criticism of moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming'
followers
(i) General criticism
60 See CHL, p. 380; Instructions, Part III: 336, pp. 256-7.
61
"Hsiieh-yen shang", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 434.
227
Most modern scholars agree that the "arrogant men" advocating moral nihilism
Liu referred to are the members of the T'ai-chou School and the "prudish men"
advocating the mysticism Liu referred to are people like Wang Chi's followers.63 In
mentioning the roles Wan Ken, the leader of the T'ai-chou School, and Wang Chi
play in transmitting Wang Yang-ming's doctrine, Liu said:
In Yang-ming's school, both Wang Ken and Wang Chi preferred enlightenment
in their teachings and were called the Two Wangs. Although Wang Ken spoke
of enlightenment in an exalted and transcendent language, he did not depart
from the master's essential teachings. But Wang Chi regarded liang-chih
virtually as the Buddha-nature, desiring enlightenment in a vacuum, and ended
up playing mind games. It is possible to describe him as a man who carries a
spear into his own house."64
To Liu, the common characteristic of Wang Ken and Wang Chi is that they both
"preferred enlightenment in their teachings". Liu appeared to be in opposition to this
philosophical position. As mentioned in section 3 of chapter 3, in 1622 under Liu's
direction Tsou Yiian-piao and Feng Ts'ung-wu opened the Shou-shan Academy in
Peking. In lectures, Liu got involved in philosophical discussion with Tsou
Yuan-piao and Feng Ts'ung-wu. Tsou believed that the ability of understanding and
enlightening (chieh wu fPPfH) was most important for moral cultivation, whereas Feng
emphasized personal practice (kung-hsing as essential. Liu was on Feng's side
62
"Hsiieh-yen hsia", in ibid., p. 511.
63 Mou Tsung-san, Ts'ung Liu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan, pp. 297-8; Liu Shu-hsien "Lun
Wang Yang-ming te tsui-hou ting-lun" [On Wang Yang-ming's final
conclusion], in Liu Shu-hsien, Ju-chia ssu-hsiang i-han chih hsien-tai ch'an-shih lun-chi
[Essays of modern interpretations of the meaning of Confucian thought], (Taipei:
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 2000), p. 53; Huang Min-hao, Liu
Tsung-chou chi ch'i shen-tu che-hsiieh, pp. 100-3.
228
and wrote a preface to his sayings.65 Liu's opposition to the enlightenment approach
for moral cultivation was shown in this earlier experience. In this light, Liu seems to
be criticizing Wang Ken and Wang Chi for preferring enlightenment. However, to
Liu, it appears that Wang Chi deserved more criticism than Wang Ken, because
Wang Chi's concept of enlightenment was close to the Buddhist way.
(ii) Liu's criticism of Wang Chi
Liu condemned Wang Chi's transformation of Wang Yang-ming's "Four
Sentences of Teaching" as follows:
Wang Chi said: "The teaching of the "Four Positives" is a complex and
fragmented one." He had to transform the ["Four Sentences"] into the "Four
Negatives" before he could become content. But if there was no distinction
between good and evil, how could there be the mind, the will, knowledge, and
things? So he had also to move to the denial of the mind, the will, knowledge,
and things before he could consider this a profound teaching. But then, where
are the three words chih liang-chih (extending innate knowledge) made manifest?
Wang Chi alone awakened to the fact that nothingness referred to a separate
transmission outside the original teaching. Actually even this nothingness was
nothing.66
Liu seems to blame Wang Chi's doctrine of "Four Negatives" for bringing a mystical
interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge".
To Liu, Wang Chi's mystical interpretation led to moral nihilism:
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Without establishing being and nothingness, good and evil also disappeared. All
that remained was the ch'i (pneuma) of an empty spiritual consciousness,
which moves without being attached or detached to any one place. How could
this not make him fall into the trap of Buddhism? For the Buddhists have
abandoned worldly cares to concentrate only on samsara (transmigration). [For
them,] there is no evil to avoid and no good to perform. All that remains is the
really empty ground of nature where real consciousness may become manifest.
To gain enlightenment from this point of entry is the teaching of Ch'an
Buddhism. As for us Confucians who daily seek to understand nature and
destiny in the dharmas (Law) of this world, we are full of desires that appear and
disappear. In such a situation, if we speak of the absence of good and evil, we
are only making it easier for evil to become dominant.67
In Liu's idea, Wang Chi's interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of
Teaching" not only distorted Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge" but also led the doctrine close to Ch'an Buddhism, which considers that
good and evil do not exist objectively.
Liu once also elucidated the influence of Wang Chi's idea of the enlightenment
of the mind in general as follows:
To take the enlightenment of the mind as the essential of the investigation of
things ... will inevitably make people overestimate the inwardness and
underestimate the outwardness.... The thing he investigated is the one of
nothingness not the one we mean by the thing. The knowledge he extended is
the one of nothingness not the one we mean by the knowledge. Furthermore, the
will he made sincere and the mind he rectified are the will of nothingness and
the mind of nothingness not what we mean by the will and the mind. [And so]
the tasks of cultivating personal life, regulating the family, ordering the state,
and pacifying the world are all become empty.68
Liu blamed Wang Chi's emphasis on mental enlightenment for encouraging in others
a tendency to empty thinking without aiming at the real things and knowledge in the
world. He also found Wang Chi's influence among his contemporaries:
67 Ibid.
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Nowadays, scholars who decide to concentrate on thinking are mostly defective
in imagination. They regard moral principle as the reflection of a flower in a
mirror or the moon in water (ching-hua shui-yiieh £jtT£7jC,F|). They consider this
imagination a subtle enlightenment. [In reality] their fault is like those who
cherish fragmentary studies.69
In other words, people who regard moral principle as something unsubstantial
indulge in moral nihilism, while people who are defective in imagination indulge in
mysticism.
(iii) Liu's criticism of Wang Ken
In some ways, Liu was not as harsh on Wang Ken as he was on Wang Chi. Liu
praised Wang Ken's "Lo hsiieh ko" [Paean to enjoyment of learning] for its
passages on the experience of joyfulness shared by Confucius and Yen Hui (K'ung
Yen lo ch'u This joyfulness is an important issue in Neo-Confucianism,
starting from Chou Tun-i. As Ch'eng Hao recorded: "Formerly when [we] received
instructions from Chou Mao-shu jlOBciX (Chou Tun-i), he often told [us] to find out
wherein Confucius and Yen-tzu [Yen Hui] found their joy."71 As Wing-tsit Chan
[Ch'en Jung-chieh] PijlsSjt comments, "Neither Chou nor the Ch'eng brothers ever
indicated where Confucius or Yen-tzu found his joy. Neo-Confucianists were
68 "Yii Wang Hung-t'ai nien-yu", in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 357.
69 "Ta Lii-ssu wu" ilF® ® 2 [Replies to Lii-ssu: the fifth one], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, pp. 367-8.
70 "Hstin lo shuo" [Essay on searching for joy], in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 339-41; "Hsiieh-yen
shang", in ibid., pp. 440-1.
71
Ch'eng Hao fkSB and Ch'eng I fMEili, Erh Ch 'eng chi —fEiM [The works of the two Ch'eng
brothers] (Taipei: Han-ching wen-hua shih-yeh yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1983), chiian 2a, p. 16; Source
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enthusiastic in describing it in their own ways, such as extensive study of literature
and self-restraint with rules of conduct, self mastery, enjoying the Way, complete
elimination of selfish desires, following the principle of Heaven, and so forth."72
Wang Yang-ming also emphasized the transmission by Confucius and Yen Hui of
sages' learning. Many of Wang's disciples maintained that Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" was the direct transmission of
Confucius and Yen Hui's learning since it was lost two thousand years before.
As a Neo-Confucian master, Liu, like his forerunners, put forward his
interpretation on Confucius and Yen Hui's joyfulness in his essay entitled "Hsiin lo
shuo" IPIPcIS [Essay on searching for joy]:74
The ancient Confucians often told students to find out the source of Confucius
and Yen Hui's joyfulness. Where do they find joy? Some people said: "They
find joy in poverty." [I said:] "There is no joy in poverty." Some people said:
"They find joy in [pursuing] the Way." [I said:] "To say that Confucius and Yen
Hui find joy in [pursuing] the Way is to misunderstand them." There is no joy in
the Way after all. The secret (i.e. the source of Confucius and Yen Hui's
joyfulness) is extremely subtle. In master Wang Ken's "Lo hsiieh ko" he said:
"The human heart naturally enjoys itself, but one binds oneself by selfish desires.
When a selfish desire makes its appearance, innate knowing is still
self-conscious. Once there is consciousness of it, the selfish desire forthwith
disappears, so that the heart returns to its former joy." He also said: "Without
this joy it is not true learning; without this learning it is not true joy." He also
said: "To enjoy is to learn, to learn is to enjoy. Among the joys of this world
what compares to learning! What learning in the world compares to this joy!"
This can be called "killing two birds with one arrow". Enjoying and learning are
both achieved at the same time.75
Liu regarded Wang Ken as the best interpreter of the source of Confucius and Yen
Book, p. 531.
72 Source Book, p. 531.
73 Lu Miao-fen, op. cit., pp. 275-80.
74 "Hsiin lo shuo", in LTCCC, vol. 2, pp. 339-41.
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Hui's joyfulness.76
Liu pointed out that the most important aspect of Wang Ken's paean is the word
liang-chih (innate knowing).77 Liu said that Confucius and Yen Hui found their joy
in learning to distinguish lightness from non-rightness.78 However, "there is no
definite distinction between tightness and non-rightness. Only innate knowing is the
70
judge." He concluded: "Everybody has innate knowing. Everybody knows the
principle of Heaven. Everybody can enjoy this joy. Only those who are able to be
self-reflective and acquire the Way themselves can realize its secret."80 Liu also said:
"I think that it is easy to find the source of Confucius and Yen Hui's joyfulness, but it
is not easy to find joy in our own mind. Students should try to pursue in their own
mind to find their own joyfulness. To think about what is different between their own
joyfulness and Confucius and Yen Hui's joyfulness. After distinguishing the
difference we can clearly find our own joyfulness."81 In this way, Liu praised Wang
Ken's "Lo hsiieh ko" for pursuing "learning to get the Way oneself' (tzu-te chih
hsiieh
Wang Ken is regarded as "the one who carries forward most vigorously the idea
of the common man as sage in Confucian history." Although he was the son of a
salt maker and only had five years of instruction at the village school, and although
he never sought or attained the status of a Confucian scholar-official, Wang Ken was
75
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77 See ibid., p. 339.
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full of interest in learning and had self-confidence in becoming a sage.83 His doctrine
has been characterized as "learning to get the Way oneself' (tzu-te chih hsiieh).84
Wang Ken's praise of enjoyment in learning can be seen as advocating learning for
the sake of the self. In contrast to most scholars, who learn in pursuit of an official
status, Wang Ken is very unusual. As mentioned in section 1 of chapter 3, Liu had
intended to refuse taking the civil service examination in his youth, and he also
advocated learning for the sake of the self.
Liu also praised Wang Ken's interpretation of "the investigation of things" of
oc
the Great Learning. According to Wang Ken:
The investigation of things refers to the fact that things have roots and branches.
One's self (shen J^), the world, the state and the family all make up one
substance. In the doctrine of the investigation of things for extending knowledge,
the self is the root and the family, the state and the world are the branches.
Therefore, if in one's actions there is some deficiency, one must turn and look
for it within oneself. This reflexive moment is the fundamental effort in the
investigation of things. Should one wish to regulate one's family, order the state
and give peace to the world, one must first make the self secure. According to
the Book of Changes, "When the self is secure, the world, the state and the
family can be preserved." But when the self has yet to be made secure, the root
is not firmly established. Now, one who knows how to give security to the self
cannot but love and respect his self. One who loves and respects his self cannot
fail to love and respect others. If I am able to love and respect others, others
must love and respect me, and my self should be secure. In the same way, if the
entire family loves and respects me, then the family will be regulated. If the
entire state loves and respects me, then the state will be ordered. If the whole
world loves and respects me, then the world will be at peace. Therefore, should
others fail to love and respect me, it is not particularly a case of others' lacking
humanity (jen) or respect. Rather, it is my own lack of humanity and respect that
may be discerned.86
83 See Huang Tsung-hsi, "T'ai-chou hsiieh-an i", in MJHA, chiian 32, pp. 709-10; Wm. Theodore de
Bary, Learning for One's Self pp. 155-9.
84 Shimada Kenji, op. cit., p. 97.
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Wang Ken's interpretation is special in that he emphasized the role of the self as the
most important element in the doctrine of "the investigation of things". In his opinion,
the security of the self is the basis for regulating the family, ordering the family, and
pacifying the world.
This interpretation of "the investigation of things" was proposed in a lecture in
an academic conference held in Huai-nan titf!5].87 It became known to Huang
Tsung-hsi as the Huai-nan doctrine of "the investigation of things" [Huai-nan ko-wu
This doctrine appears to be Wang Ken's most definitive theory on
learning and was quoted as such by Huang Tsung-hsi in his conclusion to his essay
on Wang Ken's life and learning in the Ming-ju hsiieh-an,89 Huang Tsung-hsi made
a serious criticism of the Huai-nan doctrine as follows:
Wang Ken said, "To make secure both one's self and the mind is best. To make
secure only one's mind and not one's whole self is less good. To fail to make
secure either self or mind is worst." [In this sense] he is taking the singing bird
as model for securing the self. This will inevitably leave people to establish
opportunities for escaping from danger simply for securing life [without caring
about the rightness]."90
In Huang's opinion, Wang Ken appeared to put too much emphasis on securing the
bodily self and less on cultivating the mind of the self. According to Huang, this way
encouraged people to be selfish. Huang's comment may be related to his impression
86 Ibid.; Records, p. 176.
87 Lao Ssu-kuang, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih, vol. 3a, p. 512.
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of the behaviour of Wang Ken's disciples. In his introduction to the T'ai-chou School
Huang said: "Many of his (Wang Ken's) disciples could fight dragons and snakes
with their bare hands. By the time his teaching passed down to men like Yen Chun
and Ho Hsin-yin, it was no longer within the boundaries of Confucian moral
philosophy."91
Further evidence to substantiate Huang's concerns about the Huai-nan doctrine
is Wang's essay entitled "Ming-che pao-shen lun" [On clear wisdom
and self-preservation]:
Clear wisdom is innate knowing. To clarify wisdom and preserve the self
(shen HO is innate knowing and innate ability. Those who know how to preserve
the self will love the self like a treasure. If I can love the self, I cannot but love
other people; if I can love other people, they will surely love me; and if they
love me, my self will be preserved. ... If I respect my self, I dare not but respect
other people; if I respect other people, they will surely respect me; and if they
respect me, my self is preserved. If by this means I regulate the family, then I
can love the whole family, and if I love that family, they will love me; and if
they love me, my self is preserved. If by this means I rule a state, I can love the
whole state; if I love that state, the state will love me; and if the state loves me,
my self is preserved. Only when my self is preserved can I preserve the state. If I
only know how to preserve my self and do not know to love other men, then I
will surely seek only to satisfy my self, pursue my own selfish gain, and harm
others, whereupon they will retaliate and my self can no longer be preserved. ...
If I only know how to love others and do not know how to love my self, then it
will come to my body being cooked alive or the flesh being sliced off my thighs,
or to throwing away my life and killing my self, and then my self cannot be
preserved. And if my self cannot be preserved, with what shall I preserve my
prince and father?92
Lao Sze-kwang [Lao Ssu-kuang] ^©7^ observes that Wang Ken confused the two
History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1991), pp. 194-5.
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meanings of the self, one meaning the bodily self and the other meaning the moral
self. Wang Ken intended to emphasize the latter but was prone to refer it to the
former. This provoked criticism by Huang Tsung-hsi and others.93 Wm. Theodore de
Bary remarks: "When Wang Ken speaks of 'my body being cooked alive or the flesh
being sliced off my own thighs, throwing my life away', etc., he alludes to
extravagant gestures of self-sacrifice, and protests against a highly idealized view of
the self which called for heroic self-denial and an almost religious dedication to one's
ruler or parents, so contrary to man's natural instinct for self-preservation."94 He also
observes "a difference between Wang Ken and Wang Yang-ming which has
important implications for those who follow them. Wang Ken's conception of the
self is strongly physical—the bodily self or person. Wang Yang-ming's emphasis in
innate knowledge is on the mind, especially the identity with principle or nature."95
He concludes: "Liu Tsung-chou noted the crucial difference between Wang Ken and
Wang Yang-ming on this point and asked whether it did not portend the
abandonment of mind control and of the restraining influence of the mind over the
bodily desires."96
These observations explain the reason Huang Tsung-hsi criticized Wang Ken's
Huai-nan doctrine of "the investigation of things." However, these observations may
be modified by the following evidence, which exposes Wang Ken's reason for
writing the essay "Ming-che Pao-shen lun". In 1526, one of his friends Wang Yao-hu
University Press, 1999), vol. 1, p. 862.
93 Lao Ssu-kuang, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih, vol. 3a, p. 513.





EEW/S9 [?-?] was heading for Peking to take office in the government.97 One of his
biographies reports:
In October of the winter [of 1526], [Wang Ken] wrote "Ming-che pao-shen lun".
By then, most of his comrades in serving the government were either killed for
remonstrating or being exiled afar. The master [i.e. Wang Ken] thought that if
one cannot preserve one's self, he cannot take care of all things in the world.
Mainly because Yao-hu was heading for Peking, he wrote it as a present for
him."98
This record reveals that "Ming-che pao-shen lun" was written as advice for his friend
who was heading for Peking to take office in the government. In writing this treatise,
Wang Ken depicted friends who sacrificed themselves in serving the ruler. As
someone who had never sought or attained official status, Wang Ken doubted the
worth of being sacrificed in civil service. He said:
To participate in civil service is to pursue the Way. Some people have sacrificed
themselves in civil service. How good can it be for pursuing the Way if one
participates in civil service and sacrifices his self?99
Based on this view of civil service he also expressed his idea of political activity. He
said:
The self is a measure, and the world, states and families are each a square, We
adjust the measure to know whether the square is straight. Therefore we should
only care about the measure and certainly not seek the measure in the square.
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Once the measure is correct the square is straight.100
In his using this metaphor Wang Ken expressed a typical Confucian moral idealism,
which insists that the establishment of political order starts from the moral
cultivation of the self and that a good society is based on the goodness of the self.101
To some extent, Wang Ken's idea of political activity can be seen as an extreme
expression of this moral idealism.
Based on this moral idealism Wang Ken had a naive concept of ching-shih
(statecraft). He said: "The statecraft of the sage is like normal matters in daily life.
The rulers and the ministers in Yao and Shun's courts simply engaged in the
_ |
'discussion of learning' (chiang-hsiieh gjilfl)." In Neo-Confucianism the
"discussion of learning" is an important term. Chu Hsi "emphasized that learning
should proceed by discussion. He also applied this principle to the education of the
ruler. He considered that there is no better method than the discussion of all matters
and issues so that their good and evil implications are brought to light before
100
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decisions are made."103 Wang Ken inherited this idea from Chu Hsi and appeared to
extend it so far that he considered politics at court as identical to the "discussion of
learning". He therefore persuaded students to "learn before participating in
politics".104
He also believed that learning means to learn to be a teacher, to be a leader and
even to be a ruler.105 To Neo-Confucians, "the authority to which they gave
adherence was higher than the state, which saw itself as guardian of classical
exegesis, higher even than the classics. They relied primarily on their own authority,
as self-appointed interpreters of the sacred message.... For this reason, in the political
realm, they acted as moral judges of their sovereigns rather than as dutiful
ministers."106 Wang Ken, like his fellow Neo-Confucians, believed that a
scholar-official should be a moral judge to the ruler, and that the ruler and the
officials should be like partners. As he advised his disciple:
The personality of the ruler and ours are supposed to be different. This is very
natural without doubt. However, it is all up to us [whether we participate in civil
service or not]. There is a regular way to it. We should consider it (the regular
way) before we decide to participate in, not the opposite. If the ruler and the
ministers beg us, and hundreds of the officers recommend us, we can therefore
participate in civil service.... The Way I am pursuing can therefore be realized
and my participation in civil service is wise. ... If the ruler and the ministers do
not employ us, even if there are hundreds of officials recommending us, we may
participate in civil service by doing a job suitable to our status. ... Many
scholar-officials before us ignored this regular way. They participated in civil
service before considering this regular way. They therefore suffered
punishments. How can you not take it as advice?107
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To Wang Ken, participation in civil service should be for the realization of the Way.
The Way can only be realized under the condition that the scholar-officials and the
ruler are partners, and the scholar-official who is sacrificed without realizing the Way
is totally worthless. This is the reason why Wang Ken urged scholar-officials to
cultivate wisdom and practise self-preservation. To regard him as putting too much
emphasis on securing the bodily self seems to an over-simplification.
Wang Ken is a realist in taking self-preservation as a basis for ordering the
world. It is his moral idealism that brings Wang Ken close to Liu Tsung-chou. Like
Wang Ken, Liu believed that a scholar-official should be a moral judge to the ruler.
As mentioned in section 2 of chapter 3, in the reign of the Emperor Ch'ung-chen, Liu
tried many times to submit memorials or to advise the emperor in their meetings that
the emperor learn by the example of Yao and Shun how to rule the country through
benevolence and righteousness. He considered benevolence and righteousness
crucially important in all political affairs, claiming that military, financial and
domestic problems would be resolved if the emperor were to keep benevolence and
righteousness in mind. Ignoring the emperor's irritation, Liu tried to persuade him to
enact political reform through his own moral cultivation. To some extent, Liu acted
as a moral teacher to the emperor. Also, in his memorials he urged the emperor to
share power with the officials.108 Like Wang Ken, Liu saw the scholar-officials and
the ruler as partners. In this sense, Liu's ideal of political activity is very similar to
108 See "Tse nan chih i i chih chiin Yao Shun shu" [A memorial to ask the
emperor to pursuit the Way of Yao and Shun], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. pp. 61-7; "Mao ssu ch'en yen
k'ai kuang sheng hsin shu" [A memorial to persuade the emperor to open his
mind], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, pp. 83-6.
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Wang Ken's. Thus Liu gave high praise to Wang Ken's Huai-nan doctrine of the
investigation of things. As Liu commented:
Among the doctrines of the investigation of things propounded by Confucian
scholars, the Huai-nan doctrine ought to be regarded as the most correct one.
[Wang Ken] said: "In the doctrine of the investigation of things for extending
knowledge the self is the root and the family, the state and the world are the
branches." I would like to develop it as follows: "In the doctrine of the
investigation of things for extending knowledge making the will sincere is the
root, and rectifying the mind, regulating the family, ordering the state and
pacifying the world are the branches."109
Where Liu agrees with Wang Ken appears to be Wang's considering the self and the
whole world as one substance and taking the cultivation of the self as the starting
point for ordering the world. In this regard, Liu appeared to have no concern, as
Huang Tsung-hsi did, that the Huai-nan doctrine of "the investigation of things"
encouraged people to be selfish.
Once in a letter to one of his disciples Liu talked about the relation between
shen H' (the self) and the mind as follows:
Wherever shen Jsp lives in the mind is right there. This is absolutely right. You
should know that shen is not simply a body of seven inches. That which fills the
world is the mind. That which fills the world is shen. ... How can it be simply to
get knowledge from the bodily self of seven inches? Those who believe it is, I
am afraid that their intelligence is limited by their bodies. They will therefore
gradually bear selfish opinions in their minds.110
Liu obviously knew that the word "s7zen" means the bodily self to many people.
However, he would rather emphasize the intimate relation between "shen" and the
109
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mind, believing that shen, the mind and all things in the world are one substance.
This brings his idea of shen very close to Wang Ken's.
However, there is still a significant difference between Liu and Wang Ken on
the idea of shen. Given his own sacrifice for the fall of the Ming dynasty, Liu appears
to agree with the notion of sacrifice of the self in civil service. The reason that Liu
agreed with the notion of sacrifice of the self in civil service is probably because of
his concept of shen. Liu said: "Shen is situated inside the myriad things of the world.
It cannot be taken as one's private property."111 Given its emphasis on not regarding
shen as one's private property, Liu's idea of shen appeared to lead him away from
Wang Ken's position on the preservation of the self. Liu expressed his position more
clearly in an essay entitled "Sheng ssu shuo" QJ?tl& [On life and death]. After
condemning his contemporaries for preferring life to honour, Liu said:
Confucian learning takes all things in the universe as one substance. We
[therefore] see it (the one substance) as a great self (Ta shen-tzu The
birth of all things in the universe is the birth of my self. The death of all things
in the universe is the death of my self.112
By using the idea of the "great self', Liu was expressing the self-fulfillment of a
person in the universe. In this sense, Liu took the personal life as a part of the
universe.113 At the end of the essay, Liu urged people not to care about preserving
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their personal life but to care about pursuing the Way.114 This shows the basic
difference between Liu and Wang Ken on the preservation of the self. This basic
difference is also exposed in Liu's interpretation of the Great Learning. Liu said:
The teaching of the Great Learning is simply to teach people to know the root.
The root of the state and the world resides in shen. The root of shen resides in
the mind. The root of the mind resides in the will. The will is what the highest
good abides in.115
What Liu emphasized about the self is, again, the will of the self. This also explains
why, after praising the Huai-nan doctrine of "the investigation of things" as the most
correct among other competing doctrines, Liu developed it with taking "making the
will sincere" as the root for the doctrine of "the investigation of things". In Liu's
opinion, the will is more essential than the self in the doctrine of "the investigation of
things." It is "making the will sincere" not the preservation of the self that is essential
for the teaching of the Great Learning. What Liu agreed with regarding Wang Ken's
taking the self so seriously was his taking the self as the responsibility of the family,
the state and the world.
To sum up, Liu praised Wang Ken for seeing the self and all things in the world
as one substance. However, as a man without experience in civil service, Wang Ken
naively considered that scholar-officials, in serving the ruler, can order the world
through the cultivation of the self and the discussion of learning, believing that since
the self is the basis for ordering the world, clear wisdom and self-preservation should
be taken as essential. Thus there is no need, and it is unwise, to sacrifice oneself in
114
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civil service. In contrast, Liu, as an experienced scholar-official, was deeply
immersed in the political movement initiated by the Tung-lin party. He was much
influenced by the passion of the members of the Tung-lin party "giving their blood to
purify Heaven and Earth."116 Liu's belief in the self and the world as one substance
takes him in the opposite direction from Wang Ken. In contrast to Wang Ken, Liu
took the Way as essential in ordering the world. He himself practised self-sacrifice by
refusing food after the fall of the Ming dynasty, claiming that his death was "seeking
benevolence and getting benevolence."117
Although Liu gave great praise to Wang Ken's Huai-nan doctrine, he criticized
it as flawed, because it failed in seeing the mind, the will, knowledge, things, the self,
the family, the state and the world as a whole.118 This comment appears to be at odds
with Liu's former appraisal. It probably is based on the above-mentioned difference
between Liu and Wang Ken that Liu showed his dissatisfaction with Wang Ken's
doctrine sometimes.
Given this dissatisfaction, Liu thought about the bad influence Wang Ken's
doctrine might have on his T'ai-chou followers. Liu said:
Among Wang Yang-ming's disciples, Wang Ken in particular propagated his
teaching far and wide. Starting from the teaching of "without learning, without
reflection" he moved to the subject of the natural and then of the joy of learning.
The latter-day followers of his school increased in number. However, they were
mediocre men without inhibitions.119
116 This is an expression used by Huang Tsung-hsi to describe the sacrifice of the members of the
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The term "without learning, without reflection" is from Mencius. It originally refers
to an innate moral intuition and an innate moral ability.120 "But Wang Ken
interpreted this to mean that learning and reflection are superfluous in
self-cultivation."121 What Liu condemned as "mediocre men without inhibitions"
might be the same as the arrogant men he criticized in his "Cheng-hsiieh tsa-chieh".
(iv) Liu's criticism of T'ao Shih-ling and the scholars of Mount Po-ma
In 1631, Liu shared the instructors' chair with T'ao Shih-ling in the Cheng-jen
Hui iSAl!" [Association for realizing humanity] to promote Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge". It assembled over two hundred
scholars.122 However, "their teachings were not the same,"123 and the assembly was
therefore divided into two parties. According to Huang Tsung-hsi:
T'ao's disciples studied Buddhism, meeting separately on Mount Po-ma, and
went into such things as causation and retribution (karma, yin kuo HJfl). ... I did
not like what T'ao said, so together with Wang Yeh-hsiin and Wang Yii-ch'i 3i
[?-?] I gathered together some forty choice scholars of the time, to become
Liu's disciples. Although these forty or more people liked to attack Buddhism,
they did not have much foundation for their learning and remained superficial.
Thus they only provided excuses for those who studied Buddhism to do so. Liu
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was anxious about this. As the two factions mocked each other, there were only
one or two persons who really transmitted his teachings.124
This indicates that most of Liu's contemporaries were influenced by Buddhism, Liu
being an exception. Liu's resistance to the trend was weak, as shown in the following
passage:
Master T'ao Shih-ling of my hometown is well respected by our comrades.
However, he starts his learning with the aid of Buddhism. [Therefore] most of
those who follow his teaching regard Ch'an Buddhism as the basis [of their
learning]. It turns out that they cannot return to the right way in the end. This is
a defect of [T'ao's teaching], I often have different opinions from master T'ao.
Maybe by the time his theory reaches a dead end he may return to the right way.
125 ^I am not sure [if it will happen like that].
Liu appeared to regret the difference between himself and T'ao Shih-ling. Although
he expected that T'ao and his followers might change their opinions, he did not see
himself as able to persuade them to change.126
The basic difference between the teaching of T'ao and Liu is that T'ao
considered recognizing the original substance of the mind as essential in moral
127
cultivation, while Liu considered the effort of cultivation as more essential. In
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criticizing T'ao's doctrine, Liu said:
Indeed, if one cannot recognize the original substance, how can he make an
effort? But once one recognizes the original substance, one should seize it
firmly and make an effort. The more delicate one make his effort, the more
bright and clear his original substance become. Now [T'ao] said that after
recognizing the original substance one has nothing to do and may behave
without any limitation. In that case, [people in following his teaching] will
become wild and arrogant. They will be afraid of nothing at all.128
In Liu's opinion, T'ao's teaching will lead people to the moral nihilism mentioned in
his "Cheng-hsueh tsa-chieh." Liu also criticized T'ao's teaching as a sort of
mysticism. In his response to one of T'ao's disciples, who, in defense of T'ao's
doctrine, insisted that recognizing the original substance is itself a sort of effort
towards cultivation, Liu said:
Recognizing [the original substance] after all belongs to imagination. Even
though one may sometimes acquire something in recognizing, the thing he
acquires is only a mirage. One should not consider it a definite truth.
Furthermore, the original substance only exists in normal activities in daily life.
If one dismisses normal activities and considers that there is a thing elsewhere
that needs to be recognized, he is merely searching for the Way in emptiness.129
To Liu, what we can acquire from recognizing the original substance of the mind is
simply a mirage, which also proves that T'ao's doctrine is prone to lapse into
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid, pp. 601-2.
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mysticism.
To Liu, moral nihilism and mysticism are connected to Ch'an Buddhism. Liu
said:
Ch'an Buddhists take "the absence of good and evil" as the main theme of their
doctrines. Moral principles, such as loyalty, filiality, honour and rightness
belong to the part of goodness. They consider them as obstacles to their
1 "30
doctrines and intend to erase them to return to the scene of emptiness.
In this passage, Liu claimed that the Ch'an Buddhist doctrine of "the absence of good
and evil" is responsible for moral nihilism in dismissing moral principles and for
mysticism in intending to return to a mystical scene of emptiness. As mentioned
earlier, Liu considered that Wang Chi's doctrine of "the absence of good and evil"
came from Ch'an Buddhism. Wang Chi's doctrine of "the absence of good and evil"
again became the focus of Liu's attacks on moral nihilism and mysticism of T'ao
Shih-ling and the scholars of Mount Po-ma.
Although T'ao Shih-ling never expressed his opinion on the doctrine of "the
absence of good and evil" and the debates on it, there is indirect evidence to show
that he believed in it. According to Tung Huang-t'ing JrIffl [?-?], one of T'ao's
disciples, T'ao once told him: "You, Huang-t'ing, are originally a sage as a human
i -j i
being. What good can you do? What evil can you get rid of?" He said this in order




good and getting rid of evil, as essential for cultivation.132 T'ao's comment can be
regarded as an expression of the doctrine of "the absence of good and evil". Also,
according to Liu Chuo and Huang Tsung-hsi, T'ao had a direct relation with the
transmission of Wang Chi's and Chou Ju-teng's doctrines. One of T'ao's main
disciples, Chin Hung-yu, showed his agreement with Chou Ju-teng on the debate on
"Nine Inquiries and Nine Explanations".134
The above shows that T'ao and his disciples were prone to accept the doctrine
of "the absence of good and evil." In this sense, Liu's criticism of moral nihilism and
mysticism referred to a trend of thought that lasted from Wang Chi through Chou
Ju-teng to T'ao Shih-ling and the scholars of Mount Po-ma.
As mentioned in section 3 of chapter 2, some early Ch'ing scholars, such as Ku
Yen-wu and Fang I-chih, confronded with the tragedy of the decline of the Ming
dynasty, considered the development of Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind as a
cause of Ming dynastic decline. To some extent, Liu Tsung-chou's criticism of Wang
Yang-ming's followers for indulging in moral nihilism and mysticism anticipated the
criticisms of these early Ch'ing scholars.
(E) Liu Tsung-chou's scheme for moral reformation
In his criticism of "arrogant men" and "prudish men" in his "Cheng-hsiieh
tsa-chieh" Liu concluded: " [They] are defective in being not sincere and are careless
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in pursuing [the Way] in i-ken ;§© (the root of the will)."135 Liu defined the term
i-ken by relating it to the cultivation of the highest goodness of human nature as
follows:
The root of the will (i ken) is the subtlest [element of the mind]. The substance
of sincerity is in accordance with the principle of Heaven. What is in accordance
with the principle of Heaven is the highest goodness. It is in making the subtlest
[element] become the highest good that we achieve the state of "abiding in the
highest goodness" [in the Great Learning] ,136
Liu emphasized that the goodness of the will is the guarantee of the goodness of
human nature. It is through the cultivation of the root of the will that one can realize
the highest goodness of his nature. Liu also tries to take his doctrine of "making the
will sincere" to interpret and substitute Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension
of innate knowledge". Liu said:
The task of "extending innate knowledge" is not different from that of "making
the will sincere". It can only be accomplished through the task of "making the
will sincere". Once it is a step away from the root of the will (i ken), there
cannot be any possibility of "extending innate knowledge".137
With this interpretation of "the extension of innate knowledge", Liu regarded the root
of the will as the most important element in realizing Wang's doctrine. Liu believed
that both the arrogant men, who confused innate knowledge with emotions and
consciousness, and the prudish men, who mistook innate knowledge for mysticism,
disregarded the root of the will. He considered this as a sign of distortion of Wang
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Yang-ming's doctrine. To defend against the moral decay induced by these men, the
cultivation of the root of the will, or "making the will sincere", becomes the most
essential task.
The task of "making the will sincere" closely relates to the task of "being
vigilant in solitude" in Liu's moral philosophy. According to Liu: "The Way of the
Great Learning resides only in 'making the will sincere.' The effort of 'making the
will sincere' resides only in 'being vigilant in solitude.' The will is the place where
the highest goodness abides. It is so unique without any distraction that it is called
solitariness."138 As Tu Wei-ming tiffin observes: "Liu considers 'vigilant
solitariness' the best approach to self-cultivation. The elaborate project of correcting
mistakes in his seminal treatise, Schematic ofMan (Jen-p'u), can thus be interpreted
as his strategy for learning to be human by putting 'vigilant solitariness' into practice
1 OQ
as a daily ritual." In other words, Liu's Jen-p'u can be seen as his basic project for
achieving moral reformation.
Jen-p'u starts with a chart named "Jen-chi t'u" [The Diagram of the
Human Ultimate], which was based on Chou Tun-i's "T'ai-chi t'u" to describe the
important role human beings play in the universe.140 After the general description of
human beings' basic moral ability, Liu stated the essential theme of realizing
humanity [Cheng-jen yao-chih l§A^s], including: "Dwelling in secluded
retirement in order to experience the self in solitude"; "Divining the movement of
thought in order to recognize incipient tendencies"; "Exercising caution in one's
137 Ibid., p. 525.
138 "Tu Ta-hsueh", in LTCCC, vol. 3b. p. 1182
139 Tu Wei-ming, "Subjectivity in Liu Tsung-chou's philosophical anthropology", p. 114.
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bearing in order to follow the decree of Heaven" ; "Strengthening the basic human
relationship in order to crystallize the Way"; "Making complete the hundred practices
in order to investigate one's conduct comprehensively"; and "Changing to good and
reforming faults in order to become a sage."141 All the six themes concentrate on
personal cultivation. With the realization of these six essential themes one can
scrutinize one's daily behaviour and correct faults. Next to these six essential themes,
Liu provided only one method for the prosecution of bad deeds. That is the practice
of sitting in meditation. In this sense, Jen-p'u can be seen as the basic guide for
personal cultivation.
Liu also urged scholars to attend lectures to cultivate morality collectively. The
Cheng-jen hui was founded by Liu for this purpose. He wrote a constitution for the
Cheng-jen hui to set out the rules for its operation and regulate the members'
behaviour.142 According to Liu's biography, Jen-p'u was originally named
Cheng-jen shiao p'u [Pamphlet for realizing humanity],143 and is said to
be used as a guide to self-cultivation for the members of Cheng-jen hui.144 Given
Jen-p'u as the basic guide for personal cultivation, Cheng-jen hui yiieh
[Constitution for the members of the association for realizing humanity] can be seen
as moral rules in public life.
The Cheng-jen hui yiieh consists of five parts: the main theme of learning, the
rules of the association, the main contracts, the main prohibitions, and a note on the
140 See "Jen-p'u", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 3.
141
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(1) The main theme of learning describes the purpose of learning as realizing
humanity through learning the classics.145
(2) The rules of the association are divided into seven parts. The first part is the
timetable of meetings. According to the timetable, the members meet three days a
month. The meeting begins at nine in the morning and ends at twelve noon. It also
describes the basic qualification for joining the association. Basically it welcomes
people of all sorts of occupations and classes. However, it divides the members into
long-term members and occasional participants. The second part is the ritual for the
meeting. An altar is set up for worshipping Confucius. At the beginning of the ritual,
they pay homage to Confucius first and then to many ancient worthies. After the
ritual, members are seated according to age. Then the lecture starts. The third part is
the lectures. Two special seating areas are set aside: one for the lecturer and recorder
and the other for appointed questioners. A public seating area is set aside for the
general audience. The fourth part is membership fees. They allow members to
contribute as they please in order to keep a meeting running. Normally the fees are
paid at each meeting for the necessary appliances, like joss sticks and candles, for the
ritual and tea, cakes and fruits as refreshments. The fifth part is the record of the
meetings. At every meeting, they elect one member as the recorder to record the
general content of the lecture and the questions. The sixth part is the prohibitions of
the meeting. They prohibit nonsense talk, grinning cheekily, sitting cross-footed,
whispering to each other, mentioning personal promotion or demotion, and rumours
about the society. The seventh part is about the staff. Ten members are elected as
staff for keeping the association in operation.146
(3) The main contracts are ten in number. The first one urges the members to
have confidence in their own potential to be a sage. This confidence also implies
psychological tension in the self because Liu emphasized in this contract that "once
one is not able to become a sage there is no other level of man he can become except
a mean person. [In brief,] Once one is away from sagehood, he is close to madness.
Once one is not human, he becomes a beast. There is not a hair's breadth in
between."147 Liu also emphasized learning from books as essential for learning to be
a sage. In answering a question "on what basis can one have confidence of the self's
potential to be a sage?" Liu said: "Learning from books is the basis. It is from
learning from books we know that every sage and worthy become what they are
simply because they devote their efforts to learning from books." In a further
elaboration of the importance of learning from books Liu said:
The ancient Confucians took learning from books as the essential for the task of
"the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge". The Confucians
of recent generations avoid this counsel and only count on innate knowing. ...
Can learning from books be dismissed? It certainly cannot be dismissed.
Although innate knowing cannot be limited by hearing and seeing, it cannot be
separated from hearing and seeing. Learning from books is the best of the
activities of hearing and seeing. When you ask what good is and what evil is,
everybody knows what they are in some sense. As to how to do good and get rid
of evil, nobody knows exactly how to do this. One day I was reading a book by
an ancient sage, and I found that the ancient sage also worried about this
question. Suddenly I was inspired and burst out into tears. I realize that I was not
qualified to be human previously. [With this reflection] I then realized that the
task of doing good and getting rid of evil is very easy for everybody."148
145






Although Liu asked members to be confident about their potential to be sages, he did
not assure that they would definitely become sages in reality. Confucian believers of
the Mencian theory of "the goodness of human nature" basically have this regard in
their mind.149 Liu is no exception to this. This is the reason that, in urging members
to have confidence in their own potential, Liu also emphasized the importance of
learning from books as essential for cultivation.
The second contract urges members to realize that innate knowledge as the basis
for learning to be a sage resembles the natural feeling of an infant's love for its
family. Liu concluded: "Scholars who intend to realize the essence of human nature
should simply and practically cultivate it (innate knowledge) rather than pursuing
something mystic. The word liang-chih is the main theme of Mencius' theory of the
goodness of human nature."150
The third contract urges members to extend their love of their family to their
relatives, friends, neighbours and step by step to all people in the world. Liu reminds
members not to have selfish minds. He suggests that once one can recall innate
knowledge the selfish mind will be under control.151
The fourth contract urges members to distinguish righteousness from profit. Liu
insisted that once one can distinguish the difference between human and beast




149 See Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality, pp. 72-3; Benjamin I Schwartz, The World of
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The fifth contract urges members be cautious of material temptations. In this
regard Liu suggested that overcoming the self was essential. He believed that
overcoming the self was a ceaseless task for moral cultivation. He says: "There is
someone I know who even took as long as twenty years simply to overcome the word
'anger'." He therefore suggests that members should patiently practise overcoming
the self.153
The sixth contract urges members to learn the rites. Liu maintained that it is
learning the rites that distinguishes humans from beasts. He believed that there are
countless rites that need to be learned. One should start from the rites for children
and go on to those for adults in order to become a complete person.154
The seventh contract urges members to be cognizant of their status as scholars,
and always to keep their honour in mind.155
The eighth contract urges members to be careful about the influence of bad
habits. Liu observed that thousands of evils come from bad habits.156
157
The ninth contract urges members to act as they say they mean to do.
The tenth contract urges members to have the courage to admit their faults. Liu
asked members to supervise each other to correct faults. He hoped that people would
correct their faults by mutual persuasion. Those who do not correct their faults by
mutual persuasion will be deprived of their membership. Serious faults may be
158attacked by other members.












(4) There are twelve categories of prohibitions: unfiliality, unfriendliness,
greediness, official corruption, over-tolerance to female relatives, licentiousness,
reckless talking, irascibility, drunkenness, extravagance, debauchery, inappropriate
appearance. Fifty types of evil deeds are also included in these twelve categories.
Punishments are divided into three kinds. The most serious one is expulsion from the
association. The second one is to be asked to stay at home refusing visitors, being
barred from one meeting, and sitting in meditation to reflect on faults and correct
them immediately. When the offender is allowed to return to meetings, he is asked to
donate a book to the association, and supply soup and cakes as refreshment at one
meeting. The third punishment is to be asked not to attend one meeting and sit in
meditation to reflect on faults and correct them immediately. When allowed to return
to the meetings, the offender is asked to donate a book to the association.159
Under these categories of prohibition, many common activities are prohibited,
such as going to the theatre, watching boat races, attending temple festivals, using
slang, using nicknames, and writing folk songs, legends or fiction: these deserve the
second punishment.160 Prohibitions concerning women include allowing one's wife
and daughters to enter a temple, to worship deities, to go to the theatre, to watch
lantern festivals, to study poetry, to learn to write books, and to leam music and chess;
such members deserve to be barred from the association.161 The prohibitions were
159
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originally thirty in number. They were increased to fifty because Liu thought that the
previous thirty were not strict enough.162 All of the prohibitions can be taken as
evidence confirming Liu Tsung-chou's reputation for moral Puritanism, as some
modern scholars have described.163
(5) In the note on the constitution, Liu recorded the reason for founding the
association. He considered that the association was a step in following Wang
Yang-ming's teaching. Liu observed that T'ao Shih-ling was enthusiastic in
propounding the theory that people have the potential to be sages. They therefore
took the name Cheng-jen A [realizing humanity] as the name of the association to
encourage people to realize the potential for humanity to become a sage. At the end
Liu said: "The scholars of the Confucian School refine their doctrines to 'being
vigilant in solitude.' Master Yang-ming also said: 'innate knowledge is simply
knowledge in solitude.' They are saying the same thing. 'Being vigilant in solitude' is
'extending innate knowledge'."164 Liu was trying to merge Wang Yang-ming's
doctrine and his own doctrine as a guide for members' moral cultivation.
To sum up, given his emphasis on the practice of sitting in meditation,
overcoming the self, learning from books, learning the rites, promoting the theory of
"the goodness of human nature" and so on in Jen-p'u and Cheng-jen hui yiieh, Liu's
scheme for moral reformation reflects his revision of Ch'en Hsien-chang and Wang
Yang-ming's doctrines and his criticism of Wang Yang-ming's followers. The above
classics in Ming] (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 1996), pp.
485-516.
162 See "Hui-lu", in LTCCC, vol. 2, p. 647.
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practices encompass Liu Tsung-chou's reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism.
To some extent, given his reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism, Liu's
scheme for moral reformation also can be seen as a plan to put Neo-Confucian moral
philosophy into practice. In this sense Liu represented the end of the custom of
philosophical discussion in late Ming Neo-Confucianism and the beginning of the
popularization of practical learning in early Ch'ing scholarship, as mentioned in the
introduction.
Besides the above-mentioned scheme of moral cultivation, a trend of thought,
which Liu opposed, should be noticed as an obstacle to his scheme. As mentioned
earlier, the scholars of Mount Po-ma studied Buddhism and went into such things as
causation and retribution {karma). The Cheng-jen hui was thereby divided. These
scholars especially were influenced by Yiian Huang's idea of the ledgers of merit and
demerit for moral cultivation, which is the most popular form for promoting the
Buddhist theory of karma,165 The Buddhist theory of karma is a great challenge to
Liu's scheme for moral reformation. Liu made the criticism that Yuan Huang's idea
of the accumulation of merits was based on an utilitarian reason that is harmful to the
Confucian Way.166 Therefore "Liu wrote the Jen-p'u in alarm at the growing
popularity of Yiian's work and the proliferation of new ledgers based on his system
and sanctioned by other literati."167 However, the influence of Buddhism on the
scholars of Mount Po-ma was increasingly popular. Liu decided in the end not to
argue with them.168
165 „Yij Lii-ssu shih", in LTCCC, vol. 3a, p. 377.
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Although Liu criticized the Buddhist theory of karma, he sometimes felt obliged
to express a tolerant attitude towards it. One of Liu Tsung-chou's uncles, Liu Ch'i
MPt [?-?], wrote a "Ch'iian shan wen" HfrHrjyC [Essay to urge good deeds]. It was
collected by Liu Tsung-chou as one of his family's "Tsu-hsun" [Ancestral
instructions], and Liu wrote a postscript to it. In this "Ch'iian shan wen" Liu Ch'i
recalled a story he heard from his teacher in his youth. A man named Lu Yen-shan H
Hell] dreamt that he had been to hell and met the King of Hell [Yama], who turned
out to be Wang Yang-ming. While Lu was chatting with Wang, a man was arrested
by an armed King's runner. Lu discovered that the arrested man was one of his
nephews. Lu asked the King to release him. The King replied that the nephew had
done so much evil in his life that he deserved to be taken to hell. After Lu woke up
the next morning, he wondered if the dream would come true. He therefore asked his
son to visit the nephew. The son was told that the nephew had suddenly suffered a
serious disease the previous night and died at noon. Liu Ch'i used this story to tell
people in the world that doing good will be rewarded with good and evil with evil,
and urged people to do good to protect themselves from evil consequences.169
Liu Ch'i's story appeared to involve the Buddhist theory of karma. Liu
Tsung-chou considered that Liu Ch'i's teaching is contradictory to the instructions of
the first ancestor of the Liu family of the Ming dynasty Liu Chin Mil [?-?].170
According to the Liu family's "Tsu-hsun", Liu Chin admonished his family not to
169
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become involved in Buddhism.171 Liu Tsung-chou felt that Liu Ch'i's story was
strange, but since it was intended to urge people to do good, he decided to keep it as
one of the instructions for the family. In his postscript, he made seven points to
expose his reservations. First, he doubted the existence of the King of Hell and the
notion of a division between Heaven and Hell. He suggested that they are made up by
Buddhists. Secondly, Liu explained that the reason that Wang Yang-ming figured as
the King of Hell was because Wang liked to talk about innate knowledge. Liu quoted
Wang's saying "Innate knowledge is the spirit of creation,"172 and asserted that
innate knowledge, rather than faith in spirits [kuei shen jlLW], was the key to
becoming master of one's destiny. According to Liu: "Since everybody has this
innate knowledge, everybody is a spiritual being. Since everybody is a spiritual being,
everybody is [the master of] karma." Thirdly, what Lu Yen-shan saw in his dream is
not Wang Yang-ming. Because Lu, like everyone in the world, has innate knowledge,
he thought he had seen Wang Yang-ming as the King of Hell. Fourthly, Liu assumed
that by the time the nephew was dying he must also have seen Wang Yang-ming
because everybody has innate knowledge. Fifthly, Liu quoted a popular saying that
"God is watching three feet above everyone's head" [chii t'o san ch'ih yu shen-ming
Hf]]. Sixthly, Liu suggested people who have done evil should believe
that the Buddhist theory of karma is true. Lastly, Liu concluded that in writing this
"Ch'iian shan wen" Liu Ch'i provided instructions for moral cultivation. This is why
he considered it worthy of preserving. However, he was still concerned that people
171 "Sui-an fu-chiin chia-hsiin" [The family instructions by Liu Chin], in LTCCC, vol.
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would put too much emphasis on the theory of karma m
To sum up, Liu was trying to use Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension
of knowledge" to give the story an explanation and deter people from believing the
Buddhist theory of karma. However, Liu did not totally dismiss the theory in the end.
The reason that Liu tolerated the belief in the Buddhist theory of karma may be
due to the influence of his teacher Hsu Fu-yiian. As mentioned earlier, in his debate
on "Nine Inquiries and Nine Explanations" with Chou Ju-teng, Hsu adopted the
theory of karma to strengthen his own position. Liu might have been influenced by
Hsu. The other reason for Liu's tolerance may be his view on the similarity and
differences between Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Liu accepted Wang
Yang-ming's opinion on this issue and quoted his sayings:
[Wang Yang-ming said:] "What the Buddhist calls one's original state is what
our Confucian school calls innate knowledge", "In broad outline the two
methods [of Confucians and Buddhists on recognizing one's original state] are
about the same. However, the Buddhists are different from us because their
minds are motivated by selfishness", and "The Buddhist escapes from human
relations and dismisses the principle of things. Therefore, they cannot be
regarded as understanding the mind."174
Liu agrees with Wang that Confucians and Buddhists share the same idea of the
human's original state and the way to recognize it, and they are different in that
Buddhists search for escape from worldly life while Confucians strive to deal with it.
With this basic point of view Liu sometimes was tolerant to those who
indulging in Buddhism, take Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge"
173
"Yii-yii fu-chtin ch'uan shan wen", in LTCCC, vol. 4, pp. 561-2.
174
"Ta Wang Chin-ju san" [Replies to Wang Chin-ju: the third], in LTCCC, vol. 3a, pp.
405-6.
263
as their counterpart. He said:
Nowadays, those who indulge in Buddhism like to talk about master Yang-ming
simply because they think the doctrine of "the extension of innate knowledge" is
close to the Buddhist doctrine of "[recognizing] the clear consciousness of
human nature". Therefore, they cannot help but believe in his doctrine in order
to increase their number. This is why Buddhist adherents pretend to be fond of
talking about innate knowledge, too. ... Once they realize the doctrine of "the
extension of innate knowledge" and pursue [the Way] with innate knowing for a
long time, they will probably see something substantial. By then, even though
they never stop talking about Buddhist theory and never leave the Buddhist
175
temple, their mind awakes and becomes a Confucian mind.
Liu appeared to be confident that Wang's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge" could be the savior of Buddhist adherents. It is Liu's confidence in
Wang's doctrine that makes him tolerate the popularization of Buddhism.
On the other hand, the popularization of Buddhism and Taoism was so powerful
that Liu appeared to have sensed it. He lamented:
Asking scholars nowadays to leam the sagely Way is like asking them to enter
through closed doors, if you do not allow them to learn Buddhism and Taoism.
If you give a man who is drowning a gourd, the gourd can be seen as a piece of
driftwood.176
In Liu's mind, Buddhism and Taoism, though not perfect, are temporary tools for
helping scholars to access the Confucian Way. Therefore, to him, no Confucian of his
time could afford to dismiss Buddhism and Taoism. However, he pointed out:
What is worrying is that scholars do not study the Buddhist canon sincerely.
175 "Ta Hu Sung-kao Chu Mien-chih Chang Tien-fu chu sheng"
[Reply to disciples Hu Sung-kao, Chu Mien-chih and Chang Tien-fu], in ibid., pp. 410-1.
176 '"pa Wang Chin-ju san", in ibid., p. 406.
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Once they study the Buddhist canon sincerely, they will become dissatisfied
with Buddhist doctrine. Then they will start to realize the greatness of the sagely
Way. If this is so, how can Buddhism hurt Confucians? It is like treating a
disease. If it is a small disease, it can be cured in a normal way, but if it is a
i nn
serious disease, it must be treated seriously.
Liu was so confident about Confucianism that he could tolerate Buddhism. It is for
this reason that he expected that the difference between himself and T'ao Shih-ling
would be solved. In 1636, Liu even recommended T'ao for promotion, praising T'ao
as a real master of Neo-Confucianism.178 He also urged his disciples not to become
involved in debate with T'ao's disciples:
[As my disciple] you must be full aware of the distinctions between
Confucianism and Buddhism. It is up to others whether or not they choose to
acknowledge them. If you [my disciples] behave in accordance with
Confucianism and reject Buddhism, why bother worrying whether Buddhist
170
adherents will escape from Buddhism and return to Confucianism?
However, the debate between his disciples and T'ao's did not reach any final
agreement. Liu's attitude towards the debate, on the one hand exposes his confidence
and open-mindedness, while on the other hand it reflects the situation of his time:
Buddhism was popular that it seemed difficult to find a solution for both sides of the
debate.
It appears that Liu could not afford to be in total opposition to Buddhism.
Although he was worried about people's belief in kamia, since it still had the effect
of urging people to do good and remove evil, he tended to be tolerant of it on some
177 Ibid.
178 "Chien T'ao Shih-ling kung chieh" [A memorial in recommending T'ao
Shih-ling], in ibid., pp. 347-9.
179 "Ta Wang sheng Shih-mei", in ibid., p. 413.
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occasions. This tolerance can be seen as part of a trend of Liu's time. With Wang
Ken's advocating the doctrine that common people can be sages and the rise of the
180
T'ai-chou School, a kind of popularized Confucianism began to flourish. To the
members of the T'ai-chou School, as Wm. Theodore de Bary remarks, "Wang
Yang-ming's innate knowing represented the fulfillment of 'getting it (the Way)
oneself and 'learning for the sake of the self,' and the obligation to propagate it
among the uneducated mass was the personal responsibility of the heroic
individual."181 Stimulated by this trend, many of the late Ming literati adopted
responsibility for popular education. Figures such as Ho Hsin-yin, Lin Chao-en
[San-i chiao-chu H—W&, 1517-98], Lii Kun QfEjt [Shu-chien 1536-1618]
and Yuan Huang were enthusiastic in spreading the Confucian ethic in accessible
1 89
ways for lower social strata, although they all adopted different approaches. As
mentioned earlier, although Liu Tsung-chou had criticized Wang Ken, he praised his
ideas on the enjoyment of learning and pursuing "learning for the sake of the self."
Liu was easily involved in this trend towards popularized Confucianism, and his
180 Tso Tung-ling TnfLfM, Wang-hsiieh yii chung-wan Ming shih-jen hsin-t'ai k a">
S! [Wang Yang-ming's doctrine and the mentality of the literati in the middle and late Ming] (Peking:
Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 2000), p. 360.
181 Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal tradition in China, p. 79.
182 For studies of these Confucian literati's activities in spreading the Confucian ethic, see Ronald
Dimberg, op. cit., pp. 99-118; Judith A. Berling, The Syncretic Religion ofLin Chao-en (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 73-81; Joanna F. Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought: The
Reorientation ofLii Kun and Other Scholar-Officials (Berkeley: The University of California Press,
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tolerance towards the Buddhist theory of karma can be seen as complementary.




Throughout Liu Tsung-chou's life, as a Neo-Confucian master, he was
enthusiastic in pursuing learning through self-cultivation. Most of his works were
presented as philosophical discussions on the Doctrines of Mind. With his revisions
of his Ming Neo-Confucian forerunners Ch'en Hsien-chang and Wang Yang-ming,
and his criticisms of Wang Yang-ming's followers, Liu established new trends in the
academic community in the period from late Ming to early Ch'ing. This has been
more or less omitted in modern studies of Liu Tsung-chou's philosophy.1 As Yii
Ying-shih observes, many new intellectual trends, such as the switch from the pursuit
of the learning of "honouring the moral nature" to the pursuit of the learning of
"following the path of inquiry and study", the emphasis of "practical statemanship"
and the switch from the pursuit of the "knowledge of moral nature" to the pursuit of
the "knowledge of hearing and seeing" in Ch'ing intellectual history have their
origins in Ming Neo-Confucianism.2 In this regard, despite his major academic
enterprises concentrated on reconstructing Ming Neo-Confucianism, Liu was partly
responsible for the many new intellectual trends in the period from late Ming to early
Ch'ing.
From this study we find that Liu's reconstruction of Neo-Confucianism
anticipates some elements for the new trends in the intellectual transition in the
1
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study of Liu Tsung-chou's influence on the intellectual transition in the period from late Ming to early
Ch'ing.
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period from late Ming to early Ch'ing as follows: In response to Chang
Hsien-chang's doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the teaching of sitting in
meditation, Liu also considered them essential for moral cultivation. However, the
doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation faced
four kinds of doubts since Ch'en Hsien-chang's paradigm was advocated. First, there
was doubt about the compatibility between them and the doctrine of "emphasizing
reverence" of the Ch'eng-Chu paradigm of Neo-Confucianism. Secondly, there was
doubt about their closeness to Ch'an Buddhism. Thirdly, there was doubt about the
"substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism on which they were based.
Lastly, there was doubt about their lapsing into a preference of tranquillity over
activity. Liu spent much effort in dealing with those.
Dealing with the first doubt, Liu saw "reverence" as a common factor of moral
cultivation in every aspect of human life. Although the doctrine of "emphasizing
tranquillity" ultimately takes the lead in Liu's moral philosophy, Liu saw no
contradiction between the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence" and his doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity". Furthermore, Liu tried to use the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" to refine the doctrine of "emphasizing reverence". In this
sense, Liu was devoted to recovering the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and
the teaching of sitting in meditation, to bring them into accordance with the
Ch'eng-Chu paradigm.
As for the second doubt, although there are similarities between Liu's teaching
of sitting in meditation in his confession ritual and that in the Ch'an Buddhist
2 Yii Ying-shih, "Ch'ing-tai hstieh-shu ssu-hsiang shih chung-yao kuan-nien t'ung-shih", pp. 405-86.
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confession rite, significant differences can be also found between them. Recognizing
the criticism of him as close to Ch'an Buddhism, Liu tried to make a distinction
between Confucian sitting in meditation and Ch'an Buddhist sitting in meditation.
And finally he drew a definite line distinguishing his teaching of sitting in meditation
from those of both Buddhism and Taoism.
As for the third doubt, although Liu was an adherent of the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" and the teaching of sitting in meditation, he opposed the
"substance/tranquillity" and "function/activity" dualism. In place of this dualism, Liu
created his own theory regarding the relationship between tranquillity and activity.
Liu believed that there is a metaphysical tranquillity that transcends experiential
tranquillity and activity, and that there is no contradiction between tranquillity and
activity in metaphysical tranquillity.
Concerning the fourth doubt, given the belief in the existence of metaphysical
tranquillity, Liu explained that the "tranquillity" to be emphasized in the doctrine of
"emphasizing tranquillity" is metaphysical tranquillity. In metaphysical tranquillity,
tranquillity can be acquired in activity and activity can be achieved in tranquillity.
Therefore the realization of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" cannot be
limited to the tranquil state. Furthermore, Liu regarded "to acquire activity in
tranquillity" as a necessity for learning the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity". Liu
appeared to combine metaphysical tranquillity with experiential activities.
With the solution of these four doubts Liu endeavoured to prevent the doctrine
of "emphasizing tranquillity" and the practice of sitting in meditation from being
accused of heresy and sought to restore them to Confucian orthodoxy. In this sense
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his ideas display his reconsideration of the doctrine of "emphasizing tranquillity" and
the practice of sitting in meditation and anticipate the criticism of them by the
anti-Neo-Confucian scholars of the early Ch'ing.
Liu Tsung-chou also developed revisions of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. First,
sharing Wang Yang-ming's caution regarding selfish human desires, Liu took a more
active position than Wang on how to overcome them. Thus he also appears more
positive than Wang about objective norms for overcoming selfish human desires.
Compared to Wang, he placed greater emphasis on the observance of the rites as
objective norms for regulating people in different situations rather than the general
principle of morality in moral cultivation. Liu's attitude to selfish human desires
makes him a representative of a variety of moral Puritanism which emerged in the
period from late Ming to early Ch'ing. His emphasis on returning to the observance
of the rites is also noteworthy in that it represents a starting point of another
intellectual transformation, which took place in the same period, in which the study
of the rites gradually increased and less attention was paid to abstract moral principle.
Secondly, with regard to his criticism of Wang Yang-ming for neglecting the
tasks of studying, inquiring, thinking and sifting, Liu adopted a more positive stance
than Wang towards learning from books, or extensive learning in general, in
Neo-Confucianism. Wang regarded knowledge from extensive learning as secondary
to moral cultivation, while Liu considered that the knowledge obtained from
extensive learning provided objective norms for regulating people's behaviour. Liu's
emphasis on extensive learning allowed him to play an important part in the switch
from the pursuit of the learning of "honouring the moral nature" to the pursuit of the
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learning of "following the path of inquiry and study" during the period from late
Ming to early Ch'ing, and was influential on the founding of the Classics Discussion
Societies, which preferred to take learning from books as the basic standard for moral
cultivation. His works on recording the words and deeds of ancient Confucians and
his Neo-Confucian forerunners also played an important part in the historiography of
scholars of the same period on intellectual history.
Thirdly, based on his criticism of Wang Yang-ming's interpretation of the Great
Learning, Liu gave i (the will) a different interpretation from Wang. In contrast to
Wang's view that the will may be good or evil, Liu maintained that the will is
definitely good. In Liu's opinion, it is the goodness of the will that is the guarantee of
the goodness of human nature. Liu was dissatisfied with Wang's confusing the will
with thought (nien), which obscured the goodness of the will as the guarantee of the
goodness of human nature. Liu also criticizes Wang's idea of chih (knowledge),
which, in Liu's opinion, can easily be regarded as advocating a sort of amoral
knowledge. Thus, in contrast to Wang's taking "the extension of innate knowledge"
as the main purpose of his doctrine, Liu took "making the will sincere" as the main
purpose. To Liu, it is only "making the will sincere", rather than "the extension of
innate knowledge", that can get rid of evil in time. By taking "making the will
sincere" as the main purpose of his doctrine, Liu considered everything in the world
to be the expression of the will and transformed the Confucian idealism of
"sageliness inside and kingliness outside" into a concentration on the learning of
"sageliness inside" only. He thus devoted himself to rigorous practice of confession
and self-criticism, which was considered a prerequisite for the correction of faults
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and the attainment of moral perfection. With his systematic work on the practice of
confession and self-criticism, Liu also led a trend towards moral self-scrutiny in the
period from late Ming to early Ch'ing.
In Liu's response to Wang Yang-ming's followers, in his criticism of the
interpretations of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of "the extension of innate
knowledge" among Wang's followers in his time, Liu exposed two kinds of
phenomena of the degeneration of Wang's followers: moral nihilism and mysticism.
Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences of Teaching" were considered as the reason for
the degeneration of his followers. Based on his criticism of Wang's "Four Sentences"
Liu wrote his own "Four Sentences". Here, he criticized the theory of "the absence of
good and evil" of the mind and human nature and, reconfirming the definite goodness
of the will, presented the guarantee of the goodness of the mind and human nature.
With his emphasis on the goodness of the mind and human nature, Liu criticized the
advocators of the theory of "the absence of good and evil" among the debates on
Wang's "Four Sentences" for confusing the distinction between good and evil.
Furthermore, in his criticism of moral decay among Wang Yang-ming's
followers, Liu expresses his opposition to the enlightenment approach for moral
cultivation advocated by two of Wang's main disciples, Wang Chi and Wang Ken.
Liu blamed Wang Chi for his transformation of Wang Yang-ming's "Four Sentences
of Teaching" thus causing moral nihilism and mysticism and Wang Ken for
considering learning and reflection superfluous in self-cultivation thus causing moral
nihilism. He did, however, share Wang Ken's ideas of "learning to get the Way
oneself' and moral idealism. Besides criticizing Wang Chi and Wang Ken for their
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influences in making moral nihilism and mysticism, Liu also criticized his
contemporaries T'ao Shih-ling and scholars of Mount Po-ma for indulging in moral
nihilism and mysticism and being involved in Ch'an Buddhism. Liu Tsung-chou's
criticism of Wang Yang-ming's followers for indulging in moral nihilism and
mysticism anticipated the criticisms by some early Ch'ing scholars who considered
the developments of Wang Yang-ming's School of Mind a cause of the decline of the
Ming dynasty.
Based on his criticism of moral decay in the circle of Wang Yang-ming's
followers, Liu presented his scheme for moral reformation. In it Liu provides Jen-p'u
as a guide to self-cultivation and Cheng-jen hui yiieh as the moral rules for public life.
The scheme for moral reformation reflects Liu's revision of Ch'en Hsien-chang and
Wang Yang-ming's doctrines, and his criticism of Wang Yang-ming's followers. In
this sense, Liu's scheme for moral reformation can be seen as the result of his
reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism. It can also be seen as a plan to put
Neo-Confucian moral philosophy into practice and a sign of the end of the custom of
philosophical discussion in late Ming Neo-Confucianism and the beginning of the
popularization of practical learning in early Ch'ing scholarships. Beside this, in
facing the great influence of Buddhism, specifically the Buddhist theory of karma, as
an obstacle to his scheme, Liu sometimes expressed a tolerant attitude towards it in
order to persuade people to do good and get rid of evil. Liu's tolerance to the
Buddhist theory of karma reflects a trend of popularized Confucianism of the late
Ming period.
It is clear that Liu Tsung-chou's reconstruction of Ming Neo-Confucianism
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made a great contribution to the emergence of many new intellectual trends in the
period from late Ming to early Ch'ing. In this sense, Liu can be seen as an early
representative of the intellectual transition in this period. In his reconstruction of




Chan Jo-shui [Kan-ch'iian 1466-1560]
Ch'an(orZen) ilp
Chang Ch'iao [?-?]
Chang Chu-cheng 5Sj^IE [Chiang-ling XLW., 1525-82]
Chang Hsii [T'ing-shih $Sj|f, 1455-1514]
Chang Mao iprlg [Feng-shan 1437-1522]
Chang Tsai [Heng-ch'U fill, 1020-10771




Ch'en Ch'iieh WM [Ch'ien-ch'u fg#J, 1604-77]
Ch'en Hsien-chang [Po-sha or Pai-sha EA/A 1428-1500]
Ch'en I-ch'ang [?-?]
Ch'en Jung-chieh [Wing-tsit Chan] Pitlilfj!
Ch'en Lung-cheng PjfCfllE [Chi-t'ing 1585-1645]
cheng hsin (the rectification of the mind) IE'Lz
Cheng-hsiieh tsa-chieh (Miscellaneous notes on verifying learning) ISI^Itjl?
Cheng-jen (realizing humanity) ISA
Cheng-jen hui (Association for realizing humanity) |SAll~
Cheng-jen hui yiieh (Constitution for members of the association for realizing
humanity) ISA#!4)
Cheng-jen shiaop'u (Pamphlet for realizing humanity) ISA-Ala
Cheng-jen yao-chih (the essential theme of realizing humanity) ISAIcs
Cheng Tsung-i
ch 'eng (sincerity) !$
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Ch'eng Hao UW, [Ming-tao 1032-85]
Ch'eng I UM [I-ch'uan ffJj I [, 1033-1107]
ch'eng i (making the will sincere) Mm
ch 'eng kuo (completed faults) (jScjIb!
chi (a subtle, incipient, activating force)
ch 'i (pneuma or air) H,
Chia-ching
Chiang-ching hui (Classics Discussion Society) IpfM'll'
chiang-hsiieh (discussion of learning)
Chiang-men tEH
Chiang-yu
chieh chii (cautious and apprehensive) )j£fH
chieh-shen (caution) )]£'|'||
chieh wu (understanding and enlightening) fPEIn"
Ch 'ien-kai ko (The ledgers of correctness)
Ch'ien Mu HfH
Ch'ien Te-hung [Hsu-shan MfLj, 1497-1574]
chih (knowledge)
chili chih (the extension of knowledge)
chih chih (knowing what to abide in) (!fUh
chih-chiieh (consciousness) %U9t
chih hsing ho i (the unity of knowledge and action) £pfj n"—*
chih hsti shou ching (to attain vacuity and maintain tranquillity)
Chih-i [538-597]
chih liang-chih (the extension of innate knowledge) ifcjs^P
Chih nien shuo (On the elimination of thought)
chih yu chih shan (abiding in the highest good)
Chin Kuan-t'ao
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chin hsin (present mind) AA
Ch'in fj|




ching-hua shui-yiieh (the reflection of a follower in a mirror or the moon in water)
Ching-kuan-t'ang chi (A note on the hall "Ching-kuan") ffIM^lE
Ching-shih (statecraft)
ching-shih chih-yung chih hsiieh (practical statemanship)
ching-tso (sitting in meditation) if
Ching-tso fa (the method of sitting in meditation) If
Ching-tso shuo (On sitting in meditation) |f
ching yang (cultivating tranquillity) If#
Chiu chieh (Nine Explanations) flM
Ch'iu Chiin [Chung-shen 1420-1495]
ch'iufang-hsin (to chase the strayed mind)
Chiu ti (Nine Inquiries) AM
Chou Ch'ao-jui [Ssu-yung ?-1625]
Chou Ch'i-yiian MSA [1572-1626]
Chou Shun-ch'ang JcplJfH [1584-1626]
Chou Tsung-chien [1582-1626]
Chou Ju-teng [Hai-men $§f"l 1547-1629]
Chou Tun-i MWlM [Lien-hsi BM, 1017-73]
Chou Ying-chung JUMA [Ling-yii ?-?]
chu ching (emphasizing tranquillity) jiff
ChuHsi [YUan-hui ABS, 1130-1200]
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Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun (Chu Hsi's final conclusion arrived in his last years) A p
Chu Tzu-yang [Chu Hsi]
chii-jen IpA
chii t'o san ch'ih yu shen-ming (God is watching three feet above everyone's head)
Ch'uan-hsi lu (Instructions for practical living)
Ch'iian shan wen (Essay to urging good deeds)
Ch'un-ch'iu
Ch'un-yang t'ai
Chung-hsing chin-chien (A golden mirror for revival) Af|#2;
Chung-yung (the Doctrine ofMean) AUlf
Ch'ung-chen
Fa-hua ching (the Lotus Scripture)
Fa-hua san-mei (the Lotus Samadhi )
Fa-hua san-mei ch 'an-i (A manual for the Lotus Samadhi) HilAifHIl
Fang Hsiieh-chien [Pen-an 7^^, 1540-1615]
Fang I-chih [Mi-chih 1611-71]






HoHsin-yin {Spoil [Liang Fu-shan 1517-79]
hsi hsin (cleaning the mind) $G'Ls
hsi hsin (the habitual mind) H^L-
Hsiang-yiieh (contract for villages)
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Hsiao-hsiieh (Elementary studies) /J\Jp:
Hsieh Kuo-chen HfHSfjl
hsien-chiao (explicit teaching) Hi
hsien kuo (obvious faults)
hsien o (obvious evils)
hsin (the mind) t\j>
hsin chi li (the mind is principle) 'LrSPJH
hsin-hsueh (the School of Mind) /L,4p
hsin-hsueh (the Doctrines of Mind)
hsin-t'i (the mind-in-itself) /Lyfl
hsing (action) fj
hsing chi li (the nature is principle) '[^UPfM
Hsiung T'ing-pi [Fei-pai fftUT, 1569-1625]
Hsu Fu-yuan [Ching-an 1535-1604]
Hsueh Hsiian [Ching-hsiian 1392-1464]
Hstin lo shuo (Essay on searching for the joy)
Hu Chii-jen [Ching-chai WlWt, 1434-1486]
Hu Han [Chin-shan <%[!], 1381-?]
Huai-nan ko-wu (the Huai-nan doctrine of the investigation of things)
Huang-Ming Tao-t'ung lu (The orthodox transmission of the Way in imperial Ming)
Huang Tsung-hsi [Ei-chou ^$jj, 1610-95]
hsii ling (vacuously intelligent) [ft®
hsti-ling (vacuous intelligence) (H®
Hsuan m.
hsiieh (studying) H
Hsueh yen (Words on learning) Iplf
Huang Tsun-su [1584-1626]
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Huang Tso MO. [#A T'ai-ch'iian, 1490-1566]
Huai-nan
i (righteousness) (U
i (the will) m
I ching (the Book of Changes)
i-kuan (a single thread that run through all) —-JC
i-ken (the root of the will) jfpfil
jen (benevolence) {U
Jen-chi t'u (The Diagram of the Human Ultimate) ASH
Jen-p 'u (Schematic of man) AHf
Juan Ta-ch'eng [BAM [Chi-chih 1587-1646 (47)]
KaoP'an-lung iltjSpii [Ching-i MM, 1562-1626]





ko-wu (the investigation of things)
k'o chi (overcoming the self) A3
Ku-an
Ku Hsien-ch'eng MMffc [Ching-yang fMil, 1550-1612]
KuTa-chang HA^ [Po-chin 1576-1625]
Ku Yen-wu [T'ing-lin -fMA 1613-82]
Kuan Chih-tao llrAM [Tung-ming 1537-1608]
kuei chi (returning to tranquillity)
Kuei-chou M'itl
Kuei O |±l| [Tsu-shih AH, 7-1531]




kung-an (A Ch'an Buddhist sort of puzzle)
kung-hsing (personal practice) JHjfr
Kung-kuo ko (The ledgers of merit and demerit)
k'ung-chii (apprehension) iSfH
K'ung Yen lo ch'u (the experience of joyfulness shared by Confucius and Yen Hui)
?lmmm
Lao Ssu-kuang [Lao Sze-kwang]
li (principle) T||
li (rites) jf!
li-hsiieh (the School of Principle)
Li-chi (Book of rites) jlUlS
LiChih [Ch'uo-wu##, 1527-1602]
li ifen shu (Principle is one but its manifestations are many)
li men (doors of criminals) HP1!!
Li San-ts'ai [7-1623]
LiT'ung [Yen-p'ing 1088-1163]
Li Tzu-ch'eng [Hung-chi 1605(7)-1645]
Li Ying-shen [1593-1626]
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
liang-chih (innate knowledge, innate knowledge of good, innate knowing)
Liang-chih shuo (On innate knowledge)
Liao-tung MlfC
Lin Chao-en [San-i chiao-chu H.—. 1517-98]
LiuCh'i flji/f [?-?]
Liu Chien-feng [1225-1605]
Liu Chin gljfl [?-?]
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Liu Ch'in-t'ai glJME [1548-1577]
Liu-ching (the Six Classics)
Liu Ch'ing-feng glj pjlllfi
Liu Chou [Po-sheng {SfH, 1613-?]
Liu Mao-shan §!]^[_Lj [1498-1576]
Liu Tsung-chou MthMI [Chi-shan jjlll], Nien-t'ai 1578-1645]
Liu Shu-hsien
Liu-tsu t'an-ching (The platform scripture)
Liu Yung-ch'eng [Ching-chih 1576-1612]
Lo Ch'in-shun [Cheng-an 1465-1547]
Lo hsiieh ko (Paean to enjoyment of learning)
Lo Hung-hsien [Lien-an 1504-1564]
Lo Ju-fang [Chin-hsi jfrM, 1515-88]
Lo Ts'ung-yen Wl&M [Yu-chang 1072-1135]
Lu Hsiang-shan [Chiu-ytian ;ftjf[, 1139-93]
Lu Ku-ch'iao [?-?]
Lu Yen-shan |if||±[ [?-?]
Lu-Wang
Lii Kun [Shu-chien 1536-1618]
Lun-yii hsueh-an (The study of The Analects)
Lung-ch'ang iifj§
MaShih-ying [Yao-ts'ao 1591-1646]
Miu Ch'ang-ch'i BUM [1562-1626]
mi-chiao (esoteric teaching)
Ming-che pao-shen lun (On clear wisdom and self-preservation)
Ming-ch 'en yen-hsing lu (The records of the words and deeds of famous officials) ^
Ming-ju hsiieh-an (A philosophical anthology of Ming Confucians)
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Ming-shih (The history of the Ming dynasty)
mo-tso ch'eng-hsin t'i-jen t'ien-li (to sit in meditation with a purified mind to
comprehend the principle of Heaven)
mu (an acre) ®(
nieh-p'an (nirvana, liberation)
nien (thought) it
nei-sheng wai-wang (sageliness inside kingliness outside) |^3=§l^.3i
Nieh Pao [Wen-wei 1487-1563]
nicn (thought)
nung ching hun (play mind games)
Ou-yang Te [Ch'ung-i , 1496-1554]
Pa-pen sai-yiian lun (On pulling up the root and stopping up the source)
ara
pan-jih ching-tso pan-jih tu-shu (sitting in meditation for half day and learning from




Po-ma yen 01 MM
San chieh (three realms of the world: world of sensuous desire, form, and formless
world of pure spirit)
San pao (Three Precious Ones: Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, i.e. Buddha, the Law,







shen (the self) ^
Shen I-kuan [Ssu-ming HEg, 1531-1615]
shen tu (being vigilant in solitude) fH$§
Sheng-hsiieh tsung-yao (The essential themes of the learning of sages) 1£||7h§c
Sheng ssu shuo (On life and death)
Shih-ching (Stone classics)
shih-hsueh (practical learning) Kip
Shih Meng-lin [Yu-ch'ih Stfe, ?-?]
shih-mu shih-chih kung-chih kung-shih (ten eyes and ten hands are beholding and
pointing) -f-g+fi '
shih shuo (the teacher's sayings)
Shou-ch'ang Wm
shou men (doors of beasts)
Shou-shan "tfUr





ssu-chii chiao (Four Sentences of Teaching)
Ssu shu chi-chu (Comprehensive commentary on the Four Books) [ZHlJIjlli
Ssu shu huo-wen (Questions and answers on the Four Books)
ssu-wu (Four Negatives) IZH)®
ssu yu (Four Positives)
sui-ch'u t'i-jen t'ien-li (experiencing heavenly principle everywhere)
sui men (door of the demon)
Sung kuo fa (A method for the prosecution of bad deeds)
Syuioha
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Ta-hsiieh (the Great Learning)
Ta-hsiieh ku pen (Ancient version of the Great Learning)
Ta-hsueh ts'an-i (Doubts on the Great Learning)
Ta-hsiieh wen (An inquiry on the Great Learning)
ta kuo (great faults)
ta o (great evils)
Ta shen-tzu (a great self)
Ta-sheng (Mahayana, the great yana, or conveyance, or the great vehicle in
comparison with the Hinayana)
Tai Chen MM [Tung-yuan jKJjK, 1723-77]
t'ai-chi (the Great Ultimate)
T'ai-chi tu shuo (An explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate) ;fc|§|llll&
T'ai-chou ffljt[
T'an Ch'ien MM [Ju-mujg*. 1594-1658]
Tao (the Way) xH
tao pen tzu-jan (The Way is rooted in nature)
tao wen hsiieh (following the path of inquiry and study) jjtfnJJfl
T'ao Shih-ling [Shih-liang ?-?]
T'ao Wang-ling IWMM [Shih-k'uei 5®, 1562-?]
te (acquire) f#
te hsing chih chih (knowledge of moral nature)
t'ien-chi (the secret of Heaven)
T'ien-ch'i
T'ien-ch'iian cheng-tao chi (The Record of Confirmation of the Way at T'ien-chiian)
fien-li (the principle of Heaven) ^fJI
T'ien-t'ai JkM.
Ting Ch'ang-ju THJIf [?-?]
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ts'an hua-tou (analyzing the saying of a kung-an) 05&WI
Ts'aoTuan [Yiieh-ch'uan £]][[, 1376-1434]
tsei men (doors of bandits) MPI
Tso Kuang-tou [I-chih jftlll, 1575-1625]
tso-ch'an ju-ting (to attain intent meditation of Ch'an Buddhism) ^ilKA
tso-p'ai TnM
Tsou Shou-i [Tung-k'uo jfijfE, 1491-1562]
Tsou Yuan-piao [Nan-kao 1551-1624]
Tsu-hsiin (Ancestral instructions) HTMr/II
tsun te hsing (honouring the moral nature)
tsung-cliih (main purpose) tk g
Tsung-yiieh (contract for clan)
ts'ung ching chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni (fostering a starting point from the cultivation
of tranquillity)
ts'ung ching-tso chung yang-ch'u ke tuan-ni lai." (fostering a starting point by sitting
in meditation)
ts 'ung kuo (miscellaneous faults) jiill
ts'ung o (miscellaneous evils) Ulni
Tu-cheng-pien (A essay with self-verification)
tu chih (solitary knowing)
tu shu (learning from books or book-learning) iftUr
Tu-shu shuo (An essay on learning from books) UUtS
Tu Wei-ming
tuan-ni (starting point) SrfifCrE
tun chien (sudden or gradual) ftjhffr
Tung-lin
Tu-shu shuo (On book-learning) gitfUS





tzu-jan er te (to acquire [the Way] naturally)
Tzu-kung [520 B.C.-?]
tzu-te (to get the Way oneself, to acquire insights for oneself) |=I
tzu-te chih hsiieh (learning to get the Way oneself) §
Wan-li
Wan T'ing yen [Ssu mo ?-?]
wang (recklessness) ^
Wang An-shih [Chieh-fu /[-flf, 1021-86]
Wang Chi [Lung-hsi 1498-1583]
Wang Fan-sen
Wang Fu-chih [Ch'uan-shan ®&|JL[, 1619-1692]
Wang Ken 3EM [Hsin-chai 1483-1541]
Wang Yang-ming 3im§Bf| [Shou-jen TpfC, 1472-1529]
Wang Yao-hu 3Ef§$j| [?-?]
Wang Yeh-hsiin [Shih-mei drU, ?-?]
Wang Yen [I-fu Hff, 256-311]
Wang Yu-ch'i iif
wei (subtlety)
Wei Chung-hsien MEM [1568-1627]
wei kuo (the subtle fault)
wei o (subtle evil) HfcH:
Wei Ta-chung ity^ [K'ung-shih 1575-1625]
wen (patterns or literature) >C
wen (inquiring) fn]
wen chien chih chih (knowledge of hearing and seeing)
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Wen T'i-jen ffilli- [Ch'ang-ch'ing JUJIP, 7-1638]
wu (things) $3
WuCh'eng [Ts'ao-lu 1249-1333]
Wu-ching (the Five Classics) SIS
Wu-ching i-shu (A speculation on the Five Classics) SIS0B1&
Wu-hsi A£§|§
wu-wang wu-chu (never let it out of your mind and never forcibly help it grow either)
wu yii (having no desires) 1®^
Wu Yii-pi [K'ang-chai jgf^, 1391-1469]
yang (the active cosmic force) M
YangChien MM [T'zu-hu MM, 1141-1226]
yang-ch 'u (to foster) HtB
Yang Lien MWi [Wen-ju 1571-1625]
Yang-ming hsien-sheng ch'uan-hsin lu (The authentic record of master Yang-ming)
Yao %
Yao-chiang
yao men (doors of monsters)
Yeh Hsiang-kao ^fn]^ [Chin-ch'ing 1562-1627]
Yen Chiin fjf#| [Shan-nung [JLlJll, 1504-96]
Yen Hui H® [Yuan U, ?-?]
YenYUan Hjc [Hsi-chai 1635-1704]
yin (the passive cosmic force)
yin kuo (the concealed fault) Bill
yin kuo {karma, causation and retribution) @Jp;
yin o (concealed evil)
yu-p'ai (the right wing) SfM
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yii ch 'i (residual material force)
YUCh'ien [T'ing-i U&, 1398-1457]
Yii shu (The book of Yii) JHU
yiiyuan yii t'ung i huop'o (being as lively as the hawk and the fish) [oj—-ftff
Yuan Ch'ung-huan [Yiian-su jvM, 1584-1630]
Yiian hsiieh (On the principle of learning)
Yuan Hua-chung [Min-hsieh Sfit, 7-1625]
Yiian Huang [Liao fan T/L, 1533 1606]
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